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Marx on Self-Consciousness,
the City and the Gods
Elliot Bartky
Indiana University
Purdue University at Fort Wayne
In his doctoral thesis on the Difference Between the Democritean and Epi
curean Philosophy ofNature Marx sought to demonstrate that Epicurus' most
significant contribution to the history of philosophy was his transformation of
atomistic physics into a critique of Greek theology and philosophy. Marx
praised Epicurus for freeing philosophy from its servitude to theology, and for
showing that the highest human good, ataraxia (tranquility), depended on free
ing man from fear of the gods.1 Marx further praised Epicurus for his claim that
in order to free man from fear of the gods, self-consciousness must be liberated
from the city. My reading of the dissertation and the notebooks written in
preparation for it leads me to suggest that the motivation for Marx's interest in
explicating
Epicurus'
attempt to free man from the city and the gods may be
found in his belief that Epicurus' critique of Greek philosophy established the
foundation for the critique of the philosophy of transcendence in the modern
state. By exposing the political-religious myths of Greek philosophy Epicurus
provided the basis for an alternative to the political-religious myths developed
by Christianity and Hegel.
The significance of Marx's explication and defense of Epicurus' attempt to
free man from the city and the gods may be somewhat doubtful, however, since
his doctoral thesis cast him into the midst of a war that seemed to have been
long over. Epicureanism, having launched the most devastating attack on the
teachings of Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, found new vitality in the seven
teenth- and eighteenth-century attacks on an orthodox tradition which sought to
combine the teachings of Christianity with those of Plato and Aristotle. Cer
tainly, as one scholar recently observed, Epicurus and Lucretius, his greatest
exponent, were "widely read in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
were a source of inspiration in many ways for the new philosophic-scientific
enterprise"(Nichols, 181-82). Yet by the close of the eighteenth century the
Enlightenment seemed to have assured the place of the materialist and mecha
nistic spirit of Epicureanism and the consequent view that humans are naturally
I would like to thank Professor Walter Nicgorski for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.
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individual beings. Most significantly, the Enlightenment had come to accept
the Epicurean teachings that humans are not by nature political animals and that
religion has no place in the political order. Why then did Marx choose to
rekindle the flames of battle when there was no war to be fought, no victory to
be won?
Marx, knowing that his contemporaries were familiar with Epicureanism,
sought to resurrect the political-theological teachings of Epicurus because the
full significance of his critique of theology and philosophy was lost to them.
Their readings were biased by the commentaries of Cicero and Plutarch, and
more recently, by Gassendi.2 Gassendi was often cited by Enlightenment
thinkers for his seventeenth-century attempt to supplant Aristotelianism with a
new reading of Epicurus. According to Marx, however, Gassendi only had
the effect of furthering the servitude of philosophy to theology. Two problems
issued from this misunderstanding of Epicurus. First,
Epicurus'
critique of
Greek thought, and thereby a complete understanding of that thought, had been
lost. Second, an incomplete understanding of
Epicurus'
critique of Greek
thought meant that Marx's contemporaries were unable to reach a proper under
standing of the place of philosophy and theology in the modem state. The
continued subordination of philosophy to both theology and the city kept the
"highest divinity," human self-consciousness, in chains.
Marx's interest in the relationship of philosophy to the city and the gods has
been neglected in favor of three other issues which address the place of religion
in Marx's thought. The most general issue which has been addressed is the
question of whether Marx's thought is, as Tucker contends, religious-mythical
or, as Bottomore argues, devoid of any religious overtones (Tucker; Marx
1964, xii). Whether Marx relies, albeit in secular form, on any remnant of
traditional political-theological ideas, or rejects them in favor of a radically new
philosophy is a longstanding controversy (Wessel). Another controversy has
developed over the allegation that Marx abandoned an early interest in religion
only in his later work. Sidney Hook argues that the concept of alienation in the
early writings "is originally and primarily religious in
nature,"but in the later
writings Marx constructed an economic approach freed of "poetic fantasy"
(Hook, 5). Lobkowitz argues, to the contrary, that Marx never took religion
seriously and that his "view on religion and atheism did not change as the years
passed"
(Lobkowitz, 306). Still a third area of disagreement concerns the ori
gins of Marx's radical break with Hegelian "theology." For many years it was
assumed that Feuerbach was the determining influence on Marx's early break
with Hegel. More recently it has become fashionable to see Bauer as the pri
mary influence (Lobkowitz; McLellan; Rosen). The relative significance of the
Young Hegelians is assumed to be crucial for the development ofMarx's politi
cal philosophy. Bauer's rejection of theology is different from that of Feuer
bach, and the distinction, the argument goes, is essential to grasp the develop
ment ofMarx's thought properly.
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The question of the alleged religiosity or religious slant in Marx's thought,
whether found in his early work or throughout his writings, must come to terms
with the fact that even his earliest effort clearly rejects any semblance of reli
gious imagery or theology. One may even go a step further and suggest that
Marx's rejection of religion may not even be an issue of any particular impor
tance since it is a commonplace of nineteenth-century thought. Moreover, be
cause religious matters are irrelevant in Marx's later work, except insofar as
he continued to maintain that religion is a reflection of the alienation which
masks the material contradictions of the modern state, there is some justifica
tion for concluding that religion is of little importance in both his early and
later writings.
To trivialize or ignore Marx's early struggle with the relationship between
religion and politics is as problematic as the attempt to find a religious dimen
sions to his writings, however. Marx sought to expose the mythical foundation
of the modern state precisely because he appreciated the importance of religion.
He believed that religion is a false consciousness which expresses the separa
tion and withdrawal of man from man. Yet religion has its own truth. Marx
rejected Kant's critique of religion for merely denying the existence of God
because Marx recognized the significance of the multiplicity of religious belief.
"All gods,"he wrote, "the pagan as well as the Christian ones, have a real
existence"(1976a, 104). On the one hand, Marx did not doubt that "religion is
only the illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolve
about himself (1970, 132). On the other hand, he considered religion, given
that man has yet to revolve around himself, the most crucial development of
human consciousness. The existence of religious belief is proof "of the exist
ence of essential human self-consciousness"(1976a, 104).
The above statement typifies both Bauer's and Feuerbach's inversion of
what had long been accepted as proof of the existence of God: the multiplicity
of religious belief demonstrates not the presence of God in the world, but of
men who create gods in their own image. In admitting Marx's indebtedness to
Bauer and Feuerbach we run the risk of being directed away from Marx's
argument. Whatever truth he found in religion remained a limited truth, how
ever, he went beyond his teachers by recognizing that the critique of religion is
the prerequisite to the critique of politics.3 For Marx, it was not enough to point
to the falsity of religious doctrine. The limits of the religious mind revealed the
limits of a human consciousness not wholly freed from the bonds of the state.
The political-theological question, that is, is it both possible and desirable to
free man from the city and the gods, is so significant to the history of political
philosophy that I consider it to be the most significant religious issue which
Marx raises.
The motivation for Marx's study of Epicurus was not an interest in antiquity
as such, but his desire to expose the mythic origins of the modern philosophy
of transcendence. In returning to Epicurus, Marx sought to expose the root of
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the tradition which culminated in Hegel, the philosopher and theologian of the
modern state. Accordingly, this study begins with Marx's understanding of the
theological-mythical character of Hegel's philosophy.
Following a discussion of Marx's confrontation with the modern philosophy
of transcendence, I shall return to the subject of
Epicurus'
attack. Here I am not
so much interested in Marx's defense of Epicurus as I am in Marx's argument
with the originators of the philosophy of transcendence. In part, this is an
attack on Aristotle, but even more it is an assault on Platonic political philoso
phy. Marx well understood that Plato and Aristotle, each for his own reasons,
failed to free philosophy from the gods and the city. In discussing the note
books and the dissertation itself, I shall address two issues which Marx raised
in his discussion of the limits of Platonic political philosophy. Marx thought
that he had uncovered the limits of Plato's approach to the political-theological
question both in his account of the life and death of Socrates and in his use of
myth. In both matters I shall compare Marx's approach to Plato's account of
Socrates with that of Hegel. Marx's treatment of Socrates borrows much from
Hegel, yet where he turns from Hegel, we are better able to appreciate the
significance of Marx's approach to both the ancient and modern struggle with
religion and politics. In Hegel's view, the Platonic Socrates, in seeking to free
self-consciousness from the city at the same time as confronting the city, was
the first to pose the problem of self-consciousness correctly. However, Hegel
also insisted that Socrates' and Plato's understanding of self-consciousness was
limited by their denial that philosophy could lead to absolute knowledge, or
wisdom, in this world. Whereas Socrates had posed the right question by intro
ducing the quest for self-consciousness, it was left to himself, Hegel thought,
to show that self-consciousness could be fully realized by mortal men in the
state.
Marx thought that Hegel had started from the same point as Socrates when
he supposed that self-consciousness necessarily "tends to extend itself, to ex
pand, to spread through the whole domain of the reality given to man and in
man"
(Kojeve, 82). Yet Marx denied that Hegel had gone beyond Plato in
demonstrating that philosophy had in theory, and in fact, extended self-con
sciousness to the point of absolute wisdom, a wisdom that comprehended the
totality of being. Marx denied, in other words, that Hegel's restatement of the
Platonic problem of self-consciousness led to its successful resolution. Marx
made it clear that Hegel had only repeated, albeit in a more sophisticated man
ner, the same mistake made by Plato. For similar reasons Marx returned to
Aristotle. Hegel had recognized Aristotle as the first to offer a solution to the
Socratic quest by suggesting that self-consciousness could be realized in the
state. Hegel saw this as a step toward the realization of self-consciousness,
albeit a step within the Platonic mold. Marx, however, saw in Aristotle only
the development of the Platonic doctrine which was later to emerge in Hegel.
I shall conclude my discussion with a presentation of Marx's account of the
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relationship between Epicurean physics and the Epicurean attempt to free phi
losophy from its dependence on the gods and the city. I shall consider that part
of Marx's detailed discussion of the distinction between Epicurean and De-
mocritean physics which allows us to reach the more significant matter, Epi
curus'
critique of Greek theology and philosophy. Epicurean philosophy foun
ded the basic distinction between science and theology, Marx argued, in order
to establish the principles for the "natural science of self-consciousness"(Marx
1976a, 73). In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, Marx argued that
the natural science of self-consciousness did more than overcome the limita
tions of Democritean physics. Most significantly, Epicurus rescued philosophy
from the city and the gods to which it had been chained by his predecessors. In
defending Epicurus, Marx assumed that he had successfully answered the polit
ical-theological questions which were raised by Aristotle and Plato. He further
assumed that that answer provided the basis for understanding the political-the
ological issue of the modern age.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRANSCENDENCE
In his study of Epicurus Marx sought to expose the origin of the myth of the
philosophy of transcendence in order to free consciousness from the city and
religion. In the foreword to his doctoral thesis Marx identified his task as one
with that of Prometheus who, in reply to the gods, said: "Better to be the
servant of this rock / Than faithful boy to Father
Zeus." Better, in other words,
to suffer the consequences for shattering the omniscience of the gods in bring
ing forth the truth to mankind, than to be like "those poor March hares who
rejoice over the apparently worsened civil position of
philosophy."For Marx,
breaking the hold of the state and religion over philosophy was necessary in the
fight against "all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human
self-consciousness as the highest divinity."
The inability of modern philosophy to recognize self-consciousness as the
"highest divinity" was nowhere more evident to Marx than in its failure to
recognize the great paradox posed by the place of religion in the modern state.
As the modem state became free from the grip of religion, religion assumed a
place as significant as any it had achieved in the past. The failure of philosophy
to understand the practical significance of religion was associated with another
issue of even greater importance. Philosophy, rather than recognize the true
significance of religion in the modern state, abandoned the critique of the state
and religion and instead remained firmly entrenched in the transcendent tradi
tion which derived from Platonic political philosophy and Christianity. Philoso
phy, rather than having freed man, continued to justify his dependence on the
city and the gods.
Hegel, the greatest philosopher of transcendence, provided a justification for
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the illusions which continued man's dependence on politics and religion. Feuer
bach confirmed Marx's view that "the secret of speculative philosophy is theol
ogy."
Indeed, Hegel was limited by his inability to break fully with the very
tradition which he sought to supplant. Hegel only turned theological demonstra
tions upside down in order to justify them (Marx 1976a, 103).
In characterizing Hegel's method as
"theological," Marx knew that Hegel's
solution to the problem of wisdom could hardly be associated with traditional
religious concepts. Hegel could not accept the earlier systems since they re
quired the existence of a transcendent God, and in so doing denied the ability
of self-consciousness to return fully to itself. What was the reason, then, for
Marx having characterized Hegel's method as theological? Hegel's idea that
self-consciousness could only be realized by a mortal man at a particular mo
ment in history, that is, by the philosopher in the modem state who knows that
he is fully self-conscious, had distinguished his from earlier theological sys
tems. Yet Hegel's belief that self-consciousness was, in fact, realized in the
modem state did no more to solve the problem of self-consciousness than the
Platonic idea that wisdom or self-consciousness could not be realized by man
and the Christian idea that the "synthesis of the Particular and the Universal, is
effected only in and by the beyond, after man's
death"
(Kojeve, 67). Marx
rejected Hegel, then, for he committed the same mistake as past
"theologians"
by having held that the state had solved the problem of self-consciousness in
theory and fact.
Marx called Hegel's idea that the state overcame the particularity of civil
society the "theological notion of the political
state"
(1970, 119).4 As Chris
tians are equal in heaven and unequal on earth, so too individuals are equal "in
the heaven of their political world yet unequal in the earthly existence of civil
society"
(1970, 80). Christianity mystified reality by inverting the relationship
between man and God; man created God, not God man. So, too, Hegel mysti
fied the modem state; the constitution was a creation of people, not as Hegel
argued, the people a creation of the constitution. Just as religion established
God as the creator in order to escape the pain and suffering of existence, so
too, the constitution, in order to overcome the conflict within civil society,
established the modem state. The idea of unity in the modem state belied the
independent existence and alienation of the private sphere. Marx argued that
the content of civil society (property, contract, marriage) lay outside the consti
tution. As "the actual man is the private man,"civil society "is the accom
plished principle of
individualism" (1970, 81-82). The state did not overcome
the individuality of civil society. Political life was, for Hegel, only in the air,
the ethereal region of civil society. Hegel's state was thus the spirit; it transcen
ded the conflict rooted in civil society just as Christ transcends the flesh of this
world.
Marx rejected Hegel for following in the tradition initiated by Plato and
transformed by Christianity into a philosophy of transcendence. In the disserta-
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tion Marx suggested that Hegel's failure to break with the philosophy of tran
scendence derived from his failure to grasp the significance of myth in Platonic
philosophy. Although Hegel understood that Christianity, "the consummate
philosophy of
transcendence," bore a profound resemblance to Platonic philos
ophy, "the heartbeat of the philosophy of
transcendence," he was unable to
establish properly the cause of and relationship between the respective transcend
ent doctrines (Marx 1976b, 498). Certainly Hegel distinguished Platonic philos
ophy from Christianity in the following way: the Platonic method begins with
dialectic turning man inward toward his own consciousness, while Christianity
proceeds with Christ as the beginning of consciousness, for where grace is
bestowed the subject is brought to consciousness of sin. Moreover, Hegel was
aware that the distinction between consciousness of self and consciousness of
sin required distinguishing between Socratic irony and grace, and that neither
the Platonic nor the Christian ideal solved the problem of self-consciousness.
The last great philosopher of modernity, as well as its last great theologian,
Hegel remained firmly entrenched in the speculative tradition which had origi
nated in Greece, however. Having failed to realize the significance of Platonic
myth, he continued down the path of transcendence which Plato had opened
and which Christianity blazed.
In arguing that Marx's struggle with Hegel led him to attack the Platonic
root of Hegelian philosophy, I may draw support from Sidney Hook's claim
that "in repudiating Hegel, Marx is also repudiating Plato and the whole Pla
tonic
tradition" (1971, 35). Hook insisted that Marx, in opposition to the Pla
tonic tradition, returned to Aristotle's naturalism for the basis of his dialectical
materialism. There is, however, a significant problem in Hook's reading of
Marx's relationship to Hegel, Plato and Aristotle. We may assume that Marx
knew that Hegel himself had clearly accepted the superiority of Aristotle,
whom he considered "excels Plato in speculative depth" (Hegel 1983, 2:119).
Indeed, Marx had considered that Aristotle, even as he had turned from his
teacher, was firmly planted in the tradition which Plato had originated. The
significant stmggle for the history of philosophy was not so much that which
obtained between Plato and Aristotle as the one between the tradition founded
by Socrates and developed by Plato and Aristotle and the tradition developed
by Epicurus. Perhaps it is more correct to say that the critical struggle was, as
Hegel had sought to demonstrate, one between philosophy and theology.
Epicurus directed Marx back to Plato's account of Socrates, which war
ranted
Socrates' designation as the founder of both the philosophy of self-con
sciousness and the philosophy of transcendence. In Platonic philosophy Soc
rates is presented as the first to break with the teachings of the city and the gods
by turning man to himself. Because he was the first to show that the tme source
of self-consciousness was neither the city nor the gods, he was the first to
suggest the philosophy of self-consciousness. Yet because he was unable to
break entirely from the city and the gods, he sought refuge in myth and laid the
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foundation for the philosophy of transcendence. Marx, holding that it was Pla
tonic philosophy itself which, in turning man away from the city and the gods,
sowed the seeds for the destruction of the philosophy of transcendence, recog
nized Epicurus as the first to expose the myth of transcendence in Platonic
philosophy.
In the notebooks prepared for his study of Epicurus Marx, following Hegel,
argued that "the first Greek wise men are the real spirit, the embodied knowl
edge of
substance"(1976b, 436). Marx meant by this that these first wise men
were only capable of mimicking the laws and moral life of the city. These pre-
Socratic wise men "are only the vessels, the Pythia, from which the substance
resounds in general, single precepts, their language is as yet only that of the
substance become vocal, the simple forces of moral life which are
revealed."
The first wise men were unable to take a critical stance against the city because
they "extol state life as real
reason."For these first wise men philosophy was
therefore impossible, since their consciousness was merely a reflection of the
existing moral and political climate obtaining in Greece at that time.
Marx attributed the fall of the first sophos, and thus the rise of philosophy,
to the teachings "embodied in Socrates as its demiurge" and in Platonic philos
ophy (1976a, 36). He wrote that the "the reason why Socrates is so important is
that the relation of Greek philosophy to the Greek spirit, and therefore its inner
limit, is expressed in him" (1976b, 438-39). With Socrates the relationship
between the sophos and the city is forever changed. The principle of philoso
phy becomes, in the embodiment of the sophos, the subjective spirit of his own
consciousness. The subjective spirit is now the vessel of substance which
"knows that it has the ideality in itself, is the judgment of the concept."In
Socrates, the subjective spirit of consciousness is bom of the city, but it takes a
subjective striving, a leap, a falling away from the city. The subjective spirit is
a force internal to spirit itself, it is Socrates' daemon. Socrates' wisdom is his
consciousness "that he carries the daemon in himself." His philosophy is the
"abstract determination of the good"which brings man to himself, just as it
separates him from the city. Socrates' philosophy is therefore "essentially his
own wisdom, his own
goodness"
(1976b, 439).
Yet the daemon of Socrates, even as it detached him from the city, directed
him toward the city. Socrates did not withdraw from the city, nor did he wrap
his relationship with the city in mystery; he was not a seer, "but a sociable
man"(1976b, 436). Socrates' purpose was "in practice the determination of the
individual spirits, education and
teaching"
(1976b, 438). His calling was to
teach about the world. Marx, citing Hegel as his authority, wrote that Socrates'
method was a "dialectic trap through which human common sense is precipi
tated out of its motley ossification . . . into the tmth immanent in human
common sense itself (1976b, 494). Socrates' teaching is a practical activity
"by which he leads single individuals out of the determination of substantiality
to determination in themselves." Thus while Socrates leads men away from the
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city, he never abandons it. Instead, he confronted citizens in an effort to pro
vide the city with a new foundation.
Socrates, Marx argued, remained rooted in the life of the state, as he in
sisted that he owed "his right to exist only to the laws of the state to which he
belongs, to its religion," which appeared to him as his own nature. Socrates'
refusal to break with the laws and religion of the city was the cause of his
death. Thus in the Apology Socrates himself is presented as saying that he
cannot cease from the practice of philosophy, even though it may mean his
death, since he was attached to the city by the god (30b-e). Because Socrates
insisted that he owed his existence to the city and the god he was unable, in
both thought and action, to free consciousness from the city and its myths.
In Marx's estimation the death of Socrates provided the evidence of the
limits of Socrates' teaching. The true free spirit, contrary to Socrates, "endures
and overcomes all contradictions and . . . need not recognize any natural condi
tions as
such"(1976b, 438). The tme free spirit is a self-determined individual,
who will act according to his own consciousness, unencumbered by the laws of
the city. Socrates, by his own admission, owed too much to Athens to separate
himself radically from the city and thereby survive.
Socrates' death proved the
deficiency of his daemon and thus the limits of his self-consciousness.
Marx recognized that Socratic dialectic was, in part, an expression of Soc
rates'love which turned him toward the city. Yet at the same time the "practi
cal
motion"
of dialectic led him to collide with the city, and this, in turn, led to
his death. Embodied in Socrates' life are both love and death, creativity and
destruction, which return man to himself at the same time as tying him to the
city. Even though he was the judge of his state he must perish "precisely be
cause he is bom of the substantial"from which he could not escape.
Marx's approach to the death of Socrates may be attributed to the influence
of Bauer's insistence on the necessity of radically separating self-consciousness
from all material concerns. However, if the point was Bauer's radical self-
consciousness, would Marx have ignored another possible interpretation, for
example, a promethean one which would have seen in
Socrates' death a radical
separation from Athenian life? Marx, in other words, could have seen in the
death of Socrates a radical step toward the fulfillment of the idea of self-con
sciousness and a turning away from the laws and religion of the city. This is, in
fact, what Hegel said in regard to the death of Socrates.
Marx, contrary to Hegel, was unwilling to see in
Socrates' death, as op
posed to his life, any resemblance to a promethean act. Marx saw little more in
Socrates' death than his failure to break from the city and fully express his self-
consciousness. Socrates offered a critique of the city, but a critique which was
necessarily limited inasmuch as it was bound to the city. Socrates must die, and
Plato can do no more than create an Ideal, never comprehending the limits of
the city or his philosophy.
Plato, according to Marx, used myth to justify
Socrates'
commitment to a
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life of philosophy because he was unable to give an adequate justification for
Socrates'
account of the philosophical life as a preparation for death (Phaedo
64a). Socrates himself is presented in the Platonic dialogues as having admitted
that his account of the immortality of the soul is no more than a myth necessi
tated by philosophy's inability to demonstrate that "there is no escape from evil
or salvation for it (the soul) except by becoming as good and wise as
possible"
(Phaedo 107d; Republic 614b-21d). Platonic myth, as Marx understood it, was
a literary way out of the dilemma posed by
Socrates'
philosophical life neces
sarily having culminated in his being put to death by the city. Platonic philoso
phy required that Socrates provide a mythic account of the philosophic life
because it was unable to overcome the fact that
Socrates' dependence on the
city and the gods led to his death.
The question one should ask when reading Plato is, according to Marx:
"why is this mythologizing to be found in those dialogues which mainly ex
pound moral and religious
truths" (1976b, 497)? Consider the fact, Marx
wrote, that the Parmenides is free from myth. Plato's use of myth was no more
than an admission of his inability to free self-consciousness from the city
and the gods. On the one hand, this demonstrated that Plato's recourse to myth
was an admission of the limits of his philosophy. On the other hand, Marx
recognized this as further proof that tme knowledge is human, sociable and
attainable.
In turning the life of Socrates into a "comprehensive, world embracing phi
losophy" Plato had been accused of creating a philosophy with the character of
religion. Marx, in opposition to this, considered Plato's literary use of myth.
By insisting that myth is no more than a Platonic device necessitated by the
inability of the dialectic form to account for
Socrates' death, Marx sought to
rescue him from the Christian cast to which he had been reduced. In the note
books written in preparation for the dissertation Marx compared Christianity, or
"personified religion,"with Platonic philosophy, or "personified
philosophy,"
and concluded "that the philosopher Socrates is related to Christ as a philoso
pher to a teacher of
religion"(1976b, 493). The philosopher and teacher of
religion are both concerned with psyche (the soul). The relationship between
Platonic philosophy and Christianity may be found in the "relationship of Pla
tonic ideas to the Christian logos, the relationship of the Platonic recollection to
the Christian restoration of man to his original image" (1976b, 495). In recog
nizing that both Platonic philosophy and Christianity sought to transform the
human psyche through myth, Marx did not intend to equate the doctrines. The
Platonic myth of recollection was an attempt to overcome the inability of
Socratic dialectic to provide a reasoned argument for choosing the philosophi
cal life over any other life. The mythical presentation of the rewards and pun
ishments in the world to come was an educational device to supplement Soc
rates'
inability to demonstrate that the just life was good for its own sake. Marx
believed that a proper understanding of Platonic myth revealed the implicit
atheism of the Platonic philosophy.
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Christianity went further than Platonic philosophy because it took
Socrates'
mythological claims about life after death and transformed them, through an
account of the death and resurrection of Christ, into a philosophy of transcen
dence. Just as Christianity turned the Platonic quest for self-knowledge into an
answer, Platonic myth became the Christian tmth. Christianity, as Marx under
stood it, adopted the myth of life after death because it denied the possibility
that a psyche could be directed to its "original image" in this world. Chris
tianity, having abandoned this world altogether, sought to lead men by con
vincing them of the tmth of the immortality of souls.
In rescuing Plato from the weight of the Christian tradition Marx was not
about to abandon the Platonic origins of Christianity. In distinguishing Plato's
recourse to myth from the Christian doctrine of transcendence Marx was able to
expose the origin of the philosophy of transcendence. According to Marx, how
ever much Platonic and Christian teachings differed, they both sought recourse
to myth because of their inability to overcome the attachment of self-conscious
ness to the city and god(s). The tme significance of discovering the origin of
the philosophy of transcendence was, of course, that it enabled Marx to un
cover the origin of Hegel's "theology."
It seems ironic that Marx found the origin of Hegel's "theology" in Plato's
use of myth. I say this because Hegel was the source of Marx's view that
Socrates was the originator of the principle "that man has to find from himself
both the end of his actions and the end of the world, and must attain to tmth
through himself (Hegel 1983, 1:386). Marx learned from Hegel, in other
words, that Socrates was the first to return man to himself as the originating
point of consciousness. Marx also followed Hegel in holding that
Socrates'
method, even as it drew men into themselves, was "no withdrawal from exist
ence,"
since his philosophical teaching required social intercourse.
Socrates'
wisdom, according to both Hegel and Marx, was human and sociable.
5 Why,
then, did Marx begin to abandon Hegel's approach to the problem of con
sciousness? Perhaps a further consideration of Hegel's treatment of Socrates
will be of some help. Hegel, contrary to Marx, considered it important to dis
cuss that side of Socratic irony which taught the limits of consciousness; that is,
consciousness is surprised when it is led to doubt. Socrates' own wisdom is that
"he knew nothing and therefore taught
nothing"(Hegel 1983, 1:404). In con
versation with Socrates one comes to the conclusion "that what we knew has
refuted
itself." Hegel considered the limits which were implied by the
daemonic urge to self-consciousness as fundamental to the teaching of Socratic
irony.
I cannot attempt to explicate the Socratic teaching. However, it is important
to raise the question of why Marx refused to consider seriously even so basic a
tenet of Socratic irony as
Socrates' insistence that his daemon only instructed
him in what not to do and never told him what action to take (Apology 3 Id).
Because Marx broke with Hegel on this matter, we must assume that he was
aware of that side of the Socratic teaching whose significance he denied. Why,
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then, did he reject that side of the Socratic teaching which insisted on the
necessary limits of human wisdom? Perhaps we may begin to understand the
reason for Marx's position by pairing it with another issue where he broke with
Hegel. Hegel recognized that it was precisely
Socrates'
attachment to the city
which enabled him to begin to free self-consciousness from the city. By refus
ing to escape from the city and save his life, Socrates pointed to the depend
ence of consciousness on the city, but at the same time he pointed to that which
is beyond the life of any particular city. In pointing to the nature of the whole
of which the self and the city were only parts, Socrates suggested the possi
bility for self-consciousness to attain absolute wisdom even though, in the end,
he held that human wisdom was limited by nature.
Hegel, of course, in his critique of the limits of the Socratic teaching, stands
as a modem thinker in opposition to Socrates. For Hegel, Socrates' genius "is
not Socrates himself, not his opinions and conviction, but an oracle which,
however, is not external, but is subjective, his oracle"(1983, 1:422). Hegel
considered this a historical leap toward self-consciousness but limited in that
Socrates'
genius remained, in part, unconscious rather than a pure expression
of self-consciousness. Socrates knew, as Kojeve points out all philosophers
must know, that "that man is Wise who is capable of answering in a compre
hensible or satisfactory manner all questions that can be asked him concerning
his acts, and capable of answering in such fashion that the entirety of his an
swers form a coherent discourse" (Kojeve, 75). Hegel, who thought he had
proved that he had demonstrated this wisdom, rejected Socrates for denying the
possibility that philosophy could result in this wisdom. Hegel was willing to
recognize the limit of human knowledge as Socrates presented it, yet he still
maintained that this was a limit conditioned by history, rather than one inherent
in man's nature. Hegel attributed Plato's inability to see the unity amid the
diversity of the speculative project to his historical situation. Only in the mod
em world can absolute independence return into the unity of the idea.
Hegel's discussion of Plato's limited understanding of freedom is partic
ularly interesting, given Marx's later perspective, when he reviewed Plato's
"suppression of the principle of individuality" in considering the abolition of
private property in the Republic. Hegel argued that we may see in Plato's aboli
tion of private property "the very limit of the Platonic Idea to emerge as an
abstract
idea" (1983, 2:113). By abstract, he also meant that Plato was not
idealistic enough in his onesided presentation of individual freedom. Plato was
only capable of seeing the opposition between individuality and the unity of the
state. Concrete individuality in private property, or the family, as it is a posses
sion and stands in a living relation with the person "in which my person as
such comes into existence, into
reality"is destroyed in Plato's Republic.
There are no private persons, only man as the universal individual in the state.
"But Being to
Philosophy," Hegel objected, "is no abstraction, but the unity of
the universal and reality, or its
content."Instead of destroying the individual
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conscience, as Plato does, philosophy sees that the individual "connects itself
with the whole, chooses a position for itself, and thus makes itself a moral
fact"
(1983, 2:109). Hegel, in opposition to Plato, chose to side with Aristotle, who
he considered had recognized the same mistake in Plato.
Yet Hegel also held that Plato "sometimes ignored" subjective freedom "be
cause it proved itself to be what wrought the min of Greece" (1983, 2:109).
Hegel understood, for example, that Plato's abolition of private property is
evidence that he knew and taught that the unfolding of self-consciousness
threatened to undermine the city. The abstract idea of the city is not, as Marx
would have it, only an admission of an inability to elevate self-consciousness
beyond the confines of the polis. The abstract idea is, as is myth, a means to
elevate men from particular to universal understanding. Hegel warned against
the mistaken belief which sees in the myth itself a simple presentation of what
is most excellent in Platonic philosophy. The tme meaning of Platonic myth is
not revealed in the simple representations in the dialogues.
Hegel did hold, as Marx was to hold later, that Plato's doctrine of the im
mortality of the psyche was, in a sense, no more than popular philosophy
which permitted him to present Socrates in heroic form (1983, 2:1-48; 1:443).
Yet, as we have seen, Hegel observed in Plato and Socrates a deeper teaching
which Marx either denied or ignored. Plato's use of myth is, for Hegel, a
device to teach that "the tmth lies within us and the spiritual content within us
must be brought intoconsciousness"(Hegel 1984, 413). He did not believe that
Plato's myth of the immortality of the psyche should be understood in a theo
logical sense, that is, in terms of the soul's existence before birth and after
death. Hegel's view of Platonic myth is thus neither what Marx took it to be, a
popular answer to a wrong question, nor what Christian theologians took it to
be, a tme answer to the fundamental question. Hegel, instead, argued that
Plato's myth of recollection and immortality is Plato's tmth that "consciousness
in the individual is in reason the divine reality and life; that man perceives and
recognizes it in pure thought, and that this knowledge is itself the heavenly
abode and
movement"(1983, 2:41). Although Socrates was wrong in suppos
ing that self-consciousness could not be obtained by mortal man, he at least
posed the right question by directing man to all that which constituted self-
consciousness.
Plato's account of Socrates' death is, for Hegel, a contribution to the history
of consciousness. The mythic view of immortality provided, as did
Socrates'
death itself, for the return of consciousness to the city at the same time that it
pointed consciusness away from the city. Hegel took the judgment of Socrates
by Athens and
Aristophanes'
account of
Socrates'
teaching to have shown
Plato's contribution. Aristophanes understood that Socratic philosophy posed a
threat to the city, since "the idea of law had been
shaken"(1983, 1:426).
Having summarized the exaggerated and humorous account of Socrates in the
Clouds, Hegel observed that Aristophanes was correct in suggesting that Soc-
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rates'
reflecting consciousness was a threat to the city. In considering the
account of
Socrates'
trial in Plato's Apology and Xenophon's Memorabilia,
Hegel concluded that the charges were tme. Socrates both denied the city's
teaching on the gods and he led the youth astray. The justice of both charges
followed from his placing "the contingency of judgment in himself, since he
had his Daemon in his own consciousness, (and) thereby abolished the external
universal Daemon from which the Greeks obtained their judgments." Hegel
was not persuaded that
Socrates'
apology was intended as a defense. Instead,
Hegel argued that Socrates in his very trial still refused to accept the laws of the
city. By refusing to recommend a punishment for himself, he denied the au
thority of the guilty verdict and thus the authority of the laws. Indeed,
Socrates'
stmggle for self-conscious spirit brought about his death, but by forcing his
death, he furthered the cause of self-consciousness, in Hegel's view.
Now we may assume that Marx knew, both from his own reading of Plato's
dialogues and from Hegel's commentary, that
Socrates' insistence on the neces
sary limits of his wisdom was a considerable element of Socratic irony. Inter
estingly, Marx chose not to comment on this aspect of dialectic and instead
considered only that part of Socratic irony which taught the positive side of
self-consciousness. Marx's failure to discuss anything other than the power or
positive side of self-consciousness leads us to conclude that he was unim
pressed by whatever purpose Socrates might have had in confronting us with
the limits of human knowledge.
Marx, of course, could not accept that there was a nature which ordered the
whole any more than he could accept that human knowledge was subject to
anything other than material and thus temporal limits. He never seriously con
sidered
Socrates' discussion of the limits of human wisdom because he rejected
both the dependence of consciousness on the city and the natural order in which
human wisdom was capable only of sharing in a glimpse of the parts. Marx,
then, saw in Plato's account of Socrates only an implicit acknowledgment of
the limits, not of nature, but of the Socratic teaching.
I shall not consider the adequacy of Marx's account of Socratic dialectic.
For our purpose it is enough to recognize that what Marx takes to be the essen
tial element of dialectic, that it returns man to himself by recognizing "the tmth
immanent in common sense itself," may rightly be considered only one part of
Socratic irony. In crediting Socrates with making a significant contribution to
the development of self-consciousness, Marx only valued
Socrates' daemon for
showing that self-consciousness was an activity emanating from the individual.
Having identified
Socrates'
wisdom as human and sociable, Marx held that that
part of the Socratic teaching which taught the limits of human wisdom merely
reflected
Socrates'
inability to free consciousness from the gods and the city.
Plato's metaphysical doctrines, such as the transmigration of souls and theory
of forms were, in Marx's view, merely attempts to overcome, in speech, Soc
rates'inability to free consciousness from the gods and the city. As such, Plato
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mystified
Socrates'
teaching because he could provide a satisfactory account
neither for Socrates' pursuit of philosophy nor for his death.
Marx's onesided approach to Socrates has been attributed to the influence of
Feuerbach's insistence on the divinity of man, Bauer's power of self-conscious
ness, or the thought of both. It seems certain that during the writing of his
dissertation, Marx was not fully exposed to Feuerbach's position, and it would
thus be difficult to make the case in regard to his thought (see McLellan, 85-
116). We may accept the notion that Marx was, to a certain extent, influenced
by Bauer's thought. But this position, even if correct, does not explain the
significance of Marx's position. The most interesting question about this posi
tion concerns his refusal to consider that part of the Socratic teaching regarding
the limits of wisdom. The answer does, in part, point to the influence not only
of Bauer, or any particular thinker, but also to Marx's stand on the side of the
Enlightenment in opposition to Platonic philosophy. Indeed, Marx's attraction
to Epicurus is in itself to be expected, as many children of the Enlightenment
sought to return to his teachings. Jefferson, for example, called him "our mas
ter
Epicurus,"
to whom we may return to save philosophy (including the teach
ings of Jesus) from the mysteries of Platonism (Jefferson, 14:386, 15:219).
Marx, in common with late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century thinkers,
was in large part attracted to Epicums because he taught that that portion of the
Platonic teaching which addressed the limits of man's wisdom ought to be
disregarded.
There is, however, another reason for Marx's approach to Socrates and for
his denial of Hegel's account of Socrates' contribution to the history of self-
consciousness. In rejecting the significance of
Socrates'
view of the limits of
self-knowledge, he sought to lay bare the origin of Hegel's mistaken assump
tion that he had answered the problem of self-consciousness. Marx agreed with
Hegel's assertion that Plato was wrong in supposing that man's quest for
knowledge must always remain just that, a quest. Marx accepted, in principle,
Hegel's proposition that self-consciousness could be fully realized by mortal
men. Let us put it this way: Marx understood what was at stake in Hegel's
assertion that it was both necessary that self-consciousness be attained in his
tory, and that he, Hegel, had attained self-consciousness in his philosophy of
the modem state. Having asserted that Hegel had failed to show that the ab
stract Idea had become Concrete (that the idea had not been realized with the
state), Marx returned to the root of transcendence in order to expose Hegel's
failure. Having shown the reason for Plato's recourse to myth, and having
identified it as the origin of Hegel's
"theology," Marx sought, in returning to
Epicums, to reopen the case which Hegel thought he had closed.
I have not developed Marx's understanding of
Epicums' break with Platonic
philosophy. I have only stated Marx's contention that Epicums established an
alternative to the philosophy of transcendence which originated in Platonic phi
losophy, and I have sought to show that Marx returned to Plato as the begin-
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ning point of his critique of the philosophy of transcendence. How had Epi
cums, according to Marx, undermined Platonic philosophy? In order to answer
this question we must first recognize that Epicums' critique of Platonic philoso
phy is not confined to Plato. In fact, Marx's observations on
Epicums'
contri
bution to the critique of the philosophy of transcendence which originated with
Plato are most explicit when directed toward Aristotle. Before addressing
Marx's discussion of Epicums' critique of Aristotle, I shall turn briefly to
Hegel. Like Marx, he considered that Aristotle had remained within the spec
ulative tradition which Plato had originated. Hegel, for example, thought that it
was particularly significant that we understand "how far Aristotle carried out
what in the Platonic principle had been begun" (1983, 2:117). But there is
another reason for examining Hegel's approach to Aristotle. What Hegel took
to be Aristotle's contribution to political philosophy was exactly what Marx had
identified as the reason for Epicums' rejection of Aristotle in particular and
Platonic philosophy in general. In considering the difference between Marx's
and Hegel's understanding of Aristotle, we are better prepared to appreciate
Marx's purpose for returning to Epicums. In returning to
Epicums'
critique of
Aristotle, Marx was able to expose the limits of the philosopher closest to
Hegel and thereby to criticize Hegel himself.
First, I shall consider the grounds for Hegel's assertion that Aristotle carried
out what Plato had begun. Hegel had warned against committing the kind of
error which Hook committed in distinguishing Plato's speculative philosophy
from Aristotle's naturalism. Yet Hegel also suggested that it was quite easy to
make the mistaken distinction between Aristotle's "realism" and Plato's "ideal
ism." Aristotle's method encouraged the error, since he "always seems to have
philosophized only respecting the individual and
particular"
and seems to have
had no unifying principle which accounted for the Absolute in its totality
(1983, 2:1 17, 137, 229). The form of Aristotle's philosophy gave it the appear
ance of denying the totality of speculative philosophy. Moreover, since Aristo
tle had rejected both abstract Platonic ideas (including the immortality of
souls), and the principle that wisdom cannot be achieved by man in this world,
it was easy to see his turning from Plato as a radical departure from his Platonic
origins. Nevertheless, the subjects of Aristotle's method "still form a totality of
truly speculative
philosophy,"
since through contemplation the philosopher is
able to absorb all particular subjects of philosophical inquiry (1983, 2:118,
228). Aristotle understood in thought, at least, that absolute wisdom was possi
ble and that its comprehension of totality was opposed to the destruction of the
individual and particular. In contemplation one was able to know that totality
comprised the individuality of substances which, in their self-determination,
ultimately pointed to the universal end, or to the one Absolute, the idea of God.
It is interesting to note here that Hegel concluded the Encyclopedia ofPhiloso
phy with a quotation from Aristotle's Metaphysics in which he set forth his idea
of a God who, having no involvement in the world, is the essence of pure
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contemplation. Now while it would be wrong to equate Hegel's idea of God
with that of Plato or Aristotle, it is revealing that Hegel had thought that Aristo
tle's "theology" had gone a long way toward developing the proper understand
ing of the Absolute. Although Aristotle's method was limited insofar as he was
unable to develop a "unifying principle"which made concrete the particular
conceptions of knowledge, he went further than Plato in recognizing that man
could attain self-consciousness through divine contemplation.
In Hegel's treatment of Aristotle's political philosophy we find a discussion
of the extent and limit of Aristotle's contribution to the development of self-
consciousness. The limits of Aristotle's speculative power could be seen in his
approach to individual freedom. Although Aristotle recognized, as Plato had
not, that individuality was not destroyed in the concept of the state, he was
unable to conceive of the freedom of individuals in its highest sense. In com
menting on Aristotle's Politics, Hegel observed that Aristotle could have no
knowledge of natural right, since "the idea of abstract man outside of any
actual relation to
others"
could not yet be known (1983, 2:208). Aristotle's
characterization of man as a "political animal"prevented him from understand
ing that the whole of which the individuals were parts did not lessen the inde
pendence of each particular individual. Because Aristotle was unable to see the
complete independence of the parts he, too, was unable to see the nature of that
which bound the whole together.
Yet Hegel did admit that, in part, Aristotle's treatment of the citizen was
superior to that of many thinkers of his own era who were unable to see beyond
the isolated individual to the spirit which holds the parts together (1983,
2:209). Aristotle knew that the individual and state shared, at least in poten
tiality, a common end (Ethics, 1094b1-10). In the Ethics Aristotle said that the
end for man is eudaimonia (happiness), and that in its highest form eudaimonia
is divine theoria (contemplation) (Ethics, 1 178b3 1 179a). In the Politics Aris
totle, according to Hegel, recognized that the perfection of the individual is
obtained in the state as a whole, and that the object of the science of politics is
therefore the eudaimonia of the individual brought to its greatest perfection.
Aristotle, even though he was incapable of seeing the abstract independence of
the individual in relation to the state, realized that divine theoria, or the individ
ual's attainment of self-consciousness, was potentially realized in the state. In
so doing Aristotle, to the extent that it was historically possible, prefigured
Hegel's own realization that self-consciousness was realized in the state.6
Marx accepted a good deal of Hegel's account of Aristotle, but unlike
Hegel, who had praised Aristotle as the first to realize that self-consciousness
was made absolute in the state, Marx turned to Epicums to demonstrate that
Aristotle only contributed to the dependence of self-consciousness on the city
and the gods. I shall turn now to Marx's account of Epicums' critique of Greek
philosophy. As Marx understood it, Epicums took the first step in freeing con
sciousness from the chains of Platonic philosophy in his critique of Aristotle.
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EPICURUS AND THE CRITIQUE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY
In the first part of the dissertation Marx sought to establish that a proper
understanding of Epicums was necessary if philosophy was to comprehend its
origins in Greek philosophy. The first part is, in large measure, an attempt to
refute the accepted opinion that Epicums had little to contribute to the history
of philosophy other than that which he took from Democritus. Here Marx's
goal was to show that Epicums was diametrically opposed to Democritus be
cause he, unlike Democritus, went beyond physics to a critique of philosophy
and theology. When Epicums denied any relevance to the gods, abolished the
idea of immortality and saw in the heavens no more than accident and chance,
he exposed the myth of the city and the gods (Epicums 1926a, 58-81).
The most important distinction between Epicums and Democritus was to be
found, Marx observed, in their respective treatments of the "contradiction in
the concept of the atom between essence and existence."The greatest part of
the dissertation is, in fact, an analysis of their respective approaches to the con
tradiction between form and matter in atomistic physics. That Marx's disserta
tion is meant to be more than a defense of the superiority of Epicurean physics
becomes more apparent, however, when we consider the argument of the sec
ond part of the dissertation. The four chapters leading up to the concluding
chapter on "The Meteors" show that Democritus' reduction of the contradiction
between the existence and essence of the atom to a matter of necessity denied
the possibility of science while holding to abstract theological explanations.
Below I shall discuss two of the four topics which Marx considered in order
to clarify the distinction between the Epicurean and Democritean philosophies
of nature. I shall then consider the concluding chapter, where Marx argued that
Epicums' discussion of "The Meteors" is the culmination of his attempt to
overturn Greek theology and philosophy.
In the first chapter of the second part of the dissertation Marx drew a distinc
tion between Epicums and Democritus by considering their accounts of motion.
Marx argued that Democritus was aware that the first principle of motion, that
atoms fall in straight lines, contradicted the second principle of motion, that
atoms are repulsed. If atoms fall in straight lines, they will never collide and
thus will never be repulsed. Yet without the repulsion of atoms they would
never meet, and the world would never have been created. In order to escape
from this contradiction Democritus argued that atoms are forced to collide by
necessity, that is, by a force external to the concept of the atom. Democritus'
recourse to necessity, Marx argued, leaves the contradiction between the princi
ples of motion and the world of appearance intact. Democritus simply ignored
the contradiction by positing an external principle of necessity.
Epicums, contrary to Democritus, posited a third principle of motion which
allowed him to argue that the cause of repulsion is within the atom itself and
not due to external necessity. According to Epicums, the atom deviates from
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the straight line due to an internal principle of declination. This swerving from
the straight line frees the atom from the determination of the line and allows the
concept of the atom to be completed in repulsion. In repulsion the atom "ab
stracts from the opposing being and withdraws itself from it" (1976a, 51).
Because the principle of repulsion is within the atom itself, it is the "soul of the
atom."
Epicums, in contrast to Democritus, transformed necessity into self-
determination.
Epicums'
primary motive for resolving the contradiction between the es
sence and existence of the atom was not simply to establish the self-determina
tion of the atom. Rather, the purpose was to reach the concept of abstract
individuality which "appears in its highest freedom and independence" in
swerving away from pain and confusion, in attaining ataraxia (1976a, 51).
Marx apparently did not believe that it was necessary to criticize
Epicums'
claim that the pursuit of ataraxia was the motivating principle behind both Epi
cums'
physical and ethical philosophy. Marx had no need to offer such a cri
tique, since the very purpose of his dissertation was to show that
Epicums'
dogmatic insistence on the unity of the ends of physical and ethical philosophy
created the possibility for the critique of Greek philosophy and theology. This
seems to explain why Marx may conclude a chapter on
Epicums'
principles of
motion by commenting on what would otherwise seem to be misplaced obser
vations. He asks that we "consider the consequence that follows directly from
the declination of the atom."The realization of the atom in Epicums' highest
beings, the gods, who swerve away from the world and do not bother with it,
also meant that the chief human good, ataraxia, is to be pursued without the
gods.
Epicums' doctrine is also more than an attempt to free man from the
gods. Just as the concept of the atom is realized in repulsion, so too, "repulsion
is the first form ofself-consci usness."Human desire leads to the initial meet
ing and then repulsion of men which, in turn, culminates in their recognition
that they are not merely products of nature, but conscious
beings.7 This con
sciousness "conceives of itself as immediate-being, as abstractly
individual."
Man first comes to consciousness, then, in recognizing his alienation from the
gods and other men. In recognizing abstract individual consciousness, Epicums
was the first to recognize natural right. Marx, having assumed that
Epicums'
doctrine culminated in an attack on both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy,
concluded the chapter with the remark that the declination of the atoms be
comes in the "political domain" the covenant, and in the "social
domain"
friendship (1976a, 53). What seemed to be extraneous comments, or perhaps
afterthoughts, are, for Marx, the necessary outcome of Epicurean physics. I
shall return to the political-theological question raised by Epicurean physics in
my discussion of the last chapter of the dissertation.
In the second chapter Marx considered
Epicums'
and
Democritus'
respective
treatments of the contradiction between the immutable essence of the atom and
the necessarily variable material properties which atoms acquire in existence. If
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in essence the atom is unchangeable, how can it possess qualities size, shape
and weight which are subject to change in the world of appearance? How, in
other words, can that which is unchangeable be subject to change? According
to Marx, Democritus simply ignored the necessary contradiction between the
concept of an unchanging atom and the changing atom of "concrete
nature."
Instead, Democritus considered the properties of the atom "only in relation to
the formation of the world of appearances, and not in relation to the atom
itself (1976a, 55). By limiting his investigation to the world of appearances,
Democritus was forced to conclude that the material qualities of the atom were
attributable only to necessity.
Democritus' inability to explain the contradiction
between the essence and existence of the atom led him to abandon philosophy
for empiricism. He was thus left to conclude that everything which is, is of
necessity. In attributing everything to necessity Democritus was unable to offer
a critique of existence.
The material properties of the atom were, for Epicums, "differences which
the atom in itself possesses"(1976a, 55). Epicums did not doubt that the idea
that atoms possess size, shape and weight contradicted the very concept of the
atom. Moreover, according to Marx, Epicums recognized that the qualities of
the atom were themselves negated in their very existence. Epicums accepted
the contradiction, because to deny it would mean abandoning the abstract indi
viduality in the concept of the atom, and/or the self-determination of the atom
in the world of appearance.
Instead of a simple resolution of the contradiction Epicums gave new mean
ing to the material appearance of the atom by asserting that "the world of
appearance can only emerge from the atom which is complete and alienated
from its concept."Epicums' attention to the world of appearance followed from
his position that "all senses are heralds of the tme." Here, too, Marx argued
that Epicums surpassed Democritus, for although he maintained that knowledge
is derived from the senses, he insisted that the subjectivity of knowledge does
not reduce "sensuous qualities to things of mere opinion."The sensuous world
is "objective appearance."Because Epicums "takes a dogmatic, not a skeptical
position,"he "was the first to grasp appearance as appearance, that is, as alien
ation of the essence, activating itself in reality as such an
alienation"(1976a,
39, 64). Epicums, rather than seek to overcome the alienation either through
recourse to necessity or the gods, preserves self-consciousness by maintaining
its willingness to live with the contradiction.
Although I have chosen not to discuss the third and fourth chapters of this
part of the dissertation, they too are intended to prove that Epicurean philoso
phy is superior to Democritean philosophy because by refusing to attribute all
contradiction to necessity, the precondition for the science of self-conscious
ness is established. Marx clearly established the relationship between atomistic
physics and self-consciousness when he stated that "what appears theoretically
in the account given of matter, appears practically in the definition of the Wise
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man"
(1976b, 432). This may be observed in the second part of the dissertation
in considering the resemblance of Marx's account of atomistic physics to his
discussion of Socrates' role in freeing self-consciousness. The first wise men
were similar to the Democritean account of matter, that is, their appearance
seemed to be a necessary reflection of the substance of Greek life. Epicurean
atoms are like Socrates in that their principle is developed in collision. Just as
the atom comes to reflect upon itself after colliding with other atoms, so too
Socrates'
self-consciousness is the result of colliding with men.
Yet self-consciousness was no more completed by the collision of atoms
than by Socratic dialectic. In the concluding chapter on "The Meteors" Marx
completed his argument that Epicums' dogmatism allowed him to take a critical
stance toward Greek religion and philosophy and that in so doing he established
the natural science of self-consciousness. Here Marx considered Epicums' doc
trine that the theological account of the heavens prevented access to the tme
knowledge of causes by attributing the movement of the heavens to the gods. In
denying the immortality of the heavenly bodies Epicums argued that the
heavens may be explained by a multiplicity of causes. Epicums thus argued
that the proper observation of the heavens and earth demonstrates that there is
"more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations"
(1926a, 59). Single explanations, such as that which religion teaches, contra
dict our sensations and thus disturb our peace of mind. By disturbing our peace
of mind religion makes men fearful and unable to achieve the highest human
goal. The importance of the primary goal of ataraxia becomes especially clear
in light of Epicums' statement that "if we were not troubled by our suspicions
of the phenomena of the sky and about death ... we should have no need of
natural
science"
(1926b, 97).
In rejecting all attempts to attribute immortality to the heavens Epicums
carried atomistics to its final conclusion and, in so doing, founded the natural
science of self-consciousness. Marx considered this of no small moment, since
in establishing the principle of absolute individual self-consciousness Epicums
was forced to deny not only popular belief in the gods but the account offered
by the philosophers. Moreover, he was forced to reject the conclusion which
his own method seemed to suggest. Epicums had admitted that the heavenly
bodies were atoms which had become real. He also admitted that if the essence
of the atom (which is unchangeable) had become concrete in the heavenly
bodies (had assumed the qualities apparent in existence), those bodies were
necessarily immortal. Yet if this was so, if the contradiction between the form
and matter of the atom was resolved in immortal heavenly bodies, then another
problem arose. If the contradiction between the form and matter of the atom is
overcome in the heavenly bodies, then abstract individuality was negated by the
universal atom. The existence of the universal required the destruction of ab
stract individual self-consciousness, and this, in turn, resulted in man's anxiety
and confusion. Because Epicums believed that anxiety and confusion result
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from a belief in the universal, he was forced to deny, against the normal
method of his theory, the immortality of the heavens. Marx argued that Epi
cums'dogmatic insistence on abstract individual self-consciousness was "the
soul of the Epicurean philosophy of
nature"
(1976a, 72). It was the soul of the
Epicurean doctrine because here Epicums maintained the commitment to ab
stract self-consciousness at all costs.
The natural science of which Epicums spoke, a science devoid of theologi
cal obfuscations, constituted tme theoria. This contemplation was not necessary
in and of itself, but only in order to overcome the fears perpetuated by religion
and philosophy. Just as there are no gods guiding the heavens, there is no
divine theoria (a contemplation good in and of itself) which men should seek to
emulate. Theoria served only to further the possibility that ataraxia could be
achieved when men were freed from the city and the gods.
Aristotle is the immediate object of Epicums' critique of Greek theology.
Marx observed that Epicums' opposition to the idea that the heavenly bodies
are gods led him to hold Aristotle in the same contempt as he held traditional
Greek religious teachings (1976a, 67). Certainly Aristotle had distinguished the
mythic teachings on the gods which are useful for law and life from what he
took to be tme knowledge, derived from principles of motion which show only
"that the heavenly bodies are gods and that the divine encompasses all
nature"
(Metaphysics. 12:1074a-b34; On the Heavens. 1:270). Aristotle correctly as
serted that the opinion of the many, that the gods intervene in human affairs,
serves only a political purpose (1976a, 67). Yet he also denied access to the
correct knowledge of causes because, rather than rejecting popular judgment on
the gods, he accepted the opinion of the many to the extent that it comported
with his physics. Aristotle was not willing to separate the philosopher from the
city and the gods. He had tied self-consciousness to the city and its gods when
he suggested that the best eudamonia was one with divine theoria, and that that
divine theoria was perfected in the best city. Moreover, since Aristotle consid
ered dikaiosyne (justice) and philia (friendship) both necessary and good for the
city, dikaiosyne and philia were essential to the life of the philosopher. Aristo
tle's teaching was therefore no better than the religious beliefs of the many,
because in accepting the interdependence of philosophy, theology and politics,
in accepting the dependence of self-consciousness on the city and gods, men
were left confused and fearful. Epicums furthered the cause of self-conscious
ness because he was willing to blame those who believe that man needs heaven
and the city (1976a, 68).
Epicums held that it was both possible and necessary to free man from the
city and the gods. Just as the chief human good, ataraxia, is to be pursued
without the gods who swerve away from the world and do not bother with it,
so, too, the philosopher was most happy when he withdrew from politics. Poli
tics was nothing more than a social contract which could, at best, provide the
conditions for the pursuit of ataraxia. For Epicums "there is no profit in secur-
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ing protection in relation to men, if things above and things beneath the earth
and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion" (1926b,
99). Dikaiosyne exists in order to free man of suspicion and is thus nothing
more than "a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one
another and save them from being harmed" so that they may pursue natural
science, a science whose goal was ataraxia (1926b, 103). And as dikaiosyne
was reduced to a covenant which creates the condition for men to retire from
the world in the pursuit of ataraxia, so too, philia (friendship) was reduced to a
private matter. For Epicums, philia was necessary to the education of the phi
losopher and thus to the complete life. Aristotle, too, had urged the necessity of
philia for the education of the philosopher (Ethics, 1 155a3 1 163b 18) . But for
Aristotle philia was also necessary for the life of the city. Epicums completed
the destruction of Aristotelian political philosophy, because in reducing philia
and education in private matters and politics to a covenant, he taught that self-
consciousness must not depend on the city. Aristotle was no more able than
Plato to free man from the city and the gods. Therefore, he had only developed
the mythological character of Platonic philosophy by chaining self-conscious
ness to the city and the gods.
CONCLUSION
Epicums was the first to expose the political-theological myth of Platonic
philosophy by showing that it was both possible and desirable to free man from
the city and the gods. In considering the political-theological question Marx,
like many Enlightenment thinkers, was drawn to Epicums because Epicums,
the most formidable opponent of Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, provided the
means for attacking their intellectual heirs in later political thought.
Marx recognized that Epicums was closer to Aristotle and Plato than to
himself, however. While he was attracted to
Epicums'
attempt to overcome the
fear which led alienated men to believe in the gods, he recognized that Epi
cums only resolved the alienation in theoria. For Epicums, the tme knowledge
of causes produced ataraxia. For Marx, fear and alienation could not be over
come through theoria alone. Regardless of Marx's fascination with Epicums,
the least one may say is that he takes a modem stance in opposition to the
ancients. Marx, as a modem, considered Epicums only one step, albeit a criti
cal one, in the march of progress. Epicums, by contrast, had no interest in the
future, for he was not fearful of death (Marx 1976b, 444).
In seeking to free consciousness from the city and the gods Marx assumed
that he understood Plato, the originator of the philosophy of transcendence,
better than Plato understood himself. Marx differs from modem social scientists
who assume that they may grasp the essential political-theological questions
without seriously attending to those arguments which they have rejected be-
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cause he, at least, understood the significance of Platonic philosophy. Nev
ertheless, he arrived at the conclusion that man must be freed from the city and
the gods without having attended to the complexities of the arguments pre
sented in the Platonic dialogues. Perhaps this was so because Marx was more
interested in overcoming the perplexity which Platonic philosophy induced than
he was in the problem of philosophy as Plato understood it. If Marx's willing
ness to pass on to what he perceived to be the greater issue, unmasking the
material basis of religious belief and the modem state, leaves the Platonic ques
tions unanswered, it is because his motive may be, after all, similar to that of
Epicums. This seems plausible, since Marx admitted that his admiration for
Epicums was due in no small part to the fact Epicums considered philosophy a
means to ataraxia.
NOTES
1 . Ataraxia, according to Epicurus, is a state of tranquility or peace of mind which the philoso
pher may attain when he is freed from fear and confusion.
2. Brundell argues that Gassendi sought to replace Aristotelianism with Epicureanism, but an
Epicureanism acceptable to Christianity.
3. See Marx's early comments on the difference in the relationship between philosophy and the
state and religion and the state in 'The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische
Zeitung," in
the Collected Works, 1:184-202.
4. See Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy ofRight, where he used religious analogies to
criticize Hegel's idea that the conflicts between the state and civil society are overcome in a
constitutional monarchy ("the monarch as the actual
'God'
man") and through bureaucrats ("Jesuits
and theologians of the state") (1970, 24, 46).
5. Compare this with Rosen's assertion (1977) that Marx's view of Socrates, as does the whole
dissertation, derives from Bauer's approach to self-consciousness.
6. Hegel's view of Aristotle is highly problematic, since it is not at all clear that Aristotle really
meant that eudaimonia for the individual and the state were at all the same. In the Nicomachean
Ethics (177all-1179a32) Aristotle appears to argue that divine theoria brings the greatest eu
daimonia, and that this eudaimonia, by virtue of its divine quality, was best in itself, but not
necessarily as such for man. Elsewhere in the Ethics and the Politics Aristotle collapses the distinc
tion between what is best and what is best for man. One possible explanation for this contradiction
may be Aristotle's recognition of the tension between the philosopher who contemplates for the
sake of theoria and the citizen who serves the city. Because the eudaimonia of the philosopher and
the eudaimonia of the city are the same only in the best city, the divine city, it does not seem likely
that Aristotle is so facile in reaching the point which Hegel attributes to him. In fact, Aristotle may
be even closer to Plato than Hegel knew in admitting of the tension between philosophy and the
city.
7. The background for Marx's presentation of the initial state of self-consciousness as the
battleground of human desire seems to be Hegel's Phenomenology.
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William Dean Howells' "Poor Real Life":
The Royal Road to the American Character
Thomas S. Engeman
Loyola University Chicago
Alexis de Tocqueville forecast the danger of modem individualism when he
warned of the American withdrawing from society until he became, simply,
self-concerned. "They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and
imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands .... Each man is
forever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut
up in the solitude of his own
heart" (p. 508). In the extended Tocquevillean
sociology ofHabits of the Heart, this apparent isolation of American existence
has been elaborately chronicled (Bellah, pp. vii-viii, 306, 353).
How accurate is this view? What life is actually lived in the American pol
ity? The abstract nature of modem political thought which equates the "good
life"
with degrees of freedom, per capita income, popular consent, worker par
ticipation, or social equality, seems less able even than a Tocquevillean-in-
spired social science such as Robert Bellah 's much less a merely quantitative
one to characterize American ethics properly. For example, the numerous
American divorces suggest the end of the family or of its influence, although,
looking at American society, there appears to be little basis of social experi
ence, and particularly social ideal, absent the family.1
Confronting Hector St. John de Crevecoeur's original question, "Who is this
new man, this American?", one recognizes again the longstanding association
between political theory and literature. Literature in most cases realizes classi
cal political ethics in depicting characters produced by different types of politi
cal regimes or principles of the human good. Especially in the modem era, the
contrast is most frequently drawn between the aristocratic gentleman and the
middle-class or "mass
man."
Literature, however, may be said to
"complete"
classical ethical regime the
ory politically by transcending classical typology to root characters in recog
nizable political or social situations. If in the modem era the most important
nexus of human experience (next to the regime) is the nation the reality of
being an American, a Frenchman, or a Russian where speech and deed are
inextricably interwoven to make the fabric of life, then the nation is the signifi-
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cant historical variable shaping human character. Thus as long as the regime
and the nation exist together, its
citizens'
characters remain recognizable over
generations.
This study will concentrate on the writings ofWilliam Dean Howells (1837
1920), an American author who attempted with a uniquely intelligent serious
ness to present realistic American characters within a realistic American frame
work. Howells was the founder and chief supporter (as the editor of The Atlan
tic Monthly and later Harper's Magazine) of the literary movement known as
American realism. He sought "to picture life just as it is, to deal with character
as we witness it in living people, and to record the incidents that grow out of
character."He was concerned with the most general and minute traits of indi
viduals shaped by the American regime. Howells confronts, perceptively, the
problem of both modem political thought and politics. How are the various
modem theoretical principles translated into practice? In particular, in the "first
new
nation,"
as Tocqueville called the United States, how are the principles of
modem rationalism related to personal and social experience?
In Section II I will outline the difficulty of seriously studying Howells'
novels resulting from the accretion of opinions in which we find them en
crusted. Since Howells is now a relatively obscure author, I will also discuss
the relevant parts of his theoretical understanding to help clarify the overall
tenor of his fiction. In Section III I propose to look at Howells as a social
commentator, using categories and topics as clearly present in his major novels
as they are in ordinary social theory. I will concentrate on the fragility of
individual and family existence and the maintenance of social morality, espe
cially the importance of religious practice. In the final part, Section IV, I will
try to summarize
Howells'
contribution through a brief comparison of his work
with that of his "dear, honored prime favorite, Jane
Austen."
II
Studying Howells' American novels one first encounters H.L. Mencken
and many others of the Progressive era who see in Howells a hopelessly
sentimental, moralistic, and cautious writer: the Norman Rockwell of American
Victorianism. "A study of
Howells'
work will show a long row of titles with no
more original ideas than so many copies of
Ladies' Home Journal, and no more
contagious feeling than so many reports of autopsies,"Mencken wrote in Prej
udices (1916), while the "Dean" was still alive. However, the briefest encoun
ter with Howells' work is sufficient to reveal his intricate reflections on the
"solitude of the heart" and the host of other questions surrounding American
character. Howells was himself a rootless man in many respects and personally
knew whereof he wrote. Moreover, George Carrington, a major recent critic,
categorically opposes the common view. Carrington finds Howells' sentimen-
talism totally ironic.
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Life [for Howells] is seen largely as "unrelieved bondage," a hell on earth, as in
1984 and In the Penal Colony. There is no possible end to this hell for man in
general, and no possible end (except for lucky accident) for man in particular.
(P.23)
Characteristically too extreme, Carrington 's interpretation does alert the
reader that there is more to Howells' bonhomie than meets H. L. Mencken's
eye. Carrington is more nearly correct when he writes:
Certainly, Howells had little of Fitzgerald's artistic feeling for the very rich (the
second generation and after), or of Dreiser's for the very shabby, but he
"felt" he
knew the central American group, the middle-class administrators and professional
men; he knew the central modem American situation: the endlessly renewed
attempt to plug along with honor in a chaotic world. No other American author has
ever done this so well as Howells. (P. 228)
It is only necessary to add that
Howells'
world is only apparently chaotic.
I think Howells' sentimentalism is indeed a facade, although not an ironic
one in the way Carrington suggests. Guided by reason, sentimentalism dimin
ishes the harshness of what Tocqueville called the "antipoetic daily life of the
American." Impmdent sentimentalism, contrarily, is obfuscating and ultimately
self-destructive. Indeed, Howells' reason is the core of the
"realists'"
war with
literary romanticism. Reason is the essence of modem society, upon which
both it and literary realism stand or fall. As with his "dear, honored prime
favorite, Jane Austen," Howells sought to contribute to the tme sentimental
education of modem society. "[I] hoped I was making my people know them
selves in the delicate beauty of their everyday lives, and to find a cause for
pride in the loveliness of an apparently homely average."2 What Howells meant
by reason is indefinable, precisely. While clearly sympathetic to the scientific
reason of the Enlightenment, he was quick to see the limits of science in mat
ters related to individual character, social morality, and political life as a
whole.
"No man, unless he puts on the mask of fiction, can show his real face or
the will behind it," Howells wrote. What permits the separation of opinion or
nomos from reality or nature is modem science. While creating an epis
temological standard critically able to judge religious, political, or traditional
opinions, science could not expect fully or finally to refute or replace those
opinions. Therefore the human condition could never be reduced to theoretical
propositions, even those produced by modem science. The dichotomy between
human opinion and partial (scientific) knowledge should be interpreted moder
ately and humanely in
Howells'
view, not radically and cruelly as Friedrich
Nietzsche suggested. Caught between "a partial knowledge of
parts"
and a
number of absolute opinions, a writer should proceed cautiously and circum
spectly. It is this self-conscious pmdence and Platonic insight into the omnipre
sence of opinion which gives Howells a classical sophistication. But Howells had
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learned from the major authors of the English Enlightenment that there is no
principle of benevolence accessible to man other than the moderating effect of
human reason, operating on a nature neither naturally virtuous nor saved, al
though reasonably amenable to reason. From this persuasion comes his realism.
While never losing sight of the realistic American world of the middle-class
professional men, Howells studied the entire range of American social life and
opinion. He sought to use his rationalism and tme "sentimentalism" to support
those institutions and opinions which, in his opinion, appeared natural, like the
family, or at least supportive of a rational and moral society. Even in his radi
cal period, from roughly 1887 to 1905, when he espoused a Christian social
ism, Howells was free from the conceit that socialism in any form, including
his own, was a serious political possibility for the middle class.
During those years the radicalized "Dean of American letters" came to be
lieve that the social and economic problems of the Gilded Age could not be
reformed using the political principles or political institutions of the original
American natural-rights consensus. Howells was certainly not alone in the con
viction that the Social Darwinist reading of modem natural right had so emas
culated economic and political institutions that major, if not revolutionary, re
form was necessary. With one of his literary heroes, Leo Tolstoy, Howells
embraced a nonviolent, agrarian, Christian socialism. If immediately impracti
cable, Christian socialism served as a humane ideal, a moral counterweight to
the materialism of the Gilded Age. But with the success of Theodore Roose
velt's presidency, Howells appears to have regained his lost republican faith:
popular consent based on the founding principles was a sufficient basis of
American political life. (See Crider. No longer a radical, Howells sought to
incorporate both the left and the right realistically in his fiction, while remain
ing a liberal Republican.)
Within his work, Howells does not openly speculate about the source of
American morality. For the purposes of his realism it is sufficient to observe
the effects of that morality on the characters living in American society. How
ever, he was certainly aware of the basic source of American attitudes in the
natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, and the habits of
political and economic liberty and equality that characterized the first seventy
years of the Republic. Howells spoke warmly of the rural
"Jeffersonian"
egali
tarianism of the southern Ohio of his youth, when his father, William Cooper
Howells, worked as Whig Party newspaper editor and later held several consul
ships under Republican presidents (secured through his son's influence). Wil
liam Dean Howells himself wrote Abraham Lincoln's campaign biography in
lSoO^and served as American consul in Venice.
m
Probably the clearest example of Howells' insight into American society is
found in The Kentons. "Judge" or "Colonel" Kenton is an American hero.
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Nevertheless, his happiness is threatened by the instabity of his family's social
environment.
Kenton is a Civil War veteran, having been named by the Ohio recruits as
their regimental commander. After the war, Colonel Kenton pursued a legal
career and was elected a county judge. At the time of the novel, Kenton is
retired, slowly writing his regiment's history, and trying to complete the educa
tion of his three youngest children.
Of these three, the one nearest Kenton's heart is his eldest daughter, Ellen.
She has been an alter ego in his literary and personal pursuits, but she is also
the shyest and most unworldly of his children. Despite Kenton's caring atten
tion, her original suitor is a young parvenu, Bittridge, who wishes to use her
affection for him as a stepping stone for his own social advancement.
Because of Ellen's continuing attachment, Kenton cannot use the family's
considerable influence in their little town of Tuskingum, Ohio, to thwart the
courtship. Moreover, as good Americans, both parents believe that marriage is
a voluntary contract between equals in which free choice is the key to lon
gevity. In order to cool the relationship, and with Ellen's consent, the Kentons
decide to spend the winter in New York (p. 3).
The planned separation is thwarted when Bittridge, now with his mother in
tow, follows them there. Kenton sees that his protection against Bittridge's suk
has been even further eroded in the anonymous New York world where the
family have themselves become estranged. Kenton finds his worst fears real
ized as he surveys "the crowd"in the hotel lobby.
He knew from their dress and bearing they were country people, and it wounded
him in a tender place to realize that they had each left behind him in his town an
authority and a respect which they could not enjoy in New York. Nobody called
them judge, or general, or doctor, or squire; nobody cared who they were, or what
they thought; Kenton did not care himself; but when he missed one of them he
envied him, for then he knew that he had gone back to the soft, warm keeping of
his own neighborhood, and resumed the intelligent regard of a community he had
grown up with. (P. 18)
Like many Americans in a similar position, Kenton is convinced he is "val
ued merely for the profit that was in
him." To the extent his family can be
identified as upper middle class and midwestern, they will be easy marks for
the various sharpers and pranksters they encounter. If commerce favors clever
ness, the
Kentons'
simple decency makes them objects of prey, not of praise.
Finally, Ellen is persuaded by her family, and Bitteridge's extreme mis
behavior, to reject his suit. Exasperated by this rum of events and by Kenton's
unwillingness to accept his apology, Bittridge abruptly humiliates the elderly
judge. Witnessing this outrage, the anonymous and passive
"exiles"
and the
mercenary hotel staff ally on Kenton's behalf. Bittridge and his mother are
dismissed from the hotel, and only Kenton's forbearance prevents Bittridge's
arrest.3
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This "gathering of the neighborhood about Kenton, where he had felt him
self so
unfriended,"
angers George Carrington. In his judgment, Howells is not
tme to his experience of alienation or able to foresee the "modem fragmented
and vulgarized urban
crowd-society"(p. 50).
Tocqueville sometimes experiences a problem similar to Carrington 's in ac
counting for the preservation of virtue in a nation dedicated to the principles of
modem individualism. What prevents the degeneration of American society
into mass egoism is a question haunting his reflections (Tocqueville, pp. 671
74). Tocqueville suggests that a combination of individual utilitarianism and
religious doctrine helps create the opinions which influence individual behav
ior. But it can be argued that he never identifies the most prominent manner in
which opinions about virtue are transmitted in American life. Through general,
rational images of respectability, and a continuing skeptical determination to
leam the truth or reality of these images, the people maintain a general social
morality, leaving for a greater familiarity the appraisal of more refined virtues.
This is the positive, and largely unexplored (even by Tocqueville), dimension
of "the tyranny of the majority."4
The judge's belief that his fellow guests are indifferent to him and the man
agement only mercenary stems from an antique view of moral cognition. Ken
ton believes virtue is recognized within a small community capable of judging
virtuous actions minutely, thus enabling the community to adequately praise or
blame the actor. Although there may be indications of a virtuous character
apparent to an observer in a mass society, mere appearance is always a suspect
basis for judgment independent of a knowledge of the individual involved.
Until one has lived in a community for some time, he is essentially invisible,
Kenton believes. He does not realize that even among the
"exiles" in New York
he is still within the purview of the larger American community.
Rooted in his mral community, Kenton fails to perceive the significance of
images or symbols in a mass society. More perceptive, his creator Howells
recognizes that social consciousness is determined by more than a utilitarian
calculus (described by Tocqueville) or a personal experience of others sought
by Kenton. It results from the rational images of virtue and vice within the
consciousness of the intelligent population. The qualities of Kenton's life mak
ing him a leader in a small Ohio community are easily recognizable, even in
New York. His conscientiousness, his fine family, his comportment and attire,
(not to mention his age, in comparison with Bittridge), identify the judge, mak
ing him a character worthy of admiration and respect because of what he is
what he has accomplished. Based on his own experience of the competitive
nature of American society, the intelligent observer knows what it takes to
attain Kenton's condition. Insofar as these images represent standards of human
perfection, and the populace maintains its commonsense realism (inherited
from an enlightened, scientific rationalism) in judging them, the citizens act
responsibly and morally toward one another.
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The substitution of appearance of respectability for knowledge of character,
necessitated by the mass society, may threaten to produce both conformity and
confidence men, although, as long as the standard is a decent one, it is reason
able to believe these images will contribute to a benevolent result. Thus, while
the judge may not be able to replace the depth of human feeling possible in his
Ohio community, the true basis of a moral society remains even in New York,
among
"exiles,"
as long as the opinions of the majority are based on decent
standards of behavior.
Kenton is tested once more after the family continues its self-imposed exile
on a voyage to Europe. When the Reverand Breckton emerges as a shipboard
suitor, all of Kenton's doubts are revived. Breckton appears of the Bittridge
mould: witty, light, and jesting. Moreover, he is accompanied by a woman and
her daughter, not themselves the souls of modesty. Once again, as he had with
the "crowd" in the hotel lobby, Kenton considers them strangers and thus prob
ably hostile. However, Breckton is friendly to Kenton: he sees who Kenton is.5
By the end of the novel Breckton and Ellen are married and living in New
York.
This short encapsulation of a part of The Kentons illustrates what is perhaps
Howells'
most familiar theme. Even though the Kentons are an unusually
strong family and "certainly richer than the average in the pleasant county-town
of the Middle West," they cannot escape the constant turmoil of American life.
Of course, the turmoil of that life, and its rationality, are of a piece. The
openness produced by free political institutions operating in a large country re
quires and produces competition in all forms: in economic, educational, social,
as well as political institutions. However, the turmoil that openness encour
ages disguises an inner core of rational expectations. For example, a compara
tive stranger may marry into a prominent family or be hired by a distinguished
company, but if the bright and well-educated stranger fails to fulfill the ob
ligations he has sought, his
"chance"
may be more than withdrawn. Therefore
those who attempt to live in the space defined by that openness, such as Bitt
ridge, are eventually controlled by those rational expectations. The society that
results from these various competitive and rational economic, political, and
social situations is fair, in most instances, even if it enforces a certain degree of
conformity. But for those like Kenton who are persevering, if unperceptive, the
overall stability and rationality of American society have, Howells once said, a
smiling
aspect.6
Perhaps two other examples may further elaborate and clarify
Howells'
view
of the individual's relation to society. In The Son ofRoyal Langbrith (1904),
the son of the title after graduating from Harvard returns to the town which has
reaped the generous rewards of his late father's beneficence. Out of filial piety,
and a desire to assert himself in his "ancestral
home," he decides the town
should do more to honor the memory of Royal Langbrith. After meeting unac
countable resistance to his plan to erect a commemorative plaque to his father,
36 Interpretation
he discovers the secret and unpleasant truth. Although Langbrith was the most
successful man in his community, he was the least liked or respected. Lang
brith defrauded and broke his partner, his boyhood friend; he similarly cheated
his own brother. However, the crowning act was his bigamous decision to keep
a second family over the futile objections of his first wife, the protagonist's
mother. Royal Langbrith's son is visited by the sins of the fathers. Through the
harm Langbrith inflicted on his own, and now the next generation, his financial
success appears less magnificent than it apparently once did. The American
experience remains, for Howells even in its most individualistic period, the
Gilded Age social in character.
The farthest point of Howells' experiment with individualism is seen in The
Landlord at Lion's Head (1897). Here the protagonist, Jeff Durgin, makes
himself into a successful "grand" hotel owner and succeeds in marrying a
woman of
"respectability." All this he accomplishes through a determined and
entirely pmdent pursuit of his economic interests, ignoring any consideration of
family, general social obligation, or the opinion of the woman he originally
wished to marry. The price of success on his terms is near-perfect social isola
tion, which Durgin seems to accept with entire equanimity. What will become
of his young daughter raised in such perfect isolation is another matter, unless
in the highly unlikely event, she is able to imitate her father's self-absorption.
If the reality of the American experience is the economically and socially
competitive middle class, founded politically on modem natural right and eco
nomically on the new science of nature, Howells was persuaded the nexus
connecting modem natural right and economics with sociability was more than
merely a rational consciousness. It was also constituted by an almost universal
religious ethic. Perhaps a greater rationalist than Tocqueville, Howells believed
with "the lively Gaul" that the almost universal social presence of religion
prevented American moeurs from becoming massively troubled.7
In his last major work of fiction, The Leatherwood God, Howells experi
mented with one of his several millenarian themes. Here he gives a fictional
portrayal of Joseph Dylks, a man who did, indeed, proclaim himself God and
attempt to call down the New Jerusalem in the little town of Leatherwood,
Ohio, in the 1820s. However, unlike his contemporary Joseph Smith, Dylks
was unwilling to organize a militia to protect the faithful, and this reluctance to
shed blood led to his eventual downfall, in Howells' view (p. 157).
Howells' foil is Matthew Braile, who can see or decipher the falsity of
Dylks'
godhead where others are blind. Braile is an Enlightenment figure, a
lawyer who has been elected justice of the peace despite his sarcastic skepti
cism about the intemperate spiritualism of his neighbors. They ignore his rea
soned appeals to morality, to
"Blackstone,"
and to the "statutes of the state of
Ohio,"
and so Braile is unable to drive the faithful from the new and more
potent threat presented by Dylks. Moreover, having the opportunity to keep
Dylks under arrest, Braile releases him, arguing that although Dylks is a source
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of evil, he has broken no law. Proclaiming oneself God and announcing the
New Jerusalem are not indictable offenses in the State of Ohio.
Justice Braile's defense of modem reason, natural right, and the mle of law
legislated by free citizens is vindicated when Dylks drowns himself attempting
a miracle. This pmdent outcome may be said to indicate
Howells'
awareness
that the regime had a permanent character capable of sustaining itself even
against the powerful spiritual challenges of the Second Great Awakening.
While unsympathetic to the millenarian Christianity represented by Joseph
Dylks or Joseph Smith, Howells described with characteristic realism the
American social conditions encouraging this kind of religious fervor (pp. 3,
156).
Howells' interest in the American religious question was extensive, embrac
ing Roman Catholicism and black Protestantism, among others (A Foregone
Conclusion, 1874; Suburban Sketches, 1870; An Imperative Duty, 1891). For
his own reasons, Howells was deeply attracted to anabaptist utopianism, while
recognizing the inevitable social influence of liberal Protestantism. We will
discuss these latter two religious-social experiences as part of our guide to
Howells'
view of social morality.
For a major part of his life Howells was fascinated by the Shakers' radical
Christian socialism. Although embodying his idealistic principles, the
Shakers'
strict celibacy confirmed the Utopian, unrealistic aspect of their existence. Nev
ertheless, Howells was captivated by their spirituality and their benevolence,
both among themselves and toward their neighbors. Indeed, in his most ex
tended treatment in The Undiscovered Country (1880), Howells portrays the
life of an elderly Shaker community as one of great harmony and as a kind of
salvation for the protagonist and his daughter.
The primary or original theme of The Undiscovered Country is the spiritism
of the late nineteenth century. The essential problem is the protagonist, Dr.
Boynton's, inability to accept the childbirth-related death of his wife, resulting
in a determination to reestablish contact with her. This motivation Boynton
masks, even from himself, with his stated desire to develop a scientific basis
for spiritism. In his pursuit of the "undiscovered
country,"he chooses as his
medium his only child, Egeria. This remarkable
"method" is scientific in the
doctor's eyes because he exercises an absolute and predictable control over her.
However, the greater the
doctor'
s determination to
"recapture" his wife and
create a new science of spiritism grows, the greater the strain placed on Egeria,
bringing about her collapse.
Her breakdown occurring in the neighborhood of a Shaker community, fa
ther and daughter are taken there. Under the
Shakers'
care and instruction, Dr.
Boynton is persuaded their spiritism is a truer alternative to his scientific vari
ety, while Egeria is nursed back to health by the old Shakers and reunited with
an early love.
Influenced by Tolstoy's Christian socialism, The Undiscovered Country is
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profoundly skeptical of the psychological theories of its time (which are par
odied to some extent in Howells's hands. In this context see his great homosex
ual novella The Shadow of a Dream, 1890.). Conversely, The Undiscovered
Country presents an equally sympathetic treatment of the
Shakers' Christianity
in a realistic, American setting.
A perhaps more "Tocquevillean" approach to the "religious question"in
America can be seen in the several novels featuring the Reverend Sewell. He is
the protagonist in The Minister's Charge (1886), and appears in The Rise of
Silas Lapham (1885). A Congregationalist minister, Sewell is the embodiment
of the ethical Christian, one who wishes to use Christian love both charitably
and rationally. If Sewell desires to heal the wounds of society and self, The
Minister's Charge shows the limits of his charity in a real social situation. In
the novel Sewell finds it difficult to undo the evils produced by his well-inten
tioned flattery of a poor and inexperienced young poet. In The Rise of Silas
Lapham, contrarily, Sewell is used to defend realism against the sensational
romanticism of a popular novel, Tears, Idle Tears, and at the conclusion he
helps Silas appreciate his ethical rise, enabling Lapham to accept the near-
impoverishment resulting from it. More than any other religious character,
Minister Sewell embodies Howells' recognition that within the modem demo
cratic experience religion could promote individual happiness and defend the
rights of man as the earthly task of God's revelation.
So pervasive is this association in America between modem natural right
and a universalized, ethical
"Christianity"
that any theoretical movement di
vorced from them, whether spiritism, a socialist materialism, or anarchism, is
sufficiently foreign that a serious adherent courts social ostracism or worse.
Howells suggests that Christianity, if not simply subordinating itself to the ethi
cal demands of modem society, thus becoming simply a civil religion, will
avoid direct confrontation with it. The Reverend Peck in Annie Kilburn (1888)
is a socialist taken seriously, who loses his position and his life. The same fate
awaits the anarchist Lindau in A Hazard ofNew Fortunes (1890).
IV
If many of
Howells'
observations seem Tocquevillean in character, this sim
ilarity appears to result from their similar subject. Although Howells knew
Tocqueville's work, there is no hint that he was guided by it in any respect.8
Indeed, even though Howells might be understood as a "literary companion" or
"fictional guide"to the American regime, Tocqueville thought such an effort
futile. Because "nothing is more petty, insipid, crowded with paltry interests
in one word, antipoeticthan the daily life of an American," Americans are
uninterested in their social life except in the form of caricature or melodrama,
where the reader's innermost and strongest longings and aversions can be viv-
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idly represented (Tocqueville, p. 485). Given the salience of Tocqueville's
view, it is impossible to imagine Howells' literary career in any milieu other
than that of American Victorianism, when the existence of a large, leisured,
feminine readership encouraged the serious examination of social conventions.
All in all,
Howells'
"dear, honored prime favorite, Jane Austen" provides
the best mirror for Howells' art. Although the American professionals lack the
near-total leisure, and some of the refinement, of the country squirearchy peop
ling Jane Austen's novels, the playful but serious inquiry into domestic life is
carried on apace in the works of both authors. If anything,
Howells'
work is
significantly broader, carried as it is to the range of social issues I have tried to
epitomize in this paper. For both authors, however, the family hearth provides
the setting where personality and social reality can be disentangled and exam
ined so that the inquisitive are able "to know themselves better in the delicate,
(or not so delicate), beauty of their everyday lives" (My Mark Twain). Pre
sumably, as long as the democratic American regime survives, this knowledge
will remain green.
If this is the case, those searching for a realistic view of the human experi
ence in the great continental republic should seek beyond the theoretical deduc
tions of critical Marxism or liberal orthodoxy the "one-dimensional
man"
or
the "lonely crowd" and look at the work of the most serious of the American
realists. Although not free from certain peculiarities and anachronisms, How
ells continues to attract our interest for the reason an earlier commentator gave.
"In the years to come he who would know what American life was [is] really
like, and would peer into our social complexities, can do nothing better than to
give his days and nights to the study of William Dean
Howells."9
NOTES
1. This is Tocqueville's understanding, e.g., pp. 507, 587-89. "Democracy loosens social ties,
but it tightens natural ones. At the same time as it separates citizens, it brings kindred closer
together" (p. 589). William Dean Howells wrote about divorce and the "ideal" of the family in A
Modern Instance (1882).
2. William Dean Howells, My Mark Twain, p. 15. "Jane Austen was the first and last of the
English novelists to treat material with entire truthfulness" (WDH to Brander Matthews, p. 168,
n.22). "We are still only beginning to realize how fine she was; to perceive after a hundred years
that in the form of the imagined fact, in the expression of personality, in the conduct of the
narrative, and the subordination of incident to character, she is still unapproached in the English
branch of Anglo-Saxon fiction." Her fiction is characterized by "its lovely humor, its delicate
satire, its good sense, its kindness, its truth to
nature''(Heroines of Fiction, I, 32). Cited in
Bennett, whose introduction to
Howells'
work is the best currently available.
3. Kenton's forbearance is not shared by everyone in his family. When Bittridge returns to
Tuskingum, he is met at the station by the
Kentons'
eldest son, Richard. "Bittridge, with his
overcoat hanging on his arm, advanced towards him with the rest, and continued to advance, in a
sort of fascination, after his neighbors, with the instinct that something was about to happen, parted
on either side of Richard, and left the two men confronted. Richard did not speak, but deliberately
reached out his left hand, which he caught securely into Bittridge's collar; then he began to beat
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him with the cowhide wherever he could strike his writhing and twisting shape. Neither uttered a
word, and except for the whir of the cowhide in the air, and the rasping sound of its arrest upon the
body of Bittridge, the thing was done in perfect silence. The witnesses stood back in a daze, from
which they recovered when Richard released Bittridge with a twist of the hand that tore his collar
loose and left his cravat dangling, and tossed the frayed cowhide away, and turned and walked
homeward. Then one of them picked Bittridge's hat and set it aslant on his head, and others helped
pull his collar together and tie his cravat.
"For the few moments that Richard Kenton remained in sight they scarcely found words coher
ent enough for question, and when they did, Bittridge had nothing but confused answers to give to
the effect that he did not know what it meant, but would find out. He got into a hack and had
himself driven to his hotel, but he never made the inquiry which he had
threatened" (pp. 69-70).
4. General opinion in Tocqueville is always presented negatively because it is necessarily
"mass"
opinion and hence inferior to aristocratic sensibility and learning. For this reason, he does
not explore sufficiently the commonsense rationalism which is neither a purely self-interested cal
culus of utilitarian advantage nor rooted in religious opinion. In On Liberty, Tocqueville's friend
John Stuart Mill captured his suspicion of middle-class or mass opinion and sought to protect the
radical individualism of the (aristocratic) genius through an absolute liberty.
5. Breckton's recognition and the question of images or symbols are brought together in a
clarifying remark of the author's: "In the mean time he had seen that these Kentons were sweet,
good people, as he phrased their quality to himself. . He did not know, as a man of an earlier
date would have known, all that the little button in the judge's lapel meant; but he knew that it
meant service in the civil war, a struggle which he vaguely and impersonally revered, though its
details were of much the same dimness for him as those of the Revolution and War of 1812" (pp.
85-86). Since Breckton does not meet the expectation, or image, of a "good person,"and the judge
is not a very perceptive man, it takes longer for him to gain confidence in Breckton. He does so, as
one might expect, through Breckton's acceptance by those members of his family in whom he does
have confidence.
6. In a review of Dostoevsky, Howells commented: "It is one of the reflections suggested by
Dostoevsky's book that whoever struck a note so profoundly tragic in American fiction would do a
false and mistaken thing. . . . Whatever their deserts, very few American novelists have been led
out to be shot, or finally expelled to the rigors of a winter in Duluth. . . . We invite our novelists,
therefore, to concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life, which are the more Ameri
can, and to seek the universal in the individual rather than the social interests. It is worthwhile even
at the risk of being called commonplace, to be true to our well-to-do actualities."This was meant to
be a plea for realism, but as Gore Vidal points out, "He [Howells] rather absently dynamited his
own reputation for the next century"(p. 45).
7. The following examples show Howells' belief that rational, middle-class opinion can survive
effectively without constant reference to religious opinions. Middle-class opinion is nourished by a
political and social education resulting from the American founding and experience. At the personal
and political extremes, however, at those periods and for those individuals for whom an American
"consensus" does not exist or is not adequate, religious opinion is a necessary (if dangerous)
handmaiden to "Americanism." Nevertheless, because modern reason is both instrumental and
progressive, it constantly requires a theoretical grounding it finds difficult to articulate or recover.
Dr. Boynton's turn to spiritism, to be discussed below, demonstrates a typical instance of scientific
"progress,"
as do the various professional, psychological theories ofHowells' time. The theoretical
tenets of Christianity provide a bulwark against this kind of scientific theorizing.
8. "A lively Gaul, who travelled among us some thirty years ago, found that, in the absence of
political control, we gratified the human instinct of obedience by submitting to small tyrannies
unknown abroad, and were subject to the steamboat-captain, the hotel-clerk, the stage-driver, and
the waiter, who all bullied us fearlessly; but though some vestiges of this bondage remain, it is
probably passing away. The abusive Frenchman's assertation would not at least hold good concern
ing the horse-car conductors, who, in spite of a lingering preference for touching or punching
passengers for their fare instead of asking for it, are commonly mild-mannered and good-tempered,
and disposed to molest us as little as possible. I have even received from one of them a mark of
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such kindly familiarity as the offer of a check which he held between his lips, and thrust out his
face to give me, both his hands being otherwise occupied; and their lives are in nowise such
luxurious careers as we should expect in public despots" (Suburban Sketches, p. 109).
Howells is thinking of Democracy, Volume I, Part II, 5. "Nowhere has the law left greater
scope to arbitary power than in democratic republics, because there they feel they have nothing to
fear from it. It can even be said that magistrates become freer as voting rights are wider spread and
the duration of office shortened" (p. 206). Tocqueville is speaking here of public officeholders, but
I don't think Howells distorts his meaning by extending it to quasi-public officials like the horsecar
conductors.
9. Schwartz, p. 232. In an earlier passage Schwartz says, "For years the world has been
looking for a truly American novelist and the great American Novel. It has found neither, princi
pally because the search has been carried on by aid of preconceptions which overlook the funda
mental quality of our American life. Whatever European critics may say, we native born
Americans ought to know that in Mr. William Dean Howells we have had a great American
novelist with us for more than eighty years, and that in the long list of books he has written we
have, not one, but many great American
novels"(p.266).
"If we imagine Howells and Henry James, as they paced the Cambridge streets, to be compet
ing in setting forth 'the true principles of literary art,'we must admit that James won the race. His
titles thrive in paperback; in the orotund oddity of his sentences and the passion of his increasingly
abstract pattern-making, he looms as the first great American modernist Yet, as we look
about, could we not say that James has many academic idolaters but few imitators . whereas
Howells' faith in 'poor Real Life' . is everywhere put to the test, and
'effectism' banished to the
drugstore racks and the best-seller lists . Today's fiction, the modernist vein of formal experi
mentation exhausted, has turned, with an informal a minimalist bluntness, to the areas of do
mestic morality and sexual politics which interested Howells. It is, after all, the triumph of
American life that so much of it should be middling. Howells' agenda remains our agenda: for the
American writer to live in America and to mirror it in writing, with 'everything brought
out.'In
1903, I know not why, Charles Eliot Norton showed Howells some letters that Henry James had
written him, likening Howells, with his fine style, to 'a poor man holding a diamond and wonder
ing how to use it.'
Howells'
response was patient, brave, and defiant: he wrote Norton, 'I am not
sorry for having wrought in common, crude material so much; that is the right American stuff. .
I was always, as I still am, trying to fashion a piece of literature out of the life next at
hand.' It is
hard to see, more than eight decades later, what else can be
done" (Updike [1987], p. 88). One
wishes that Updike shared Howells' concern with the moral character of modern society as well as
his "agenda." Howells never sought to have "everything brought
out"in quite the same way as
John Updike has achieved in the four novels featuring
"Rabbit" Angstrom. Caricaturing American
life in bringing, or hanging, everything out, Updike does not aid, in fact destroys, the realistic
sentiment Howells saw in the American life next at hand. Cf. Updike (1990).
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The Relation Between Philosophy and Religion:
Reflections on Leo Strauss's Suggestion Concerning the Source
and Sources of Modern Philosophy
Laurence Berns
St. John's College, Annapolis
The problem from which these reflections begin can be formulated in a
fairly straightforward way: Although philosophy came into the world by sep
arating itself off from religion, in modern times it seems to be incorporating
within itself what more properly belongs to religion. The modern philosophy I
have in mind is that which takes its relation to the tradition ofWestern Philoso
phy as part of its own self-definition. I am thinking primarily of Nietzsche and
Heidegger.1 The incorporation of religious ideas into the thought of Nietzsche
and Heidegger, I will argue, fulfills one of the deepest tendencies of modern
philosophy as a whole. The aim of this paper is to understand how and, more
importantly, why this change has come about it. It will require a general sketch
of the history of the relation between philosophy ("Western Philosophy") and
religion. The sketch will culminate with Hegel, whose attempted integration of
religion within philosophy is, it seems to me, most clear, most explicit and
most thoroughgoing.
The contrast here is not between philosophy and theology: natural theology,
discourse about god or gods based on natural reason and naturally acquired
evidence, is a part of philosophy. It is traditionally and correctly, I believe,
distinguished from the supernaturally revealed theology of religion. The two,
however, are not always kept apart, as the famous saying of Heraclitus illus
trates: "That which alone is wise is one, it does not wish and it does wish to be
called by the name of Zeus" (Diels10, 32).
An illustration might be useful. The Declaration of Independence of the
United States asserts that the laws of nature and of Nature's God entitle all men
to certain natural rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happi
ness. What is the basis in nature of these natural rights? The traditional and
correct answer, I believe, is the natural superiority of the rational animal, man,
to nonrational animals, beasts. But that may be only half the story. We notice
that God is referred to in the Declaration at least four times in the following
order, once as legislator of the laws of nature, once as Creator,2 again as Su-
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preme Judge of the World and finally as the executor of Divine Providence. In
the divine Governor of the world, legislative, executive and judicial powers are
united. The Founders of the United States, like intelligent men of all times,
disagreed about many things, but if there is anything about which they all
seemed to agree, it is the necessity to separate the powers of government.
Humanly speaking, the uniting of legislative, executive and judicial powers in
the same hands, they declared, is the very definition of tyranny. Only a divine
being with supreme wisdom and goodness, with no truth-obscuring and exces
sively self-regarding passions could rightly possess such powers. The natural
theology of the Declaration is then an extrapolation from the idea of good
government to the idea of perfect government, and the perfect governor. No
human being can measure up to such a standard. No human being is suffi
ciently godlike to be entrusted with such despotic power over other human
beings. The natural rights of the Declaration then stem from human superiority
with relation to the beasts and human defect with relation to God. All men are
equal in that they are neither beasts nor gods. Does such a God exist? That
might require faith to believe. But the natural theology of the Declaration, the
idea of such a God, clarifies what it is meant to clarify whether one conceives
of such a God as existing or not. By its reference to the Creator and His
Providence, however, the Declaration brings both traditions together, it com
bines its natural theology with the revealed theology of the Biblical
tradition.3
I. THE SEPARATION OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY FROM RELIGIONTHE
INCORPORATION OF RELIGION INTO MODERN PHILOSOPHY
Both the lovers of myth and the philosophers, Aristotle says, wonder about
the first things, the things whose characters and actions govern all the rest. The
first philosophers distinguished themselves from the lovers of myth by no
longer speaking of the first things as gods, but as nature. Science and philoso
phy come into the world, Aristotle suggests, with the discovery of nature.
There were and still are people who have no distinct idea of nature. The words
nature and natural do not occur in the Hebrew Bible or in the Gospels.4 The
prephilosophic equivalents of the word nature seem to be the words "way" or
"custom." Before the discovery of nature men spoke about the gods ordering
and commanding things to go in their customary ways. The way or custom of
fire is to go up and burn, for the earth to bring forth plants, for human beings to
speak, for one tribe to bury its dead, for another to bum its dead. At some point
a curious and thoughtful person must have noticed that some ways are always
the same no matter what anyone does about them, while others vary from time
to time, and still others would vary from time to time more ifmen did not make
them happen the same way. Such a person begins to become aware of the
distinctions between the necessary and the accidental or contingent, the neces-
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sary and the customary and the necessary and the artificial. The ways that vary
from place to place, from city to city, from tribe to tribe, must have been most
striking at first because they most contradict "our
way."Herodotus tells how
horror-struck Greeks and Indians were on learning of each other's diverse
burial customs (III. 38). These divergencies extend to differences about the
nature of the gods themselves.
The suspicion begins to arise that the ways that are everywhere the same are
primary, permanent and fundamental, and those that differ from town to town
and from tribe to tribe are secondary, transient and derivative. The manmade
things owe their existence to forethought; the ways which are everywhere the
same seem to occur by themselves automatically inside the things characterized
by them. Way or custom splits up into nature, on the one hand, and convention
or law, on the other.5 That human beings can speak is natural, that this tribe
speaks its particular language, that tribe its particular language, is conventional.
Impersonal nature replaces divine ordination. The good life is no longer deter
mined by divine law but by the quest for what is right by nature. In Plato's
Republic the torch race in honor of the goddess, which all the interlocutors
were supposed to watch, is forgotten in favor of the discussion in quest of the
life that is good according to nature. Philosophy and science come into the
world by separating themselves from religion.
To see the other pole of our initial problem, the incorporation of religion
into philosophy, we turn to Heidegger. For Heidegger, philosophy, or what he
would rather call Thinking, cannot be academic or isolated from the spirit of
society, from the spirit of one's own times, from history. The deepest sense of
what things are, he argues, depends on History, and History, in German Ge
schichte, he connects with the word Geschick, that which has been sent. The
sender, this mysterious ground of existence, or ground of the relation between
being and human thought, of human fate (Schicksal), he sometimes calls gods,
sometimes god.
The great danger of our time, Heidegger argues, is that we are so over
whelmed by the power of scientific, mathematical, technological thinking that
we have begun to think of human beings as just one more product of scientific
laws to be serviced, used and conveniently disposed of. In contrast to the focus
on the depersonalized, the dehumanized, the cybernetic, he argues that the
deepest truths about the world reveal themselves to thought and to thinkers that
are caring, committed, concerned with what they regard as
"mine"
and ours,
with home and homeland. Authenticity, the standard that he erects as a replace
ment for ethical virtue, emphasizes the personal and particular. The German
word Eigentlichkeit has no direct English equivalent, its literal meaning is
"one's ownness."In his "existential
analytic,"
which allegedly exposes the
deeper grounds of any ethics, conscience, anxiety, guilt and
"fallenness" be
come central.
That your and my being here, our particularity, our individuality, even the
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fall of a sparrow, should have ultimate significance would make sense, if we
and our world are the creations of a loving, caring omnipotent God. Heidegger
has incorporated Christian religious ideas and sentiments into his thinking with
out articulating the theological premises they presuppose.
In fairness to Heidegger, however, it should be said that he emphatically
rejects the account of the origin of philosophy out of religion and myth as a
Platonic-Aristotelian prejudice. "The fall of thinking into the sciences, on the
one hand, and faith, on the other, is the evil, fateful sending of Being."6 Reli
gious mythos and philosophic logos "became separated and opposed only there
where neither mythos nor logos could maintain their original essential presence.
This happened already with
Plato." He denies that logos could destroy mythos.
"Nothing religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is destroyed only by the god's
withdrawing
himself."7
II. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL
AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY
For our purposes, a sketch of the history of the relation between philosophy
and religion, the usual distinctions ancient, medieval and modern seem ade
quate. They are distinguished here not according to the times of their origin and
predominance, but in terms of what each takes to be the ultimate source of
meaningfulness in the world: ancient philosophy as nature-centered (physio-
centric); medieval philosophy as God-centered (theocentric) and modern philos
ophy as man (human)-centered (anthropocentric). Although the later positions
presuppose the existence of the earlier, they are not considered here as time
bound. They are presented as much as possible in their own terms as permanent
alternatives.
The way representatives of each position account for the appearance of
purposiveness or end-directed activity in nature can serve to illustrate the
differences.
The primary prescientific or prephilosophic meaning of the Greek word for
nature, physis, is growth, which includes that into which a thing grows, the end
or term of growth, the state in which the thing is most capable of doing the
work, or, as we say, the function, characteristic of that thing. End-directed
activity is most characteristic of living things. The acorn becomes intelligible as
a possible oak. The structure of the eye becomes intelligible with a view to its
function of seeing. Aristotle speaks of such an end as a cause, the cause "for
the sake of which,"in its latinate form, final cause. (We concentrate here on
the most influential part of ancient philosophy, Platonic-Aristotelian Philoso
phy.) Aristotle defines nature as a principle or cause of motion and rest in that
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to which it belongs primarily and not by accident. The end of natural growth is
a potentiality inherent in the living thing from the beginning, in its constitution,
so to speak, in its very matter. He frequently compares natural end-directed
activity to the end-directed activity of human making. The crucial differences
are that in artifacts the final form of the work of art exists primarily in the mind
of the artisan; both the end and the formative action have their source in
the artisan, external to the thing produced (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140al-23;
Metaphysics, 1032a12 ff). The unapprehended ends of natural activities like
respiration, metabolism, animal instinct, etc., do not require an external mind
intending them as purposes. They are simply inherent in natural things as
potentialities.
For Thomas Aquinas as representative of the theocentric view there is no
end or final cause that is not intended as such by some intelligence, as the artist
intends the completed work of art. If the being in which the end is being
actualized does not have the intelligence to apprehend it, it is apprehended by
the intelligence of another, namely the intelligence of God. We quote from his
discussion of natural instinct:
the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of
insensible things result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of
the intellectual nature . . . called the will. But there is a difference, in that the will
is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the
movement of the natural appetite results from the apprehension of the separate
Intellect, Who is the Author of Nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb
animals who act from a certain natural instinct . . in the actions of irrational
animals and of other natural things we observe a procedure which is similar to . . .
the actions of art.8
According to Immanuel Kant as representative of the modern anthropo
centric view, the necessary and universal laws which constitute objective
knowledge of nature are not found in the things themselves, but are prescribed
to nature by the human understanding. When we come across phenomena like
the phenomena of living organized beings for which the laws of mechanical
cause and effect do not seem adequate, the reflective judgment of the investiga
tor should supply the phenomena with purposive laws that make sense of them
as if some intelligent cause, a God, had produced them. Like Thomas, Kant
argues that ends in nature only make sense when they are thought of as in
tended by some intelligence, namely God. Teleology, he argues, finds its con
summation in theology. But this God cannot be assumed to have objective
reality. We produce and supply the idea of such a being to ourselves in order to
satisfy the subjective needs of our cognitive faculties (Kritik der Urteilskraft,
Einleitung and sections 75 and 76).
The ultimate source of the appearance of end-directed activity in irrational
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nature for the ancients is the inherent nature of things in themselves, for the
medievals the mind of God, for the moderns the human understanding itself.
HI. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
The Platonic-Aristotelian, or Socratic, way of seeking the primary, perma
nent and fundamental things that are nature (among other things, by thinking
through the implications of human speech) culminates in a doctrine that the
truly fundamental is the intelligible. For Plato it seems to be the eternal ideas,
or forms, or species; for Aristotle the thinking, or active intellection that is the
life or energy constitutive of those forms or ideas, or as he sometimes calls
them, the universals. If there is to be genuine knowledge, or even true opinion,
of things in themselves, these intelligibles must be able to exist at one and the
same time both in the things they characterize and in the mind knowing them,
in the things as enmattered, in the mind as thought (Plato, Meno, 72c6-dl).
Corresponding to the intelligibility in things, then, is the power in all rational
beings to apprehend it, the power called nous, intellectual intuition.
There is another way to put this: for the classical philosophers the intellig
ible is the divine, and the concern for the truly divine is philosophy. The self-
sufficiency of the intelligible is the standard for both theoretical and practical
life; in this respect there is a harmony between theory and practice. But the
intelligible is manifested in universal or general principles, or as we often say,
in general laws, and every practical action is a particular action, an action of
one's own. It is true that every human action is more or less permeated by the
intelligible, by understanding, but it is always a particular action mixed with
the accidental and the contingent, the inherently unintelligible (Aristotle, Meta
physics, 1072al4, 1036a9). According to this philosophy then, it is impossible
for any particular or contingent event to be absolutely sacred. There seems to
be a tension in our souls between the love of the good recognized by intel
ligence and the love of one's own that guides our spirited part. It is the natural
favoritism of parents for their own children and its conflict with pure justice
that leads to the unnatural family arrangements of Plato's Republic.
Since both, the love of one's own stemming from our particularity and the
love of the good stemming from our intelligence, are rooted in human nature,
the tension between them can assume tragic proportions. We have no choice
about the genetic makeup with which we are endowed, the family and country
in which we are born. Yet to be deprived of pride of ancestry is barely sup
portable for most individuals, families and societies. Virtue is not virtue,
knowledge is not knowledge, until it becomes one's own. The love of own's
own and the love of the good are both equally primordial or ineradicable. But
to say that both are equally primordial is not to say that both are of equal
dignity. As Leo Strauss put it, classical "idealism" held that "the form is higher
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in dignity than the matter. . . . The practical meaning of this idealism is that the
good is of higher dignity than one's own. . . On the highest level, according
to Socrates in the Symposium, the love of one's own and the love of the good
are reconciled in the beautiful, the true object of love is "to have the good be
one's own
forever" (206a).
But for most of us most of the time the words of Plato's Athenian Stranger
seem appropriate:
In truth the cause of every failure comes to each person each time through
excessive love of oneself. For the one who loves is blinded about the beloved, so
that he judges the just and the good and the noble things badly, believing that he is
bound always to honor what is his own before the truth (Laws, 731e-732a).
This consequence of our particular needs, this tendency to sacrifice the truth
to the love of one's own, points to moderation as a key virtue in moral and
political life, even the moderation of our highest hopes.
The sublime Alenu prayer sung at the close of almost every Jewish religious
service calls out:
We therefore hope in thee, O Lord our God, that we may speedily behold the glory
of thy might, when the abominations will be removed from the earth . . when the
world will be perfected under the kingdom of the Almighty, and all the children of
flesh will call upon thy name and all the wicked of the earth will be turned to thee.
Compare this with Socrates' reply in the Theaetetus to an enthusiastic The-
odorus: "But it is not possible for evils to be done away with, Theodorus, for it
is necessary that there always be something contrary to the
good."The moder
ate Socrates, however, does not silence the voice of his heart; he goes on to add
that of course evils cannot be established among gods, but necessity forces the
evils "to haunt mortal nature and this region here." Flight from these evils, he
says, partial assimilation to the divine as far as possible in justice, holiness and
intelligence, may be possible for some individuals but not for society as a
whole {Theaetetus, 176a-b).
That moderation is the virtue of the philosopher's action, but not his
thoughts is exhibited by this statement of the tenth-century Arabic philosopher
Alfarabi on the relation of classical philosophy to religion.
There are two ways of making a thing comprehensible: first, by causing its essence
to be perceived by the intellect, and second by causing it to be imagined through
the similitude that imitates it. Assent, too, is brought about by one of two methods,
either the method of . . . demonstration or the method of persuasion .... when
one acquires knowledge of the beings or receives instruction in them, if he
perceives their ideas . . . with his intellect, and his assent ... is by means of . . .
demonstration, then the science that comprises these cognitions is philosophy ....
if they are known by imagining them through similitudes that imitate them, and
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assent to what is imagined ... is caused by persuasive methods then the ancients
call what comprises these cognitions religion . . . Therefore, according to the
ancients, religion is an imitation of philosophy Religion sets forth images [of
the ultimate principles] by similitudes . . . taken from corporeal principles and
imitates them by their likenesses among political offices . .
Further, to enable us to overcome the passions bred by radical selfishness
and the love of one's own, counteracting lawabiding passions must be bred by
the sanctification of norms, in order to enable us to live decently in society with
a modicum of freedom. Such sanctifications require divinities that can address
us passionately, individually and collectively, here and now. Classical philoso
phy never considered itself able to become a substitute for public religion.
If Aristotle's treatment of religion is to be found anywhere, I believe it is
most of all in his Poetics," and in scattered remarks in the Ethics, Politics,
Rhetoric and Metaphysics. For Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, it is much
clearer: religion is classified in the Summa Theologica as a part of the moral
virtue of justice, religion is the worship which is properly due and paid to God.
IV. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Medieval philosophy is characterized by the attempt to reconcile classical
philosophy with revealed or scriptural religion, with the religions of the Bible
and the Koran. For the most influential medieval philosophers the natural
world, as far as natural reason unaided by supernatural revelation could com
prehend it, was to be understood through the philosophy of Aristotle. The fun
damental presupposition for medieval philosophy is belief in the truth of the
revealed word and in the God that is its supernatural source. This assumption
entails important modifications of and deviations from Aristotelian doctrine.
Aristotle evidently held that the visible universe is eternal, at least, with Plato,
that its intelligible underpinnings, the forms, are eternal.
All philosophers seem to have accepted what has been called the principle of
causality, namely, that nothing comes into being out of nothing. The positive
consequence of the principle is not: Everything comes into being out of some
thing.12 It is rather that: Everything that comes into being comes into being out
of something. Those "somethings out of which"have either themselves come
into being or have not come into being, that is, are unchanging. The task for
scientific and philosophic knowledge then is to discover the permanent or un
changing somethings, or principles, underlying
change.13 As Thomas Aquinas
says, "that the world did not always exist is held by faith alone, and cannot be
proved by demonstration."14
The Bible tells us that in the beginning God created the heaven and the
earth. If the ultimate principles are unchanging or eternal, philosophy tells us,
there was no ultimate beginning. To meet the challenge of ancient philosophy,
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religious or scriptural philosophers declare that Almighty God supernaturally,
miraculously, created everything out of nothing. The Platonic and Aristotelian
forms are thoughts in the divine mind in accordance with which He creates the
laws of nature. Creation is unlike any human making, it is not bound by the
limitations of its materials, for all material limits too are grounded in God's
will. There is, therefore, no eternal order independent of divine will, no source
of principles for human guidance apart from that will. If the God of the Bible is
omnipotent, He is also omniscient. Not the least action of the least of his
creatures escapes his notice.
In practice He is a caring God, a just and loving God. There is no necessary
conflict between the love of one's own and the good, if the love of one's own
is sanctified by the ultimate principle of the universe. Particularity is not dispar
aged: the ultimate principle of the universe reveals itself in personal address to
particular men, particular families and nations, on particular occasions. If their
souls are immortal, each individual is of everlasting importance. One can be
fully at home in the world when the world is one's Father's house (Psalms,
139).
On the other hand, one might say that the gulf between man and the God of
the Bible is unbridgeable. In the Hebrew Bible the mutuality of the Covenant
and the gift of the Law bridge the gulf. In Christianity the gulf itself, one is
tempted to say, is overcome by the mystery of God's becoming a particular
man, by the very notion that full divinity can exist in a particular man. The
pain of the moral gulf between man and God is relieved by Jesus' assumption
of the world's sin, for all those who are justified by believing in that sacrifice.
Morality for the Bible as a whole takes on heightened importance when error
and perversion become sin, an ungrateful personal affront to the loving all-
powerful source of all goodness. In explaining why divine law was needed in
addition to natural and human law Thomas Aquinas says that because "of the
uncertainty of human judgment ... on contingent and particular matters . . .
that man may know without doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to
avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed ... by a law given by God, for
. . . such a law cannot err (ST, III, Q. 91, A.4). This, however, is moderated
by the arguments of philosophers like Thomas that the great bulk of morality is
given to men through the natural law, the law of reason. Virtues are habits that
perfect natural powers in a world so designed as to allow reason to discover
ends implicit in nature. Something like classical moderation, the moderating of
unreasonable expectations, is also preserved in the medieval distinction be
tween this world and the kingdom of heaven, the world to come, the "other"
world.
How can classical and medieval philosophy deal with each other's funda
mental assumptions?
Thomas' harmonizing formula is that revelation goes be
yond, but cannot contradict, reason. Because revelation is superior, philosophy
is the handmaid of theology. That is not acceptable to Alfarabi's ancient philos-
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opher: religion is an imitation of and therefore subordinate to philosophy. The
possibility of Creation, Revelation and miracles seem to rest on the assumption
that God is omnipotent and his will is unfathomable. Can reason refute that
assumption? Is it self-contradictory? Can revelation refute reason? Can they
both even agree about what would constitute a refutation, what would consti
tute evidence? A rational proof demands suspension of belief, or doubt, until
all the evidence is in. Revelation claims that its truth requires faith in the re
vealed and revealing God in order to be accepted and to be understood. From
the point of view of rational philosophy, faith or belief is simply insufficient
knowledge. Each can refute the other only by begging the question in dispute,
presupposing its own canons for understanding. They appear to be mutually
irrefutable.
Faith, Thomas Aquinas tells us, is an act of the intellect wherein the intellect
is moved to assent, not by the clarity and evidence of the intellect's proper
object, but by the command of the will, the practical
faculty.15 This subordina
tion of the theoretical to the practical faculty is another fundamental difference
between ancient and medieval philosophy.
V. MODERN PHILOSOPHY
The mutual irrefutability of philosophy and revelation, Leo Strauss has sug
gested, has created a tension that is perhaps the secret of the vitality of West
ern Civilization, a civilization that will not allow the mind to silence the voice
of the heart, nor the heart to drown out the voice of the mind. This tension
must trouble philosophy more than faith. If faith in the omnipotent God of
Creation, Revelation and miracles cannot be refuted, does philosophy itself rest
on indemonstrable premises, just a different kind of faith, or at best, disputable
opinion?16
To free itself from this unresolvable tension and uncertainty, Strauss sug
gests, a new kind of philosophy, modern philosophy, comes into the world,
rejecting both the idea of nature of classical philosophy and the omnipotent
God ofmedieval philosophy a new philosophy with a new basis, that is, man:
the ultimate source ofmeaning for humanity's understanding of the world is the
human understanding itself.
If one wished to refute Orthodoxy, no other way remained than to attempt to
demonstrate that the world and life are fully understandable without the assumption
of an unfathomable God. That means that the refutation of Orthodoxy depended on
the success of a system. Man had to prove himself theoretically and practically the
lord of the world and the lord of his life. The world he created had to make the
world that was merely
"given"
to him disappear. Then Orthodoxy was more than
refuted, it was "outlived."17
The medievals in their very efforts to harmonize classical philosophy with re
vealed religion face and articulate the essential tension between them. Modern
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philosophy incorporates the religious motive, but "supersedes" that essential
tension by rationalizing and secularizing revealed religion's sanctification of
individuality. This, I believe, is behind Leo Strauss's remark at the end of
Natural Right and History: "The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns
concerns eventually, and perhaps even from the beginning, the status of indi
viduality." If this is what Strauss meant, the sources of modern philosophy
would be the idea of philosophy and science first articulated by classical philos
ophy and, negatively, the Guarantor of the significance of individuality, the
omnipotent God of revealed religion. The source then would be the wish to
supersede the tension arising from their mutual irrefutability. In the introduc
tion to his Logic, Kant says that the basic questions determining the basic
divisions of philosophy, What can I know? (Nature), What ought I to do?
(Morality), What may I hope? (Religion), can all be referred to the single
question, What is man?
The classical understanding of nature is opposed by the modern idea of the
conquest of nature and its practical goal, in
Descartes'
words, of making men
"the masters and possessors ofnature."The classical and medieval standard for
morality, virtue, seen as natural fulfillment of natural powers, is replaced by
freedom, or more precisely, autonomy. And last in our sketch of modem
thought, the idea of history as a determinate process rather than a certain kind
of study, becomes a secular substitute for Divine Providence.
A.
Nature, Bacon declares, cannot be conquered except by being obeyed.'8 The
nature to be conquered must be different from the nature to be obeyed. The
nature to be conquered is nature as it presents itself to ordinary prescientific
experience, with its apparent purposivity and unpredictability due to chance.
The nature to be obeyed, through which the conquest is to take place, is the
nature to be discovered by methodical experimentation keyed to (following
Galileo and Descartes) mathematical laws. Final causes are to be excluded from
physics. To prepare the way for the new science, the classical reliance on, or
"idolization"
of, natural experience and natural speech is to be refuted by a
critique or refutation of the natural human understanding. This critique culmi
nates in Kant's assumption that there is no intellectual intuition that permits us
to gain access to the nature of things in themselves. There is no natural har
mony between the natural human understanding and the natural world. Nature
is not a kind mother, she must be tortured by methodical experimentation and
forced to reveal her secrets. Furthermore, the ideas of chance or fortune and the
subordination of art to nature must be rejected as breeding a "premature despair
in human enterprises"(De Augmentis Scientiarum, Book 2, Chap. 2). The
Aristotelian notion of unstable matter, pure potency, underlying the notion of
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fortune is altogether to be rejected. Matter is to be understood as acting in
accordance with fixed and unwavering laws. Above all, Bacon insisted in op
position to medieval philosophy, physics must be separated from theology in
order to avoid fabulous philosophy and heretical religion. With Bacon clearing
the way,
Descartes' "I think" becomes the exemplar of finding a beginning for
thought that in no way depends upon anything outside of man.
B.
The new philosophy was obliged to find a new moral standard that would be
compatible with a nonteleological physics. That standard, again, is freedom,
autonomy,
self-legislation.19 Just as the "intelligibleworld"is "our" world, a
world we have construed, that is, constructed,20 so part of the reverence or
respect we feel for the moral law of autonomy, Kant suggests, is a love for
what we have produced ourselves (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,
footnote to IV, 401). Rousseau was the first to define freedom as self-legisla
tion, but it is already implicit in Hobbes's theory of sovereignty and the social
contract. According to Hobbes, we must obey the sovereign because each of us
through the social contract has agreed to allow his will to represent each of our
wills. His legislation, because of the social contract, is, legally considered, our
own self-legislation. He is our representative. Hobbes also formulated the more
fundamental principle underlying this conception: there is "no Obligation on
any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his
own"(Leviathan, chap. 21).
This is all made even more explicit in Rousseau's doctrine of the general
will. Freedom in society consists in uniting oneself with all the rest under the
general will that declares the law, while at the same time remaining free in so
far as one has contributed to the making of that law. The process that makes the
will general also makes it moral. Being compelled to express one's will in such
form that it can become a general law, so that it can coincide with the wills of
all the others, moralizes the will. If I generalize my desire not to pay taxes in a
law that no one ought to pay taxes, I am compelled to see that then the police,
public schools, courts, and so on, would disappear, the irrationality of my
original desire becomes manifest.
The idea is fully developed as a moral principle in Kant's doctrine of the
categorical imperative: so act that the maxim of your action can become a
universal law. The truly free or moral person, according to Kant, bows only to
the moral will or practical reason within him or her self, and not to any stand
ard imposed from without, either by nature or by God.
Hegel extends the notion of freedom as self-legislation beyond politics and
morality to make it a logical and metaphysical principle. The life of the con
cept, the life of that Spirit or Mind that forms and informs the human mind,
human History and the objects of human knowledge the mind of God pro-
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ceeds in accordance with the principle of freedom, self-legislation. Hegel be
gins his "Doctrine of the Concept" with these words: "The Concept is the prin
ciple of freedom, the power of substance self-realized."And later:
... the concept is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the
action of the concept dwelling in them and revealing itself in them. In our religious
consciousness this comes forth in such a way that we say God created the world
out of nothing, or, in other words, the world and finite things have issued from the
fullness of the divine thoughts and divine decrees. Thus religion recognizes
thought, more exactly the concept, to be the infinite form, or the free creative
activity which can realize itself without the help of a matter that exists outside it.21
At the same time modem ethical and especially political thought is said to be
characterized by a certain Realism associated with the name of Machiavelli.
Classical and medieval political thought, the modems argue, failed because
they aimed too high. Because they based their political doctrines on exalted
notions of virtue and societies devoted to the formation of virtue, they made
themselves ineffective. As Bacon put it, their discourses are beautiful like the
stars, which give little light because they are so high. Effectiveness can be
secured by lowering one's goals, by accepting and exploiting those lower mo
tives that move most men most of the time: pleasure, comfort, acquisitiveness,
and especially that all powerful negative motive fear, fear for the loss of one's
life and fear for the possible loss of what one already
possesses.22
C.
History, the meeting place of modem morality with modem realism, seems
to have been conceived as the secular substitute for divine providence. One of
the first signposts on the way to the idea was Machiavelli's observation that the
conflicts between nobles and plebeians in Rome, the vicious civil strife univer
sally deplored by the philosophers, actually led to the greater good of Rome as
a whole. Adam Smith extends the notion of private vice, public benefit, to the
economic sphere. Merchants intending only their own gain increase the annual
income and well-being of society as a whole; led by an invisible hand they
promote beneficial ends which are no part of their intentions.
Kant calls for a history that will show how the antagonism of men in soci
ety, their ambition, lust for power and greed cause them to develop their talents
and, consequently, their moral discrimination so as to prepare them for citizen
ship in the perfectly free and moral societies of the future (Idee zu einer
allge-
meinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht, Idea of a Universal History
with Cosmopolitan Intent). Hegel, as it were, takes up Kant's call, finding
Kantian freedom and reason, linked up with his own doctrine of logical oppo
sites, operative everywhere in History, making Smith's invisible hand visible as
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the self-unfolding of the human spirit and Spirit in general. This self-unfolding
culminates in the self-consciousness that all spiritual goods are produced not by
any external source, but by Spirit itself. The idea of History and the modem
idea of freedom seem to be inextricably linked, history allegedly showing that
man's freedom is basically limited only by the ideas of those limits that human
consciousness has imposed on itself; man's freedom is limited by his earlier use
of that inchoate freedom, and not by his nature or by the whole order of nature
and creation.23
VI. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Modem philosophy's world of natural science and its moral world of auton
omy have been spoken of here as peculiarly
"ours" because in some decisive
sense we make them. If it is permitted to interpret this development as, in part,
rooted in a desire to be fully at home in the world, and to want to be fully at
home in the world is a religious motive, perfectly appropriate for a world gov
erned by an omnipotent, beneficent and loving God, then perhaps we can speak
of a religious motive permeating modem philosophy from its beginning, even
in its antitheological stances. If this is correct, one can say that this motive
begins to become explicit with the formal acceptance of philosophy of religion
as an accepted branch of philosophy.
The modem scientific conception of nature, according to Kant, is incapable
ofsupplying ethical and political standards. Morality is traced to a source inde
pendent of nature, namely, practical reason. The realm of nature and the realm
of freedom or morality, according to Kant, do not contradict one another, but
like parallel lines simply do not meet. This thoroughgoing separation becomes
a special problem for Kantian philosophy. How can natural man and moral man
coexist in one and the same man? How can the two realms be brought together
in systematic unity?
Kant experimented with a philosophy of history, but finally settled on a
philosophy of religion. The Critique ofPure Reason established, according to
Kant, that we have no knowledge, positive or negative, concerning the exis
tence of God. Religion within the limits of reason alone establishes what in the
absence of knowledge we are obliged to believe in order to strengthen our
capacities to obey the moral law. Religion is unambiguously subordinated to
morality, moral reason: "pure moral legislation, through which the will of God
is primordially engraved in our hearts, is not only the unavoidable condition of
all tme religion whatsoever, but is also that which really constitutes such reli
gion." Tme religion, he argues, "is a purely rational
affair."24
His position is brought out dramatically by his interpretation of what he calls
the myth of Abraham's sacrifice: Abraham should have replied to this sup
posedly divine voice that even if your voice rings down from heaven, if you
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order me to kill my good son, contrary to the moral law, you cannot be the
voice of God.25 Some might regard this as superficially rational; but would the
story of Abraham's sacrifice have had the influence it has had if he had indeed
sacrificed Isaac?
Hegel's thought aims at absolute comprehensiveness. It aims not only at
comprehending and superseding all previous philosophies and theories, but also
the tmth not only about but also within practical life and reality as a whole. Its
all-comprehensiveness will allow it to supersede all finite standpoints. One
most important part of that reality is religious life and religious
thought.26 The
incorporation of religion into philosophy reaches its culmination in Hegel.
"Culture has," he declares:
raised this latest era so far above the ancient antithesis of reason and faith, of
philosophy and positive religion, that this opposition of faith and knowledge has
acquired quite a different sense and has now been transferred into the field of
philosophy itself. In earlier times philosophy was said to be the handmaid of faith.
Ideas and expressions of this sort have vanished and philosophy has irresistibly
affirmed its absolute autonomy.27
Kant, too, he argues, tried to accomplish this synthesis, but his notion of rea
son was too narrow. Alongside the narrowly intellectual and rational, "religion
has its sublime aspect as feeling, the love filled with eternal longing ... it
yearns for eternal beauty and bliss ... it seeks ... the Absolute and the
eternal"(Glauben und Wissen, 290-91; Faith and Knowledge, 58). Hegel's
philosophy must encompass the full range of religious experience. For Kant,
Jesus was a representation of "the Idea of Humanity in its full moral perfec
tion." For Hegel, Jesus was the epoch-making revelation that the universal
divine Spirit, God, that permeates and enlivens the universe dwells in and
comes to full self-consciousness in man, in the human spirit. This conscious
ness goes through stages, the highest of which is the conceptual. "Every philos
ophy sets forth nothing else but the construction of highest bliss as
Idea." "The
sins of him who lies against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven, and the lie
against the Spirit is that he is not a universal. . .
But this sanctification of the universal must be combined with the sanctifica-
tion of the individual subject for Hegel. He rephrases the Platonic statement
that evils will not cease for the human race till "state
power"
and philosophy
come together by arguing that not only state power and philosophy, but "state
power religion and the principles of
philosophy"
must come together. "Plato,
he [Hegel] asserts, did not know the idea of freedom, an outgrowth of the
Christian doctrine that 'the individual as such has an infinite value'; according
to Plato man is free only in so far as he is a
philosopher."29 Plato, in opposition
to the religion of his time found the ground of righteousness in the Idea, but the
Idea in its most general and abstract form, he did not do justice to the subjec
tive side of the Idea, its being for itself, its life in concrete individual subjec-
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tivity, in feeling, intuition and pictorial representation. In religion (Protestant
religion) only is the holiness of subjective individuality adequately expressed.
And consequently, in the modem constitutional order only, where the spirit of
the state is permeated by the spirit of such religion, will there come to be
adequate recognition of and protection for subjective freedom, for individual
liberty (Enzyklopddie , 482 and 552).
The expected transformation of human life, Hegel's rational kingdom of
heaven on earth, is long overdue, according to his schedule. Kierkegaard, re
volted by Hegelian rationalism, turned to revelation as intrinsically irrational.
Nietzsche continued the modem project of finding the source of meaning in,
rather than outside of, man, no longer as reason, however, but as will. Heideg
ger urges us to be resolute without clarifying what the ends of that resolution
are to be. The classical and medieval dependence of morality on nature and
natural law is replaced by an exaltation of human "creativity" coupled with
despair of finding a rational source of ends to guide that creativity.
However, even if modem thought should have proved an inadequate candi
date for articulating the meaning of human life, there is one area in which its
success seems indubitable. I refer to the natural sciences. The question for
those who lean toward the classical or medieval alternatives is: Can modem
natural science be integrated into those allegedly more comprehensive frame
works? One indication, certainly no proof, of this possibility is Werner Heisen
berg 's turning to Aristotle's concept of potency and Plato's Timaeus when he
tries to make philosophic sense out of quantum theory.30
The unanswered questions raised by this broad survey might seem over
whelming, but it does seem to be clear that we are faced by three fundamental
alternatives, and that the attempt to dispense with or transcend the ancient and
medieval alternatives is highly questionable. If, as Heidegger says, to question
is the piety of thought, such piety requires of both philosophy and religion that
each remain open to the claims and questions of the other.
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In the beginning, the Founders created the Constitution and the Supreme
Court to interpret it. But these institutions were "barely in
place,"Robert Bork
tells us, "when one Justice of the Supreme Court cast covetous glances at the
apple that would eventually cause the
fall." Compared to the work of creating
the political universe, tending the legal garden was a mundane labor, and this
justice wished to be like his creators, to make the law, not just discover it.
Succumbing to the seduction of politics, Samuel Chase chomped into the apple
and delivered his memorable pronouncement: "An ACT of the Legislature (for
I cannot call it law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of the legislative authority"(typo
graphic curiosities from the original). So, even if nothing in the Constitution
expressly forbade such act, the Court would be obliged to declare it void.
That was 1798, and though the words of Justice Chase were mere obiter
dictum in this case, he gave voice to what Bork describes (switching the meta
phor but maintaining its genre) as the
"heresy" "the denial that judges are
bound by law"1 that would continually haunt and eventually overwhelm our
constitutional
"orthodoxy." In Part I, Bork describes how this occurred on the
Supreme Court through a concise and remarkably penetrating analysis of the
development of constitutional law from 1798 to the present. As one would
expect, the account gives central attention to "substantive due
process,"
noting
with special care the origin of the concept as a device for protecting slavery in
the Dred Scott case, its gradual re-emergence over the nineteenth century until
its death in 1937 as a tool for protecting laissez-faire capitalism (most noto
riously in Lochner v. New York), and its subsequent revitalization since the
1965 contraceptive case Griswold v. Connecticut as a cover under which a
motley assortment of claims labeled
"privacy" have been indulgently attended
and as a utensil by which portions of the Bill of Rights have been ladled into
interpretation, Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1
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the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states. Having nothing to do with
text, intentions, or understandings, "substantive due
process"is the most ob
vious heresy, but Bork reveals with similar verve that heresy has accompanied
as well the cases that have at least claimed to rely on the text, most notably the
equal protection clause (since any law can be challenged as a denial of equal
protection) and the first amendment (which he observes has been transformed
from a protection of ideas to a protection of exhibitionism).
Part II examines the intellectual currents that support the triumph of heresy.
Although Bork impartially attacks heresy on the right as well as the left, his
main target is the left. One after another, he takes on "The
Theorists"
of consti
tutional law John Hart Ely, Laurence Tribe, Paul Brest, Frank Michelman,
Thomas Grey, David Richards, Mark Tushnet, Michael Perry and Ronald
Dworkin, to start the list showing the intellectual shallowness of their attacks
on original understanding and the scant relation that their own theories have to
constitutional orthodoxy. These theorists manage consistently to read into the
Constitution a moralistic demand for redistribution on the one hand and on the
other a relativistic demand for "privatization of morality"(pp. 241-50). Bork
cautiously but insightfully advances the thesis that the underlying unity in these
apparently inconsistent positions lies in a sort of egalitarianism that is ruth
less in its hostility to hierarchy. Part III tells the story of his confirmation
battle, "The Bloody
Crossroads,"
where his orthodoxy met the wrath of this
new egalitarianism.
As a critic, Bork is brilliant in rooting out, exposing, and impaling heresy
with his mordant wit. But of course he wishes to do more than criticize. He
wishes to re-establish the orthodoxy, and "persuade Americans that no person
should be nominated or confirmed who does not display both a grasp of and
devotion to the philosophy of original
understanding"(p. 9). Thus a significant
portion of his Part II is devoted to a explanation and defense of this philosophy.
To assess Bork's solution, we need to consider more carefully the problem as
he defines it. And as he defines it, the principal problem for American constitu
tionalism is how to confine the use of judicial review.
One should not underestimate the importance of this problem. On the other
hand, one cannot overstate the radical nature of the intellectual assault on the
idea of law, and the Constitution as law, that is being voiced from within the
citadel in the name of postmodern philosophy, and to this problem Bork's solu
tion is only partially responsive. Consider this comment by Sanford Levinson,
McCormick Professor of Law at the University of Texas: "[Tjhose of us who
are classified as nihilists have drunk deeply at the well of those branches of
modem thought most skeptical of concepts like tmth .... 'Truth' may continue
to be a word within modernist culture, but only as a synonym for culturally
shared conventions. At the very least there are, from this perspective, no self-
evident, immutable, or eternal truths. And the more local, socially constituted
truths of our cultures and everyday lives are, in important ways, up for
grabs."
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With such indeterminacy in the world, the "text" of the Constitution can mean
anything. The interpreter, he approvingly quotes Richard Rorty, "simply beats
the text into a shape which will serve his own purpose."Having accepted the
triumph of modem philosophy, Levinson thus announces the "death of constitu
tionalism."2 Given such nihilistic assaults, by no means atypical, Bork's focus
on judicial review may seem narrow, which I will argue is in fact the case, for
he cannot define the authority of the courts without addressing the authority of
the Constitution.
To return to Bork's statement of the problem: He defines it as the "Madison
ian Dilemma," that is, the problem faced by courts in adjudicating the claims of
the people in their varied names of self-government as they are represented in
state and federal governments, Congress, and the Presidency and their claims
against these various bodies in the name of individual rights. Unless there ex
ists some definite standard, "that can be called
'correct,'" by which to assess
the work of the courts, their decisions will simply amount to a form of judicial
tyranny. In the name of judicial review courts would arbitrarily expand or limit
claims of the people as they are expressed either through government or against
government. For a court to be a court, it must be thoroughly
"neutral" in as
sessing these claims, that is, it must not impose any will of its own, but simply
follow that standard (pp. 139-41).
Original meaning, he maintains, is the only standard that will answer to
these needs and allow the Constitution to fulfill its claim to be law, for only
original meaning will allow the courts to be neutral in three important senses:
First, derivation of the principle to be applied in the case, that is, making
certain that the principle is distinct from the court's will, that it comes instead
from the will of those who made the law. Second, definition of this principle,
that is, determining at what level of abstraction the principle is to operate. If
the principle is equality, should it mean something very specific, such as pre
venting discrimination against blacks in the exercise of a defined body of
rights? Or should it mean something much broader, say equality of race, na
tionality, gender, wealth, and so forth. Original meaning says to define it at the
level intended by the framers, not at what suits the judge. Third, application of
the principle, that is, applying it according to its rationale and not according to
the judge's personal likes or dislikes of the parties involved. Here again, it
seems, neutrality can be preserved only by accepting the rationale of the
framers (pp. 144-53).
Original understanding, of course, is not an unambiguous term. As Ronald
Dworkin has pointed out, in developing a theory of original understanding one
must answer such questions as who counts as a framer, whether we should
credit their hopes or their expectations concerning how a term will be under
stood, whether we should look at concrete or abstract intentions or both or the
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dominant one, as well as several other questions.3 Some of Dworkin's distinc
tions may seem precious or their importance exaggerated, but the more general
point of his argument is sound. That is, we must have some reason, perhaps
even a political theory, to justify our choice among these options. Bork does
answer several of these questions. On who and what counts, for instance, he
tells us that it is not the understanding of the people most actively involved in
the framing of the Constitution, nor even understandings reached at the ratify
ing convention, but "what the public of that time would have understood the
words to
mean."That could be further illuminated in "secondary materials,
such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dic
tionaries in use at the time, and the
like." As law is a public act, "secret
reservations or intentions count for nothing"(p. 144). Thus the theory is unem
barrassed by the fact that Madison kept secret his notes from the federal con
vention; these are merely useful, and not crucial, in allowing us to see what the
public would have understood these words to mean.
But what about Dworkin's more general point, that in answering these ques
tions the theory of original meaning requires a judge to make the sort of choice
that Bork had sought to avoid? Bork responds that his approach does involve
choice, "but the political content of that choice is not made by the judge; it was
made long ago by those who designed and enacted the Constitution. It was a
choice between a judicial branch that is a policymaking arm of government and
a judicial branch that implements the policies made by others"(p. 177). The an
swer does not seem altogether satisfactory. Can a group simply call itself fram
ers and declare that its specific (or abstract) intentions count? Isn't that rather
like saying that the majority should mle, because that is what the majority
wants (Dworkin, p. 54)? In fact, Bork seems to admit the point that some part
of his theory must lie outside of the
framers' intent or original understanding:
Even if evidence of what the founders thought about the judicial role were
unavailable, we would have to adopt the rule that judges must stick to the original
meaning of the Constitution's words. If that method of interpretation were not
common in the law, if James Madison and Justice Joseph Story had never endorsed
it, if Chief Justice John Marshall had rejected it, we would have to invent the
approach of original understanding in order to save the constitutional design. No
other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to a defined sphere
of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers whose exercise alters,
perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic. The philosophy of original
understanding is thus a necessary inference from the structure of government
apparent on the face of the Constitution. (P. 155)
Thus original understanding is
"chosen" because it eliminates choice. It is
the only approach that will eliminate judicial subjectivity in adjudicating the
various claims involved in resolving the Madisonian dilemma; it is the only
approach that can prevent the judges from imposing their personal moral phi
losophy on the citizenry.
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At the outset, a couple of things should be noted about this statement of the
problem and the solution. First, the very statement of the problem takes what
we might call a
"juridico-centric"
view of the Constitution, that is, it assumes
that the exclusively correct lens for viewing the Constitution is that of the
courts. Constitutional interpretation is synonymous with the judicial review
(pp. 78, 139, 147). Second, from this perspective, the question of authority is
nearly subsumed by that of meaning, for once we have a sufficiently determi
nate meaning, we solve the problem of authority, or rather this problem of
authority, preventing the judges from imposing their own personal values on
the body politic. Three questions are suggested: (1) To what extent does origi
nal understanding eliminate choice? (2) Does the demand for certainty itself
cause distortion? (3) Can Bork define the authority of the courts without ad
dressing the authority of the Constitution?
1. To what extent does original understanding eliminate choice? To be fair,
this question must be a comparative one, for no theory will provide crystal
clear answers to all questions. If one did, we would have no need for judges,
and certainly Bork does not profess to eliminate his profession (pp. 161-67).
But let's compare original understanding with contemporary understanding.
Are courts given a far more definite answer if they ask what a provision of the
Constitution meant to the public then than if they ask what it means to the
public now? For some provisions, original understanding would provide a more
ready answer than in contemporary understanding. Most people today would
find "letters of marque and reprisal"rather quaint, and they would be slower on
the uptake of such phrases as a "person held to service or labor" or "the migra
tion or importation as any of the states now existing shall think proper to ad
mit."
Also, it is probably tme that for most clauses the meaning was richer for
the founding generation, at least for its literate members. As Philip Kurland and
Ralph Lemer state in their introduction to The Founders' Constitution: "It was
a world of the leisurely essay, the hour-long sermon, a great hunger for the
printed word, and a discerning appreciation for good argument. People are apt
to savor slowly what they most enjoy, and the generation of the Founders had a
great taste for political discourse."4
Yet if we are concerned with the range of meaning, as opposed to its rich
ness or readiness, the record is mixed. For some provisions, such as the due
process clause, the original understanding probably is more definite; it would
be limited to procedural questions of justice and it could not conceivably have
been understood to encompass an unfettered right to have an abortion or engage
in homosexual sodomy. For other provisions the range of meaning is probably
similar in scope, although its subject matter has shifted markedly. While the
original generation debated such questions as whether "free
speech"
would en
compass "seditious
libel" if the words were tme or expressed with good mo
tives, today we debate whether it encompasses flag burning. The subject matter
differs, but the range of possible meaning does not, at least not markedly. For
yet other provisions, the original understanding seems far less definite.
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Whether the enumerated powers of Article One, Section 8, generally, and the
necessary and proper clause in particular, authorize the use of powers as expan
sive as that of incorporating a national bank was a question hotly debated then,
but it would hardly stir a soul today. Or whether the president needs Senate
approval to remove a cabinet officer, a major question in the original under
standing of the executive power, would not raise a doubt
today.5
So the gain in certainty is not obvious when we look to original over con
temporary understanding, at least with this simple sense of the term. If the
problem is simply preventing judicial tyranny, one could perhaps decrease the
danger by adopting a more restricted sense of original understanding. One
might for instance count only that meaning which had the support of a constitu
tional majority. In places Bork seems to suggest that this is what he has in
mind. Consider for example his response to Paul Brest's comment that original
intent, even if it does yield the principle the court is to apply, does not define
its level of abstraction.6 Brest's example is the equal protection clause. Given
the principle of equality in the context of the Bakke case, does it mean specifi
cally "black
equality"
or more generally "racial
equality."Bork replies as fol
lows: "Without meaning to suggest what the historical evidence in fact shows,
let us assume we find that the ratifiers intended to guarantee that blacks should
be treated by law no worse than whites, but that it is unclear whether whites
were intended to be protected from discrimination in favor of blacks. On such
evidence, the judge should protect only blacks from discrimination, and Alan
Bakke would not have had a case. The reason is that the next higher level of
generality above black equality, which is racial equality, is not shown to be a
constitutional principle, and therefore there is nothing to be set against a current
legislative majority's decision to favor blacks. Democratic choice must be ac
cepted by the judge where the Constitution is silent"(pp. 149-50).
Successful in safeguarding against judicial tyranny, this sort of certainty,
however, is obtained at some cost. On the surface, the principal cost would be
the crabbed interpretation it gives to individual rights, but that is not perhaps
the biggest problem or even the necessary result if we think through this ap
proach to original understanding. In the sort of case identified there seems to be
an answer to the constitutional question: democratic choice prevails.7 What
about those instances where one claim of democratic authority clashes with
another, where it is state authority versus federal, or Congress versus the Presi
dency? What if a constitutional majority of the people did not have clear inten
tions about whether a president needs to get Senate approval before removing
an executive officer, or about whether Congress may employ such expansive
powers as that of incorporation to pursue the enumerated powers of Article
One, Section 8? The image of "clash" assumes governmental authority for the
competing claims. Often "gulf would be more appropriate. For if the federal
government has only that power delegated from the people of the states, the
claims of authority become far more restricted. By this logic, unless the people
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of the states clearly intended to give a power to the federal government, that
power should be denied. Returning to the question of individual rights, at least
at the federal level, the excess would be towards anarchy rather than oppres
sion. This obviously is not what Bork, or anyone else, wishes to emerge from a
theory of original understanding, and most of his examples indicate a far more
expansive theory of meaning. But honestly applied, a more expansive meaning
brings greater uncertainty.
2. Does this demand for certainty cause distortion? As already indicated
above, and especially when the demand for certainty is coupled with a juridico-
centric view of the Constitution, I think the answer is yes. Bork wishes to
portray the law as a material with hard edges and sharp boundaries. Thus,
conservative revisionism and liberal revisionism are "equally
illegitimate,"
as
are "Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe" (pp. 131, 32; see also pp. 20, 93, 118).
Similarly, upholding legislation when it exceeds constitutional boundaries is
just as "activist" as voiding it when it does not (pp. 56, 129, 140). s Once you
are over the edge, you have fallen, so whether you were one inch or twenty feet
over does not matter. Thus, where the Constitution does not allow for such
definite decisions, Bork is reluctant to call it part of the Constitution, instead,
as in the case of the privileges and immunities clauses and the Ninth Amend
ment, we have "ink
blots" (p. 166). Bork's concern for what an interested
judiciary could do with these clauses is quite understandable, but his general
reverence for the work of the framers of the Constitution seems hard to square
with this simple dismissal of this aspect of their work. Also two routes avoid
the danger of judicial tyranny. One acknowledges that these provisions are part
of the Constitution, but not of sufficient certainty to allow for judicial review.
This may sound strange to one tutored in the tradition of judicial exclusivity,
but as Robert Nagel has pointed out, perhaps the greater part of the Constitu
tion has found its meaning in political practice rather than in court
litigation.9 A
second route allows the Court to give meaning to them but only under a very
deferential standard, akin to that employed by Cardozo in interpreting the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that is, the Court should void
laws or actions, only when they violate a principle "implicit in the concept of
ordered
liberty,"
one "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of the people as
to be ranked fundamental" (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]). This
concept of "ordered
liberty" in fact is what Charles Fairman, probably the most
eminent scholar of the period, concluded was the best understanding of the sort
of thing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in
mind.10 Yet
because of its imprecision, Bork finds this approach intolerable. Far more pref
erable, according to him, is the approach of Justice Hugo Black, who claimed
that the Fourteenth Amendment had been intended to incorporate the first eight
amendments of the bill of rights and nothing more (pp. 60, 94, and 118). This
is a perfect case of certainty purchased at the price of distortion, however, for
while some ratifiers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the bill
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of rights, there is no evidence that any ratifier understood it to mean
"only"
the
bill of rights, as Justice Black claimed. Those who claimed the amendment
would encompass the bill of rights claimed it would encompass other funda
mental rights, or privileges and immunities, as well. Thus, the quest for cer
tainty even defeats original understanding."
3. Can Bork define the authority of the courts without addressing the author
ity of the Constitution? If nearly as much uncertainty attends original under
standings as contemporary ones, the preference for old over new understand
ings must be one of authority rather than meaning or rather authority in a
more fundamental sense than providing the sort of determinate meaning neces
sary for judicial review. But since Bork's concern with authority, as we have
seen, is largely confined to the prevention of judicial tyranny, it is virtually the
same as his concern for finding definite meaning, and he gives scant attention
to it as an independent factor. That is, he assumes the authority of the Constitu
tion and merely wishes to confine the action of the courts under it. To the
extent that he does address the question of authority, he endorses a theory of
positivism:
It is of course true that no document can become law merely by its own assertion.
The Constitution did not become law merely by its own assertion. Neither does any
statute become law merely because near the beginning of the text it says something
like, "Be it therefore enacted that. . . Neither does any judgment of a court
become law merely because the court states: "It is therefore ordered that. . . All
these writings become law because they are made in ways that the people of this
nation assume to be ways of making law. Why should that assumption produce
law? I do not know of any ultimate philosophic reason why it should. A legal
system cannot operate if we must rethink the perplexed issue of the nature of
political obligation every time somebody cites a statute or a case. Law is a very
practical instrument for organizing a society into a polity, and it is necessary to any
polity that there be ground rules or assumptions that identify certain propositions as
laws if they are produced in certain ways. It is clear that this nation has always
treated the Constitution as law. (P. 174)
This statement, echoing H.L.A. Hart's theory of a "mle of
recognition,"
can
hardly explain why the Court should stick to original meaning rather than con
temporary ones, for this theory ultimately depends on a habit of the people of
recognizing that law is made in a certain way. But the entire first third of
Bork's book demonstrates that the Court has been ignoring original intent from
the very beginning, and as he acknowledges, the people have even grown in the
habit of accepting this.
"Scholars," he writes, "used to worry that the Court
would damage its authority if it acted politically. I have written a few such
naive lines myself. The fact is quite the contrary. The Court is virtually invul
nerable, and Brown proved it. The Court can do what it wishes, and there is
almost no way to stop it, provided its result has a significant political constitu
ency" (p. 77). If we put this statement together with his Haitian mle of recogni
tion, we get the following: "this nation [has almost] always treated [the pro-
The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of the Law 69
nouncements of the Court] as law." And the conclusion that follows is not
original understanding, but the "unwritten constitution"of Bork's adversaries.
That is, the fundamental law is what the Court thinks is right, confined only by
the boundaries of political pmdence.
In short, it seems that Bork cannot solve his problem, preventing arbitrary
decisions of the judiciary, unless he addresses the more fundamental problem
of justifying the Constitution. And here we see that the Biblical allusions noted
at the outset of this essay with which Bork laces his argument do not merely
decorate it, but reveal the stmcture of his thought and, on the question of
authority, its insufficiency. God creates ex nihilo and gives form to the void.
The founders and ratifiers, in his argument, seem to do likewise. Therefore, the
only meaning we can attach to the words of the Constitution is that which they
gave to them; outside of this meaning, there is nothing. Bork seems to ask that
we interpret the words of the Constitution in terms of the the Lockean formula
tion that "[w]ords in their primary or immediate signification, stand for noth
ing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them." In a curious way, then,
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, he would appear to accept the post-
modem assumption, that there is no inherent nature to things.12 If in the final
analysis we rest the authority of the Constitution on the fact alone of its habit
ual acceptance by the people, we must ask how far this is from Levinson's
observation:
" 'Tmth'
may continue to be a word within modernist culture, but
only as a synonym for culturally shared
conventions."
This is not the place to launch an alternative theory of constitutional inter
pretation, but let me suggest what might be a more promising
approach.13 An
adequate theory of the Constitution must affirm what
"postmodern"
philosophy
rejects, that there is a nature to the world and our understanding of it, that we
have some access to this world through the forms in which we apprehend it,
that these are not arbitrary assertions of the interpretative will, and that this
ordering of the world includes moral and political phenomena. The Constitution
makes a number of extraordinary claims: to bind the people of America to it as
fundamental law, to extend this law to future generations, to protect freedom of
speech, religion, and property, to demand that its citizens risk their lives for the
sake of the nation, to enforce ultimately with its own violence the laws that it
makes, and much more. To support such claims, the document needs an anchor
in moral and political reality if it is not to drift as "culturally shared conven
tions"
shift, or more likely,
"divide"
as our culture splits into multiculturalism.
Whether this anchor is the natural rights of the Declaration of Independence, a
neo-Kantian theory of equal concern and respect, a version of communitaria
nism, I cannot explore here, but if the Constitution is to be law, as it claims to
be, it needs not just the certainty that Bork seeks (and perhaps not in the degree
that he seeks it), but authority.
If then, as the Constitution seems to presuppose, there is a nature to things,
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it follows that the words we use to name this world can have objective mean
ing, and that if there is some direction to human purpose, that even the more
conventional things we name can have enough stability of form that they too
have objective meaning. And if we accept this "realist" account of the relation
of words to the world, and if we see the Constitution not simply as a text to be
interpreted but as a deed to be justified, then it makes some sense to seek
neither original meaning nor current meaning, but what we might call "real
meaning,"in an approach that combines interpretation with justification. (I am
obviously not displeased with the rhetorical advantages such a name provides,
but my main intention is to indicate a meaning the ground of which is not
merely conventional or derived from philosophic idealism.) The opinions of our
forebears should carry great weight in part because they are our forebears; they
define who we are and how we understand the world. The Constitution seems
to presuppose a corporatism of this sort by acting in the name of a "people," in
being ratified by states, and in having states later join it. We are impoverished
as individuals and as a contemporary body if we cannot look back and up to our
forefathers as defining much of who we are. Yet we demean them if we look to
their opinions only because of their age. These opinions merit our respect most
decisively because the framers by and large were more deeply learned about the
nature of politics and law than are we. It also follows that we should pay
greatest attention to the understanding of those uncommon individuals we call
the Founders their understandings over more shallow common understand
ings. These individuals deserve to be honored not just because they are old, or
because they are representative, but because they were wise.
In fact, this search for "real meaning"seems close to the original intent of
the Founders, for part of their wisdom was to understand the Constitution by
understanding the nature of the things that it names and to interpret these in
terms of the ground on which the Constitution is justified, even if this meant
putting aside their or the public's original understanding.14 Consider for exam
ple Madison's opposition to the Alien and Sedition Act as an infringement of
the First Amendment. As Leonard Levy has demonstrated, the original under
standing of freedom of the press, to the extent that the subject was given much
attention, was almost certainly limited to the common law notion of no prior
restraints. Following the separation from England, twelve of the thirteen states
"expressly adopted the common-law system after separating from England."
And "[n]o state abolished or altered the common law of criminal defamation in
general or seditious libel in particular, and no state court mled that the free
press clause of its state constitution rendered void the prosecution of a libel."'5
Yet in Virginia's opposition to the Alien and Sedition law, Madison argued
forcefully that the freedom of the press "under the common law . . . cannot be
the standard of its freedom in the United States." His argument here was based,
not the original public understanding of the term free speech or press, but on
the place of a free press in the American form of republican government. For a
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system of parliamentary supremacy, he argued, the common law principle was
appropriate; there "an exemption of the press from previous restraint, by licen
sors appointed by the King, is all the freedom that can be secured to it."
In the United States the case is altogether different. The People, not the
Government, possess the absolute sovereignty. . . Hence, in the United States the
great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative as well as
against executive ambition. They are secured, not by laws paramount to
prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the freedom of
the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the
Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this
exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous
inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws.16
Similarly, on the power of removal of an executive officer, the founding
generation reversed its original understanding. In Federalist number 40, Ham
ilton has simply assumed that the Senate would have to approve any such re
moval and went on to speak of the virtues of such a plan. "[I]t has been men
tioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the
senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability
of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace
as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate therefore would not
occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government,
as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices."Joseph Story
reports that this understanding of the removal power "had a most material tend
ency to quiet the just alarms of the overwhelming influence, and arbitrary exer
cise of this prerogative of the
executive." Yet with thorough deliberation and
reflection on the principles of separation of powers, the First Congress con
cluded that the President should have the power of removal. As Madison re
ported to Jefferson, the House decided in favor of executive authority as the
principle "most consonant to the text of the Constitution, to the policy of mix
ing the Legislative and Executive Departments as little as possible, and to the
requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department."17 In sum, in
these instances what we see the framers seeking, is not their original under
standing, but what the concepts
"really"
mean.
We also see, as in these examples, members of this founding generation, in
their political capacities, taking primary responsibility for constitutional inter
pretation and not sloughing off responsibility to the courts. Judicial review has
a place in a
"realistic"
approach to the constitution, but it is a secondary and
restrained role. More is clearly required to support this point than I can develop
here, but if we accept (a) that the words of the Constitution indicate real things
(using this word broadly), not just "Ideas in the Mind of him that uses
them,"
(b) that no one has a complete understanding of these things, including the
framers, and (c) that whatever the authority of the Constitution, it must encom-
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pass a strong claim for representative government, then it would seem to follow
that our democratic republican institutions have a primary responsibility to in
terpret the Constitution authoritatively. The claim of the court to overrule these
determinations of constitutional meaning should be limited to those instances in
which the lawmakers have made a clear mistake.18
On one subject Bork does seem to embrace a "realist" rather than an "origi
nalist"
approach, the nature and relation of the courts and law. Law is enacted
and courts must be bound by it: "What does it mean to say that a judge is
bound by the law? It means that he is bound by the only thing that can be called
law, the principles of the text, whether Constitution or statute, as generally
understood at the
enactment"(p. 5, emphasis added). This is his metaphysical
fulcmm. Indeed, as we have seen, it is this realist account of the judiciary that
drives his originalist theory of the Constitution. Regardless of what the framers
intended, he maintains, a theory of originalism is needed if the Constitution is
to be law and judicial review a judicial rather than a political function (p. 155).
I think that this fulcmm must fail to support the Constitution for two rea
sons. First, although it attempts to be "realistic" in offering an essentialist ac
count of courts of law, it is not very realistic, for we have always accorded
nonenacted, common law the status of law and have never doubted that courts
were courts as they adjudicated cases according to it. Thus, if we use our
judicial heritage as offering some guide as to the nature of courts and law, "the
principles of the text ... as generally understood at the
enactment"
are not the
"only thing that can be called law." And it follows that there is nothing inher
ently nonjudicial about adjudicating cases according to principles of right as
reflected in a nation's historical usages and customs and as given more definite
shape by earlier court decisions. If Courts are to avoid extratextual, nonoriginal
approaches to constitutional adjudication, the reason must lie elsewhere, not in
this theory of the judiciary.
Second, and more fundamentally, Bork seems to assume that this fulcmm is
a point on which all will agree, including his opponents. It functions as his
supposed firm ground from which he deploys a sort of intellectual jujitsu
against his opponents, turning the full strength of their arguments against them.
Note, for instance, his response to those who claim that, after this much time
and under such different conditions, we cannot possibly discern what the origi
nal generation had in mind for our situation. Bork responds: "If the meaning of
the Constitution is unknowable, if, so far as we can tell, it is written in unde
cipherable hieroglyphics, the conclusion is not that the judge may write his
own Constitution. The conclusion is that judges must stand aside and let cur
rent democratic majorities mle, because there is no law superior to theirs" (p.
167). Similarly, to those who respond that the intentions of dead men have no
authority over us today, Bork observes that the complaint taken seriously
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should annul the institution of judicial review itself as well as the whole of the
Constitution.
His responses are effective against those who share his view of judicial
supremacy (and of democratic mle). But Bork seems so enjoyably absorbed in
this task of hurling his traditional opponents against the ropes that he does not
notice when he is being attacked from a more radical angle. Many on the left
are in fact willing to relinquish judicial supremacy, a loss they find easier to
bear as the courts are filled with conservative appointees. For example, to San
ford Levinson, whom I quote above on the "death of the Constitution," Bork
replies: "Levinson does not explain why his view of the Constitution as non-
law does not lead to the conclusion that judicial supremacy is without legit
imacy" (p. 218), expecting thereby, one supposes, to leave him stunned for the
count. But Levinson, as it turns out, like many devotees of critical legal studies
(CLS), sees little reason for "privileging" judicial opinions over those of others.
About a decade ago, when asked for guidance on constitutional interpretation,
CLS comrade Mark Tushnet replied that one should "make an explicitly politi
cal judgment: which result is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to ad
vance the cause of socialism."19 Increasingly, these scholars have taken note
that the interpretations advancing the cause of socialism are not those being
given by the courts; thus, courts might well be abandoned in favor of more
"advanced"
organizations.
In most instances of constitutional adjudication, I doubt that the
"realist"
approach I have sketched here would differ dramatically from the
"originalist"
theory advocated by Bork. But if the Constitution is to be defended against the
attacks it is now weathering, I think we need to address more forthrightly than
does this version of originalism the philosophical foundations for the claims of
authority that the Constitution makes for itself. With such foundations more
than with filial piety we can guard ourselves against political temptation.
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A revered teacher of mine has written that Felix Frankfurter "was the best of
the twentieth century justices, but still not good
enough."That remark came to
mind more than once while reading Robert Bork's The Tempting ofAmerica. In
1987, when Ronald Reagan nominated him to replace Lewis Powell as Associ
ate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, few if any possible candidates to that
office compared to Bork in scholarly quality, intellectual rigor or judicial tem
perament (which is to cast no aspersions on the eventual choice, Justice An
thony Kennedy). If any doubt remained that that was so, this book, a combina
tion of judicial history, constitutional theory and personal memoir, removes it.
It is Bork's vindication, and it is much more than that. In it are revealed the
considerable virtues Bork would have brought to the bench of the high court
and some disturbing shortcomings as well. All could see, three years ago, that
here was no Earl Warren; neither is he the Great Chief Justice reincarnate.
Bork's purpose is to call America back, if it is not already too late, from the
brink of a very deep abyss, one in which the Constitution will have lost all its
independent status as law and become merely the "highest
prize"
to be won by
the victors of a "larger war in our culture"over questions of morality and of
democratic procedure (pp. 3, 10). As goes the Constitution, he argues force
fully, so go the very idea of law and any obligation to treat it as legitimate. The
moral terrorism displayed by the organized opposition to Bork's Supreme Court
nomination (amply documented in the final chapters here) demonstrates that
intellectual honesty, simple civility and sober public discourse are already casu
alties in this cultural war. The recent nomination hearings on Justice David
Souter witnessed just as much silliness but far less shrillness, but this marked
no revival of those qualities sacrificed three years earlier. It only meant that the
stakes were not perceived as quite so high by the opposition that mobilized
against Bork, and that President Bush had learned one of the lessons of the
author's experience, that "[a] president who wants to avoid a battle . is
likely to nominate men and women who have not written much, and certainly
nothing that could be regarded as controversial by left-leaning senators and
groups"(p. 347).
How did we come to this pass? The answer is a tale Bork tells in three parts.
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Part I, "The Supreme Court and the Temptations of Politics," consists of five
chapters charging that the Justices, since the Court's first decade, have occa
sionally succumbed to the urge to "strike down statutes on the basis of princi
ples not to be found in the Constitution" (p. 15). More accurately, Bork's
account is that what was at first an occasional indulgence became a habitual
vice in the late nineteenth century with the rise of property-rights activism in
the name of "due process,"and then metamorphosed into a full-blown patho
logical addiction with the late New Deal and Warren courts'embrace of a
constitutionally rootless egalitarian liberalism an addiction that still afflicted
the Burger Court and afflicts today's Rehnquist Court in an only slightly less
feverish condition. The increasing detachment of constitutional law from the
Constitution by the Supreme Court itself thus forms the first ingredient in the
potent brew that hooked American public life on political judging.
The second ingredient is provided by "The Theorists" Bork considers in Part
II. As it became increasingly difficult in the last thirty-five years to pretend that
the Court was enforcing the terms of the actual Constitution, a cottage industry
sprang up in the academic community, particularly in the law schools, devoted
to manufacturing mythical constitutions that could be called upon to justify the
Court's decisions. Some but not many of the new constitutional theorists honor
the original understanding of the Constitution in the breach, as they hammer its
terms into shapes that will lead to the results they prefer. More of them openly
question or attack the very notion of original understanding, spinning theoreti
cal constructs that will keep the document in tune with the times by making
the document increasingly irrelevant. If we may borrow a phrase that originated
with Walter Bems, Bork sets himself the task of "keeping the times in tune
with the
Constitution,"
by confronting a number of these theories on their own
ground and ably defending the doctrine of original understanding against their
assaults.
Bork's musings on the influence of these abstruse theories provide some of
the best passages in the book. No one in the general public, the press or on
Capitol Hill has the time or inclination to read the torrent of "[l]aw school
moral
philosophy"
that pours from the pens of Laurence Tribe, John Hart Ely,
Thomas Grey et al., with frightening regularity. Lawyers and judges them
selves have only slight contact with it, in quantitative terms (hapless law stu
dents get a bit more, of their
professors' favorite variety), and even its schol
arly manufacturers must have trouble keeping up with one another's inventions.
How, then, does the flood of theory find its way into what pass for judicial
opinions?
Its very inaccessibility may, paradoxically, be a source of its influence. Because
the public at large and the legal profession as a whole are unaware of what is being
taught and written, the reaction of ridicule and hostility that might have been
expected has not been forthcoming. But judges are aware that there is an enormous
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literature and that it is almost entirely disapproving of the idea that courts are
bound by the original understanding of the Constitution. The message arrives where
it counts. (P. 135)
Once it arrives there, it is a short step from judicial decisions with results
pleasant to a half-educated elite (the decisions, like the books and articles, read
by relatively few), to a common contempt among that elite for anyone who
questions the "reasoning" that led to the results. It is, after all, results and not
the mle of law that matter to this highly politicized audience. Thus a shoddy
philosophy that almost no one reads becomes an
"attitude"
that almost everyone
adopts at least, everyone who fancies himself abreast of the latest in intellec
tual fashion and moral rectitude.
It is that elite, which Bork calls the "intellectual
class"(though it "is not
necessarily composed of people who are good at intellectual
work"[p. 8]),
which confronted him on the path to the Supreme Court and turned it into the
"The Bloody Crossroads" described in Part III of the book. Coddled by a Court
that had legislated, in the name of the Constitution, their peculiarly egalitarian
agenda of moral relativism and moral coercion (see Chapter 11), bolstered by a
cadre of academic theorists that claimed to provide a constitutional underpin
ning for their agenda and for the Court's decisions, this elite (in the Senate, in
the press, in the academy, in the "civil rights
community,"in the "women's
movement") swung into action against a judicial nominee they rightly perceived
to be a threat to their continued dominance of America's legal culture. They
could not afford to describe openly the culture for which they fought, however,
for most ordinary citizens of common sense would reject it outright and em
brace the nominee. Instead, not to put too fine a point on it, they lied about
his writings and about his acts in official capacities. One of the admirable
qualities of this book is the civility Bork brings to the refutation of the charges
lodged against him during the nomination ordeal. But since, as he argues, the
politicization of the law has been accompanied by the sacrifice of exactly this
virtue, his civility is less surprising than it is admirable.
The core of The Tempting of America, literally and otherwise, is Bork's
defense of the doctrine of original understanding in constitutional interpreta
tion. These chapters are at once brilliant and simple in their argumentation (and
recalling, as Bork does, that Joseph Story warned against "metaphysical refine
ments"
and prized the Constitution's accessibility to the common citizen, those
qualities do indeed go together). The essential problem with any species of
"constitutional revisionis ,"liberal or conservative, is that it runs afoul of
what Bork's late friend Alexander Bickel called the "counter-majoritarian diffi
culty": on what grounds can the judge in a democratic republic override the will
of the people's elected representatives? With a note of wistfulness, Bork con
cludes that his friend never settled on a satisfactory answer to that question, for
Bickel chose grounds other than the Constitution's original understanding, and
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thus attempted the impossible, trying to "accommodate] a value-choosing
Court to the theory and practice of
democracy" (p. 193).
The dilemma is that plain, and that easily resolved: either the major premise
for every constitutional case is supplied by the "text, stmcture, and history of
the
Constitution" (p. 162), or it emerges from a trek through what James Kent
called "the trackless fields of [the judge's] imagination." The academics who
seize the latter hom may on occasion write interesting moral philosophy, but
every attempt to make of it a judicial philosophy comes finally to nothing but a
preference for the pleasant ukase over the democratic will. Authoritative
choices regarding the areas of public life where the people shall not mle, at
least not by simple majorities of nation or state, are made by the Constitution;
where it permits majoritarianism (or is silent, which amounts to the same), the
people need only express their will through the forms and processes of constitu
tional self-government. The latter is the case on most matters of public life, and
even on many matters of public judgment as to private behavior.
Chapter 8, which contains a series of refutations of "Objections to Original
Understanding," is probably as good a job of this as has yet been done. Bork
replies most cogently to the claim that recapturing the original understanding is
an intractable historical problem. This claim manifests itself variously: that the
intentions of the Framers are simply unknowable (an unusual assertion, given
the historical record); that the sources show the Framers to have been in dis
agreement on some interpretive issues (to the extent that this assertion rests on
the richness of the historical record, it contradicts the first); and that what we
can discover is useless for specific application to modem cases entailing cir
cumstances unknown and unforeseen two hundred years ago.
Bork cuts through these arguments with sound common sense. As to the
first, "[t]he case for general incomprehension because of the passage of time is
foolishness" (p. 166), and would equally obviate every kind of historical study
of literary, philosophical and religious texts. As to the second, Bork reminds us
elsewhere, "[t]he search is not for a subjective
intention"
of this or that member
of the Philadelphia Convention, or of all them together (p. 144). The Constitu
tion's authority derives from the consent of the ratifiers, and its meaning "must
be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood the words to
mean"(ibid.). (This, incidentally, is why Bork wisely insists on writing of the
"original understanding,"not of "original intent.") If subsequent disagreements
arose in the same generation, as they did, it cannot be because the words are
susceptible to any construction one cares to put on them surely the combat
ants of that day thought of their disputes as being carried on within an accepta
ble range of meaning, even if in the heat of debate they sometimes accused
each other of bad faith.
As to the final argument above, it amounts to the caricature that because
telephones did not exist in 1787, we cannot decide from original understanding
whether to apply the Fourth Amendment to wiretapping. In substance, just such
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an assault on what David Souter has called "specific intentionalism" was made
by his predecessor, William Brennan; the problem, as Bork notes, is that "Jus
tice Brennan demolished a position no one holds" (p. 162). The task of the
judge is to reflect on the Constitution's principles, not merely to research their
historical foundations; through this reflection he derives the major premise of a
constitutional decision, not its minor premise or conclusion. Will such reflec
tion have political results? Certainly; but it "should never have political inten
tions" (p. 177). That will have to be "regarded as good enough or we must
abandon the enterprise of law and most especially, that of judicial review (p.
163).
Because he criticizes the importation of extraconstitutional standards of nat
ural law into judicial decisions (whether under the contract clause, due process
or equal protection), Bork has been attacked by some readers whom one would
have supposed to be his natural allies. The argument is that he fails to recog
nize that the irreducible foundations of the Constitution's legitimacy as law are
the principles of natural right expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
Perhaps Bork is guilty of this failure: while he rests the Constitution's authority
on the consent of the people, nowhere does he explore the philosophical basis,
or limits, of that consent. To that extent he plumbs none of the depths of
limited government's first principles. But this is an empty indictment of his
theory of judging. To account fully for the scope of the judicial power under
the Constitution requires no such enterprise.
It is one thing to say that the Constitution derives its moral worth, its good
ness as a system of government founded on enlightened consent, from its foun
dation in transcendent principles of equality and natural law. Perhaps Bork
should have said this. It is also tme that a number of specific provisions in the
text are attempts to codify in positive law certain principles of the "laws of
nature and of nature's
God" (see, e.g., John Marshall's reflections on the philo
sophical roots of the contract clause in Ogden v. Saunders). Judges may need
at times to reflect on those underlying principles in order to grasp the purposes
served by certain provisions. This too is a possibility Bork does not address.
But it is quite another thing to say that where no specific principle of natural
law is posited in the Constitution's text or context, the judge should supply the
defect by filling in what the Constitution should have said but did not. It is a
mde surprise to my undergraduates of conservative bent to discover that the
founding generation, so mindful of the natural right to property, provided al
most nothing in the way of substantive protection for that right, but protected it
only procedurally from the taxing power, the federal commerce power, and the
state police power. Equally surprised are my liberal students to find that no
general "right to
privacy"is secured by the Constitution. The sovereign people,
not their judicial servants, are responsible for the constitutional order's consis
tency with the laws of nature. They may amend the document if the Framers
wrought not so well, or they are free to codify in legislation any natural rights
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they find inadequately protected. They may also make mistakes in their at
tempts at such measures. The good judge reminds them that this is their respon
sibility; he does not assume it for them, however pure the motive.
If this smacks of positivism, it is well to remember that the judicial positivist
(unlike the legal positivist) is not necessarily a moral relativist. As Bork rightly
notes,
where the Constitution does not apply, the judge, while in his robes, must adopt a
posture of moral abstention (which is very different from personal moral
relativism), but he and the rest of us need not and should not adopt such a posture
when entering the voting booth. (P. 259)
It needs to be said that we can do (and have done) a lot worse than have even
thoroughgoing legal positivists on the bench. Such a jurist may be unable to
articulate the tme ground of the regime; we may find his opinions on constitu
tional questions arid and unenlightening of the public spirit that a viable repub
lic requires. But better he than the judicial moralist confident that he can supply
the justice the Constitution does not promise. We are better off with the latter
than the former in the legislature, no doubt; but in the judiciary is another
matter.
In one respect only, Bork's righteous anger at the improper introduction of
extratextual natural law into the decision of constitutional cases leads him
astray: he sees it where it isn't. In his first chapter, "Creation and
Fall," Bork
claims that early justices such as Samuel Chase, John Marshall and William
Johnson succumbed to the temptation to make the Constitution say what it does
not in defense of natural law. Only in Johnson's case is this even arguably so;
Chase and Marshall can be read this way only by taking their words out of
context. Bork's excuse is that in this he is utterly conventional; everyone since
Roscoe Pound has lodged the accusation against Chase and Marshall, among
other antebellum justices. Unfortunately, repetition has replaced investigation
for most scholars.
This example brings us to the only serious weakness of the book. Bork is
not a very good constitutional historian. Worse, since the historical chapters
provide most of his opportunities to display his interpretive skills at work, they
reveal that he is a better defender of the doctrine of original understanding than
he is a practitioner of it. Aside from the unsupported and insupportable claim
that Marshall was an activist in Marbury v. Madison and other cases (also
utterly conventional and wrong), there are a number of other curious readings
of judicial history. A few examples are in order.
With no substantial argument, for instance, Bork asserts that Hepburn v.
Griswold (1870), in which Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase declared unconstitu
tional an act of Congress making paper money legal tender, "may well have
been correct, though Chase's opinion does not persuade one of that" (p. 34; see
Bork's throwaway line on alternative grounds, p. 36). An apparent animus
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toward centralized federal power leads him to condemn Wickard v. Fillburn
(1942, upholding wheat quotas even when a farmer did not intend his surplus
for market). Based on "[s]ound economics without doubt," it was nevertheless
"a manifestation of judicial activism."Why? Because of the Tenth Amendment
and the supposed principle that "a regulation of commerce had to be done for
commercial reasons and not as a means of social or moral
regulation"(p. 56).
One wonders whether Bork is familiar with Marshall's statements on the non-
justiciability of the Tenth Amendment in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and
on the breadth of the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). Wickard in
fact marked a welcome end to the activist doctrine of dual federalism in com
merce cases. "Protecting federalism" more than the Constitution warrants is no
more legitimate than protecting natural rights the Constitution does not codify.
And it is decidedly strange, given his treatment here, that Bork has next to
nothing to say in criticism of this century's most egregious assault on federal
ism (and judicial power grab): the application of the Bill of Rights to state
governments.
The treatments of two interpretive issues under the Fourteenth Amendment
suggest that Bork is unfamiliar with the seminal work of Raoul Berger in this
area. First, while rightly praising the mling in the Slaughterhouse Cases up
holding a state-mandated
butchers'
monopoly in New Orleans, he too readily
leaps to the statement that the meaning of the amendment's privileges land im
munities clause "is largely
unknown"(p. 39; later it becomes an "ink
blot,"
p.
166). If the clause is effectively a dead letter today, that has more to do with
Justice Miller's evisceration of it in Slaughterhouse than with any intrinsic
mystery about its meaning.
Secondly, Bork joins a choms of scholarly voices that the desegregation
mling in Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954) "was supported by a very weak
opinion"(p. 75). This is tme, and he is right to point out that the Court's
departure from originalist reasoning in that case helped spawn much of the
liberal constitutional revisionism seeking better alternative grounds for that ml
ing than the Court's foray into sociology. But after conceding the "inescapable
fact"
that "those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed segre
gated
education"(ibid.), Bork then spends several pages attempting the impos
sible, namely searching for a way to say that what the original understanding
did not mean then it does mean now. The attempt is valiant, but he cannot
manage this without violating his own canons of interpretation. For better or
worse, Brown was not only poorly reasoned but incorrect and incorrectible,
much as that observation has become taboo among polite academics.
These and other disputations over particular cases require more space than is
permitted here and should not detract from the merits of The Tempting ofAmer
ica. The rulings Bork chooses to praise and blame would not in all cases have
been my choices. But one final and disturbing point should be made. Through
out the book Bork uses "judicial
supremacy"
as a synonym for "judicial re-
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view."What can be inferred from this about the separation of powers is bad
enough, but Bork makes his meaning explicit:
[T]he only safeguard we have in the long run against the abuse of judicial power,
which we have agreed in advance to obey, is the formation of a consensus about
how judges should behave .... (P. 55; emphasis added.)
Such a consensus is desirable, and a Court stocked by Borks and Bork-readers
might just be good enough. But the Framers did not contemplate judicial su
premacy over constitutional questions and thought long and hard about the in
stitutional means to check overweening power wherever it appeared. Do we no
longer have a sense of the "auxiliary
precautions"
they prescribed in the event
of a "defect of bettermotives,"as well in those who govern as in those who are
governed?
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of the Law
(New York: The Free Press, 1990), xiv + 432 pp. $22.50; $10.95 paper.
Ken Masugi
The Claremont Institute
Those who made and endorsed our Constitution knew man's nature, and it is to
their ideas, rather than to the temptations of utopia, that we must ask that our
judges adhere.1
Robert Bork
Judge Bork's book elaborates on his jurisprudence of original understanding,
which he regards as "the only method [of legal interpretation] that can preserve
the Constitution, the separation of powers, and the liberties of the people"(p.
159). But can these noble aims be secured by the judge's version of "original
understanding"? Bork claims to have produced a jurisprudential discourse on
method, reflecting on Supreme Court history (with a focus on the development
of substantive due process), current trends in constitutional law, and his own
demonization during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings.2 His defense of
freedom focuses on legal and political institutions, for
[t]he foundation of American freedom is in the structure of our Republic. The
major features of that structure are the separation of powers of the national
government and the limitation of national power to preserve a large degree of
autonomy in the states. (P. 4)
Today the threat to freedom comes not so much from tyrannical majorities
but rather a nonelected, life-tenured judiciary, which seeks to "remake the his
toric Constitution from such materials as natural law, conventional morality,
prophetic vision, the understanding of an ideal democracy, or what have
you"
(p. 6, emphases added). These doctrinaire "theorists. ... all wind up in the
same place, prescribing a new constitutional law that is much more egalitarian
and socially permissive than either the actual Constitution or the legislative
opinion of the American public."This subversion of the original understanding
of the Constitution comes about when judicial interpretation is mistaken for
justice. Bork cites as the contrary "American
orthodoxy"Oliver Wendell
Holmes's contention that "[j]ustice in a larger sense, justice according to moral
ity, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit, through the
creation of a new
law" (p. 6). But here, along with Holmes's animus against
natural law, Bork imports a quite unorthodox doctrine leading to legal pos
itivism that undermines him and his friends in their fight against nihilism and
interpretation, Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1
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their patriotic defense of freedom.3 Moreover, Bork's approach distracts good
citizens from more comprehensive and politically persuasive arguments. A crit
ical reading of Bork reminds us of the political significance of philosophic
principles, in other words, the political and philosophic sides of classical natu
ral right an enduring theme of American politics. (That Bork invites judg
ment by this high standard is implicit in his claim to have produced a book "not
. . . ultimately about legal theory. It is about who we are and how we live; it is
about who governs us and how, about our freedom to make our own moral
choices . . [p. 11].)
In articulating his method of original understanding, Bork focuses exclu
sively on the text and its interpreters, the judges. "All serious constitutional
theory centers upon the duties of judges. . (p. 155). The place of the Court is
thus to assure neutrality, and "original
understanding"intends to supply neu
trality in deriving, defining, and applying principle (p. 146). In deriving origi
nal understanding, what interpreters look at is "how the words used in the
Constitution would have been understood at the time," by the public, in their
ratifying conventions (p. 144). Original understanding calls for the best judges
can be expected to do; it is an imperative. For example, judges cannot interpret
an "ink blot" (p. 16) like the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities
clause. (". . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
Bork summarizes:
In short, all that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the
text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion
but with a major premise. That major premise is a principle or stated value that the
ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile legislation or executive action. The judge
must then see whether that principle or value is threatened by the statute or action
challenged in the case before him. The answer to that question provides his minor
premise, and the conclusion follows. (Pp. 162-63)
This neat procedure not only provides for a disciplined, apolitical judiciary, but
it also has the great political benefit of encouraging democratic self-govern
ment. A judge must exercise "abstinence from giving his own desires free
play"
and self-consciously renounce power, for this is "the morality of the
jurist" (p.
178). In America's present circumstances this neutrality would have the politi
cal benefit, Bork observes, of combatting the left-wing assault on politics, cul
ture, and morality (pp. 241-50).
But this jurisprudence is not mechanical, Bork argues; politics, in the form
of making political judgments, does intrude on the courts. For Bork might well
respect a precedent which he would have disputed purely on original-under
standing grounds, by relying on what he calls "the pmdence of a court." A
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prior decision "may be clearly incorrect but nevertheless have become so em
bedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to
the private and public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the re
sult should not be changed now"(p. 158). Thus a strict "original understand
ing"
of the commerce clause the principal constitutional justification for the
expansion of federal power might overturn New Deal and Great Society pro
grams and "plunge us into chaos. No judge would dream of doing
it" (p. 158).
Though Bork appears to call for judicial statesmanship, he leaves us in the dark
about when and how a judge knows when he need be more than an interpreter
of the laws and applier of the "original-understanding" text.
Closely related to this narrow view of the Court's function is Bork's legal
positivism. While attacking leftist
"moralism"
and its concomitant relativism,
Bork regards law as an expression of the community's morality (pp. 241-50,
infra.). Like Max Weber, who propounded the fact-value distinction to fight
Marxist corruption of the universities, Bork would use "original
understanding"
to rein in nihilism and prevent the corruption of the law and hence of politics
and morality. Needless to say, the collapse of Weber's Weimar democracy
advises against Bork's tactic here. Bork makes impossible demands on judges
and, implicitly, on citizens as well:
In order to gain the assent of the public, the
judges'
explanation of why they are
entitled to displace our moral choices with theirs would require that the judges be
able to articulate a system of morality upon which all persons of good will and
adequate intelligence must agree. .
I do not mean that moral philosophy is a failed or useless enterprise. I mean
only that moral philosophy has never succeeded in providing an overarching system
that commands general assent. (P. 253)
He continues in this radically skeptical vein in other places as well (p. 255).
Adopting the language of earlier work, he argues that ". . . unless we can rank
forms of gratification [of the parties in a case] , the judge must let the majority
have its way. There is, however, no principled way to make the necessary
distinctions" between types of "gratifications" (p. 258; Bork relies on his earlier
provisional essay, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems,"
Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 47 [1971], p. 1.). Astoundingly, Bork characterizes
this attitude as "moral abstention,"not moral relativism. (Bork's assumption
oddly resembles that of "the end of history
thesis,"
that a consensus on political
forms indicates the end of history/philosophy and the discovery of the tmth.)
Of course it is tme that "moral philosophy cannot create primary mles, or
major
premises"for a judge (p. 254), for American political morality is not
something
"created" but rather derived from natural rights and revealed reli
gion. Yet Bork's positivistic blasts at those who attack "traditional views of
morality"
would backfire and destroy the morality of the Constitution he so
passionately seeks to defend. For the Founders neither argued as positivists nor
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conceived of constitutional law as primarily a matter for judges, but they did
think and act in the natural-rights, higher-law tradition.
These differences place Bork closer to the dangerous tendencies in contem
porary jurisprudence he criticizes than to the Founders, whose views he dis
torts. Founded as "a Madisonian system," the United States, Bork contends,
contains two opposing principles that must be continually reconciled. The first
principle is self-government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are
entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities. The second is that
there are nonetheless some things majorities must not do to minorities, some areas
of life in which the individual must be free of majority mle. The dilemma is that
neither majorities nor minorities can be trusted to define the proper spheres of
democratic authority and individual liberty. To place that power in one or the other
would risk either tyranny by the majority or tyranny by the minority. . . We have
placed the function of defining the otherwise irreconcilable principles of majority
power and minority freedom!,] ultimately, in the Supreme Court. ... (P. 139)
The Court's obligation of resolving the
"dilemma"
of majority versus minority
mle "impose[s] a need for constitutional
theory"
about the Court his theory of
original understanding (p. 140).
But Bork has rushed too quickly to the Court and too quickly from his
principles, which are themselves problematic. Certainly Madison himself never
formulated the democratic "dilemma" in the way Bork does. In The Federalist,
number 10, for example, Madison notes the necessity for modem republics to
deal with the effects of faction, majority or minority, while pointing (as he does
in paper number 14) to the need for republics to deal with the causes of faction,
through a civic education that teaches citizens to be "the mutual guardians of
their mutual
happiness,"
a "public happiness." Bork's jurisprudence is all
means, purporting to take account of basic political principles, but in fact dis
missive of higher political ends other than the process of democratic give and
take. By contrast, Madison makes the question of democratic self-government
depend not on numbers, large or small, but on legitimacy, a quality rather than
a quantity, majority or
minority.4 Compare Bork's later comment that
a person who understands these issues [viz. original understanding] and
nevertheless continues to judge constitutional philosophy by sympathy with its
results must, if he is candid, also admit that he is prepared to sacrifice democracy
in order that his moral views may prevail. ... He believes in the triumph of the
will. (P. 265)
Here Bork assumes that the crisis of our times ("the tempting of America") is
not on a par with the great regime crises of the Founding and the Civil War. As
Bork stresses, the separation of powers is cmcial to American freedom, but
today Congress administers, the executive makes speeches, and the judiciary
legislates. Ideological jurisprudence exhibits the willfulness that natural rights
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and the classical portrayal of law embodying reason without passion were in
tended to overcome. The willfulness of former Mr. Justice Brennan is seen in
his inventive opinions, and the willfulness of some conservatives occurs in their
faith in majorities but majorities evidently unrestrained by natural law or right
reason. This is not government proceeding according to enlightened consent.
(See John Marini, "The Political Conditions of Legislative-Bureaucratic Su
premacy,"The Claremont Review ofBooks [Spring 1988], pp. 7-9.) In light of
such opposition, why now demand such an original-understanding jurispru
dence for the Court, with its excessive deference to a Congress far gone from
the
Founders'
understanding of deliberation? Had the judge forgotten Mad
ison's query in number 10, "what are many of the most important acts of
legislation but so many judicial determinations. . ."? What should we make of
Madison's reference to the separation of powers as one of a pattern of "inven
tions of pmdence"? Finally, can one understand any decent regime exclusively
in terms of consent (and the institutions which produce it), while neglecting the
role of wisdom?
By confronting such questions, Bork would have approached the nature of
the original understanding. He comes close, at times, to recovering this hori
zon, but he is ultimately worlds apart from the Founders as they understood
themselves. For example, he once refers to "[t]he orthodoxy of our civil reli
gion, which the Constitution has aptly been called . . (p. 153). But how a
Constitution lacking transcendent principles of God and nature could deserve
the status of religion, even civil religion, is unexplained. Behind the principles
of majority versus minority tyrannies is another set of principles, namely those
of the American Founding including natural rights, equality, liberty, and con
sent of the governed which inform the debate over democratic mle.5
In sum, Bork slights the significance of the Declaration of Independence
that is, of fundamental principles for the "stmcture of our
republic."
Nothing
could better illustrate his aversion to natural right than his omission, marked by
ellipses, of the Constitution's reference to the Declaration in its closing lines
(completed on "the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the Independence of the
United States of America the Twelfth") from the book's reprinting of the Con
stitution.6 Bork is determined to battle the enemies of the regime without the
resources of the original document that inspired the regime; such an effort will,
to quote Bork on his
enemies'doctrines, "wind up in the same
place"
as theirs.
That this is a possibility can be seen in his sketch of Supreme Court history.
Bork focuses on the rise of the dubious concepts of substantive due process and
substantive equal protection, doctrines enabling the Court to make willful moral
judgments under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. Here we see some
accusations which at first seem surprising. For example, even Chief Justice
John Marshall does not escape criticism for favoring natural-law reasoning in
some of his cases and for having reached a "few conclusions that could not be
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justified by the Constitution" (p. 27). Moreover, Bork concedes that there was
an overriding political purpose to Marshall's jurisprudence:
It would be wrong for those of us who have never faced the possible failure of
the entire enterprise that is the United States to be too easily critical of Marshall's
performance. . . . [B]y the same token it would be a mistake for us to take
Marshall's performance, in all its aspects, as a model for judges now that the basic
structure and unity of our nation have been accepted. (P. 28)
But, if the Founding is one exception requiring judicial statesmanship, why
would not the Civil War be another? And what about the Great Depression?
And the stmggle to preserve free government and western civilization today?
To the contrary, Hadley Arkes argues that the natural-law reasoning of Jus
tice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia (2 Dallas 419, 1793)
should serve as models for Supreme Court opinion writing (First Things, pp.
ix-x). Note as well Jeremy Rabkin's remarks:
Early decisions of the Supreme Court could invoke "the first principles of
justice"
or "natural law" to condemn government interference with contractual
rights of private persons. . . . But the moral authority of courts was still sharply
limited by the modest pretensions of this "higher
law." Judges did not claim
responsibility for promoting virtue or for securing the common good. In form, the
judicial obligation, even in cases invoking the higher law of the Constitution, was
simply an obligation to determine whether individuals had been subject to unlawful
coercion. (Judicial Compulsions [New York: Basic Books, 1989], p. 119)
Today, when individual rights are under attack from diverse ideologies, is not
the notion of limited government derived from the "higher law" indispensable?
But for Bork the common thread in cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford (60
U.S. [19 Howard] 393), Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45 [1905], striking
down a state law limiting bakers' work hours), and Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113
[1973]) is that they all equally distort the meaning of the Constitution's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses, that government may not de
prive a person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." For
Bork, the courts'using these procedural clauses to strike down laws concerning
slavery, labor, and abortion is the negative proof of his positive defense of
original understanding: "Who says Roe must say Lochner and
Scott" (p. 32).7
This aversion to involving the Court in matters of fundamental political prin
ciple may explain Bork's puzzling comments on policies of abortion and race
and gender preference, the two principal moral questions facing our polity to
day. In criticizing Laurence Tribe for citing Lincoln on Dred Scott in support of
a constitutional right of abortion, Bork makes the astounding assertion that
"[t]he abortion issue does not threaten the survival of the nation, and Lincoln
certainly never suggested that the cure for a nation half slave and half free was
for the Supreme Court to end slavery by inventing the Thirteenth Amendment"
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(p. 203). While Tribe certainly is preposterous, as Bork's well-taken observa
tion about Lincoln indicates, Bork misses the point of Lincoln's "crisis of the
house divided" speech. He was referring even more to the survival of the char
acter of a free nation than to an impending war. Slavery would kill the nation's
soul. Thus, Lincoln's arguments against slavery are the pro-life movement's
best resource, as it too argues that America's spiritual survival is in jeopardy.8
But the oddest, and most revealing, result of Bork's doctrine of original
understanding occurs in the area of racial preference. Here we see most vividly
the consequences of his dichotomy between the Constitution and natural right.
He attacks the federal companion case to Brown v. Board of Education (347
U.S. 483 [1954]), Boiling v. Sharpe (347 U.S. 497 [1954]), for using the Fifth
Amendment due process clause to strike down racially segregated schools in
the District of Columbia. (The Fifth Amendment due process clause reads: "No
person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . .") Bork is certainly correct in noting that the Fifth Amendment
requirement restraining the federal government cannot be facilely equated with
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, which restricts state leg
islation. (Consider the Japanese-American relocation cases from World War II,
in which the Supreme Court rejected such challenges and accepted the military-
necessity arguments of the elected branches.) Yet,
[i]ronically [sic], given the motives for this innovation, the Court's fifth
amendment equal protection clause is the main basis for attacking federal
legislation compelling affirmative action or reverse racial discrimination. Without
Boiling's invention, it is not easy to think of how a constitutional challenge to such
laws could be mounted. (P. 84)
This shocking legitimation of racial preference laws indicates the extent of his
belief in legislative-executive supremacy. This is the reductio ad absurdum of
Bork's peculiar attack on substantive due process. Particularly in Dred Scott
and Boiling an appeal to the origins of American constitutional government in
the Declaration of Independence's reliance on human equality would confirm
the Constitution as a document protecting individual rights. This was indeed the
failure of the Court's reasoning (as opposed to its decisions) in Brown and all
the race-related cases: overlooking the Civil War
ame dments'
revival of the
principles of the American Founding. Thus Bork's jurisprudence is unable to
deal satisfactorily with today's leading moral issues of American politics.
Good citizenship requires recognition of the nation's birth in and perpetua
tion through these principles. A Supreme Court justice is not exempt from this
common understanding of citizenship obligations. Deprived of his character
and legal talents in public life, Americans can hope that in his good fight the
judge would add to his armory the weapon of natural right, for he has been
much too kind to the enemies of free government.
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NOTES
1. P. 355. All further references to The Tempting of America occur in the text. I wish to
acknowledge the aid of John Marini in developing my argument, as we watched the Bork contro
versy unfold when we worked in Washington together, and of Dennis Teti and Jeffrey Wallin and
the challenging commentaries of various members of the Federalist Society.
2. A faithful insider account of the Bork nomination struggle can be found in Patrick B.
McGuigan and Dawn M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice (Washington, DC: Free Congress Research and
Educational Foundation, 1990). Bork's singular act of statesmanship was to insist on a full Senate
vote a demand for senatorial responsibility.
3. For Holmes's contempt for reason, see "Natural
Law" in The Political Thought ofAmerican
Statesmen, Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens, eds. (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers,
1973), pp. 263-67. Note Walter Berns's reflections:
Holmes was a man of the law, but the Supreme Court of the United States is not simply,
and in one sense not even primarily, a court of law; and this explains his failure as a justice.
The Supreme Court is primarily a court of constitutional law in the sense that its power to
enforce constitutional principle gives it a role in one sense the decisive role in the
governing of Americans. [B]ut no judge in the history of the Supreme Court made less
of an effort to learn what was expedient for the United States, or what the Constitution
regarded as expedient for the United States. And contrary to the Holmesian iconographers, no
man with anything approaching his length of service on the Court, contributed so little in the
development of the constitutional law that defines the rights, privileges and immunities of
Americans even as it imposes limits on the government.
The cause of his failure in this respect is not hard to find. The Constitution occupied no
special place in his thoughts, because the idea of natural principles ofjustice which the
Founders understood to be embodied in the Constitution was wholly alien to his thought.
("Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the Question of Judicial Activism," in William F.
Buckley, Jr., and Charles R. Kesler, eds., Saving the Tablets (New York: Harper and Row,
1988), p. 302, emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
Of course, Bork and his allies have seen natural law typically used to justify left-wing positions.
4. Hence Bork criticizes his late friend and colleague Alexander Bickel for his emphasis on the
"legitimating function" of the Supreme Court through the making and articulation of principled
decisions (pp. 190-91). Bickel argues, ". . . [I]t has in large part been left to the Supreme Court to
concretize the symbol of the Constitution" (The Least Dangerous Branch [Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1962], p. 31). For reflections on reconciling principle and expediency in American poli
tics, Bickel (pp. 65-72) relies on Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1959; reprinted, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
5. For secondary sources that point to some of the most interesting primary sources for recover
ing original understanding in its fuller sense, see, e.g., George Anastaplo, The Constitution of
1787: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Hadley Arkes, First
Things (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Herman Belz, "Abraham Lincoln and
American Constitutionalism," The Review of Politics (Spring, 1988), pp. 169-97; Harry Clor,
"Constitutional Interpretation and Regime Principles," in The Constitution, the Courts, and the
Quest for Justice, Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Ameri
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990), pp. 115-35; Edward J. Erler, "Natural
Right in the American Founding," and Thomas G. West, "The Classical Spirit of the Founding," in
The American Founding, J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy, and Ken Masugi, eds. (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 195-223, pp. 1-56; Charles R. Kesler, ed., Saving the Revolu
tion: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (New York: Free Press, 1987); Michael
Zuckert, "Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth Amendment," Constitutional Commentary,
vol. 4 (Summer, 1987), pp. 259-83. Unfortunately this review could not take account of Arkes's
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Beyond the Constitution, which was just being published by Princeton as the review was being
completed.
6. This portion of the Constitution, not to be mistaken for a mere flourish, is frequently omit
ted; e.g., Garry Wills's edition of The Federalist (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 462.
Presidential proclamations end with this formulation. See "Introduction," The American Founding,
pp. xii-iv.
7. See Abraham Lincoln's great speech on the Dred Scott case, June 26, 1857 (Complete
Writings [Camden, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956], vol. 2, pp. 398-410). For a critical
analysis of Bork's few pages on Dred Scott see Harry V. Jaffa, National Review (July 9, 1990), pp.
40-43. Note as well Professor Jaffa's "What Were the 'Original Intentions' of the Framers of the
Constitution of the United States?" University ofPuget Sound Law Review, vol. 10 (Spring, 1987),
pp. 351-448. Regarding the Lochner case, the question arises especially given the experience of
the socialist countries of the extent of economic regulation a liberal democracy can tolerate before
it is transformed.
8. For understanding the Court's early cases on another method of population control, steriliza
tion, see Walter Berns's classic article, "Buck v. Bell: Due Process of
Law?" Western Political
Quarterly, vol. 6 (December, 1953), pp. 762-75. Professor Berns notes the common intellectual
patrimony of the eugenicist movement and the Nazi party. Regarding the constitutional question, he
observes: "In the end, procedural due process is a substantive right which is denied everyone to
whom injustice is done" (p. 775). For thoughtful commentary on the abortion issue which acknowl
edges natural right see Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987).

Book Reviews
Kirk Emmert, Winston S. Churchill on Empire (Durham: Carolina Academic
Press and the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political
Philosophy, 1989). xx + 157 pp., $18.95.
Will Morrisey
Winston Churchill claimed, "There is no halfway house for Britain between
greatness and
min"(p. 3). In fact there is; its proprietor is Margaret Thatcher.
Britain has lost and gained: markets replaced colonies; Englishness replaced
'civilization'; corporations replaced viceroys. If household management or eco
nomics has not quite replaced politics, the mold that shaped Churchill has bro
ken. There is no halfway house for a Churchill between greatness and min.
Americans think of Churchill as a wartime ally against rightist tyranny and a
peacetime ally against leftist tyranny, as a courageous prophet of liberty finally
honored in his native land. Churchill's defense of the British Empire strikes
Americans as contradictory to this spirit, something to be deplored or at best
apologized for. Professor Emmert's study has the merit of recognizing that
Churchill's "commitment to empire was central"to his political career (p. xi).
Emmert shows that Churchill's commitment arose not from mere traditionalism
or even from ambition, simply, but from an "aristocratic or
Aristotelian"
under
standing of the demands and responsibilities of political life (p. xvi).
"Tme" imperialism develops both "manhood" and commerce in the imperial
nation (p. 1). By renouncing its continental ambitions and building the stron
gest navy in the world, Britain increased its own security and encouraged lim
ited government in England while freeing the army for overseas conquests.
Continental nations expended substantial public revenues on self-defense; the
British navy defended the island nation inexpensively, leaving money available
for private investment and international commerce. The navy protected British
shipping and forcibly opened new markets. Military
'necessity'
refocused, from
national defense to imperial defense. Imperial defense requires expansion, as
increased territory increases the scope of security needs. "[W]ar and change,
not peace and permanence, are the constant companions of
empire"(p. 8). A
moderate, civilized empire must "pursue a policy which is difficult to distin
guish from that of an aggressive, intentionally expansive
nation."Even a civi
lized empire "must act in much the same manner as a tyrant" (p. 9). Nor did
Churchill try to hide under the cloak of 'necessity'; he freely observed that the
natural desire "to be predominant"fans imperialist ambitions. Civilization "re-
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strains and rechannels these instincts into more pacific activities, but it cannot
eliminate or fully control them" (p. 10).
Churchill parted from Machiavelli in upholding an "eternal standard of right
and wrong independent of and superior to climate, custom, and
caprice"(p.
11), a standard beckoning citizens to honor. Honor is a mean between "narrow
self interest and moralistic excess"(p. 12). "Churchill proposed civilizing em
pire as the cure to the disease of tyrannizing
empire"(p. 13), of which he saw
three kinds during his career: the "scientific
barbarism"
of the Kaiser's Ger
many; the "animal form of
barbarism"
of Bolshevik Russia; and the racist bar
barism of Nazi Germany (p. 15). Barbarism begins with human life itself. A
prepolitical war of "all against all"reflects mankind's "strong aboriginal pro
pensity to
kill" (p. 16). Primitive peoples lack shame and moral indignation,
engage in treachery and violence, and cannot reason. They emerge from the
most primitive barbarism when, tiring of perpetual insecurity, they establish
tyrannies. In their credulity, primitive men also give way to "religious fanati
cism grounded in a claim of prophetic revelation"; this religion impedes civili
zation's development by encouraging "degraded
sensualism"
and by retarding
the mental faculties (p. 17). As civilization develops, however, intelligence
usually outmns morality, leading once again to barbarism.
Churchill considered courage to be the foundation of civilized or fully hu
man life. Courage is "the first of all human qualities"because it "guarantees all
the
others"(p. 19). The courage of barbarians is reckless or "wild courage"
passionate, unruly, rash (p. 20). Civilized courage is calm, a sign of self-
mastery and endurance. "In the civilized man, Churchill suggests, reason mles
the bodily desires and man's spiritedness. Thus, under stress, the civilized man
is persevering, serene, deliberate, self-controlled and proudly
self-sufficient"
(p. 22). Habituation forms civilized courage; the force of discipline and of
circumstances supplements habit. Habit should be reinforced by vanity, the
desire to establish a good reputation, but this must not be overemphasized, as it
will promote timidity in the face of public disapproval. The sentiment of no
bility, whereby "vanity is transformed into justifiable pride"(p. 25), best an
chors habitual courage.
Churchill recognized that the increasing egalitarianism of modem civiliza
tion threatened these Aristotelian virtues. He therefore "stressed increasingly in
his speeches and more popular writings the kinship of civilization and freedom
or
self-government"(p. 25). Attempting to preserve as much of the older moral
order as possible, he traced British rights, liberties, and constitutional safe
guards to "ancient Greece and Rome" (p. 26); he represented the Roman Em
pire in Britain as "a golden age for Britain" (p. 9), a time when the British
themselves benefited morally and politically from mle by civilized imperialists.
The virtues of justice, pmdence, moderation or self-government, and goodwill
or toleration, along with civilized courage, make individual and political free
dom possible; most of these are classical virtues. Christianity too has its place
Book Reviews 97
because "philosophy" these are Churchill's words "cannot convince the
bullet" (p. 129, n.81). Prayer and belief in providence may not convince the
bullet, either, but they serve as helps to steady the man facing the bullet.
"Churchill understood that the morality that guided the [British] Empire and the
rest of the civilized West had both classical and Christian roots"(p. 29); al
though the statesman will conduct himself according to the classical standard of
gentlemanly honor, he will also nourish Christianity as "the most politically
salutary religion available to modem civilized
statesmen"(p. 30). Modem sci
ence also needs cultivation; even more it needs restraint. "The first civilization
that has indissolvably married human excellence and physical power rather than
leaving them to come together occasionally and by chance"(p.31) must take
care that scientific or intellectual development does not overwhelm moral vir
tues, destroying the conditions of its own existence.
Emmert discusses Churchill's view of civilizing empire's effect on mlers
and the mled. "[A]ll human beings have an obligation to improve themselves
which takes precedence over any rights they might claim to liberty or self-
government" (p. 33). Primitive contentment is no more fully human than is
primitive strife, and both prevent or retard the development of civilization.
"The precariousness of [the] natural way to civilization, its long duration, and
the likelihood it might miscarry led Churchill to reject it in principle as an alter
native to imperial mle"(p. 34). Empire as it were assists nature by "rapidly
increasing capital wealth and by expanding human desires" (p. 36), first by
encouraging small entrepreneurs, then larger scale commercial projects. At the
same time modem civilization's technology goes beyond assistance to the sub
jugation of nature for use by man. Capital investment should be limited to
avoid exploitation; Churchill preferred a limited state socialism, limited be
cause an excessively powerful local government would overawe the native pop
ulation and demand independence from the Empire, breaking the civilizational
bonds that alone justify empire. Christian missionaries posed an especially dif
ficult problem; Churchill applauded them only in such places as Uganda, where
they cooperated fully with the imperial government.
Altruism and philanthropy should not move imperial mlers. Nor should self
ishness. "At its best, empire is not a burden to be
endured"
or a tyranny to be
exploited "but an opportunity for individual and national
self-improvement"
(p. 53). Barbarians have no intrinsic rights; rather, civilized nations owe it to
themselves to treat barbarians justly. In this Churchill found himself opposed
by the democrats and state socialists who gained power after the First World
War. Democrats reduced politics to economics, "denied that man was a politi
cal
animal"(p. 55). Socialists sought to politicize the private. Churchill defined
politics in two distinct, complementary ways: as a means of collective action to
satisfy the individual's need for security and well-being and as an effort to
realize the distinctively human potential for reasoning and reasoned speech.
Imperialism satisfied man's political nature in both senses, immediately for the
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mlers and mled with respect to
'low'
politics, and immediately formlers, even
tually for the mled, with respect to
'high'
politics. Empire "calls forth certain
virtues, and thus a specific type of human
being" (p. 63). Its ordinary citizens
strengthen their self-respect; its extraordinary citizens fulfill their magnanimity,
their greatness of soul in the Aristotelian sense. Empire counterbalanced the
leveling effects of mass democracy. "[SJince the maintenance [of Empire]
necessitated a considerably greater degree ofmoral and political virtue from the
nation's foremost citizens, in looking up to these leaders the British citi
zenry was taught to admire the considerable virtue they
embodied"(p. 64).
For the foremost citizens themselves, "mling
imperially"
afforded the
chance to achieve the fullest humanity by engagement in "the fully civilizing
activity" (p. 64).
"By the late 1920s, Churchill had concluded that the coming of mass de
mocracy had transformed and degraded British
politics"(p. 70). Majoritarian
ism replaced deliberation and consent, and "the advent of political equality
undermined [the] conventional acknowledgments of political authority which in
the best cases were indications of natural preeminence and in most cases made
mediocrity more
serviceable"(p. 71). As technology purveyed mass tastes,
politics itself became more 'technical' or technocratic as middle and lower
classes improved their standard of living but declined in the exercise of civic
liberty, pmdence, and initiative. The British political system liquefied (in
Churchill's metaphor). Institutions, hierarchy, structure weakened against the
ebb and flow of public passions. Churchill attempted to use imperialism as
a bulwark against this tide, but as the spirit of party triumphed over the spirit
of Parliament, the Empire itself became a bone of political contention. A poli
tics of individual rights and self-interest overcame the politics of honor and
"noble self-regard" (p. 81). "[I]t was not possible for long to mle according
to 'new principles'at home but 'old principles'abroad"(p. 85). Churchill
gradually came to hope for a British Empire of self-governing dominions, a
"voluntary association of like-minded nations"or "English-speaking
peoples"
(p. 99) less a political than a cultural empire modeled on Demosthenes'
pan-Hellenism.
The tension in Churchill's thought between "his acceptance of human equal
ity"
and "his admiration for excellence and for the accomplishments of the
unequal
few"
would have disappeared had he "fully embraced one principle or
the other." "This Churchill would not do, probably because he thought that
neither in itself reflected the full tmth about human nature"(p. 107). The lim
itations of imperial mle reflect the contradictions of politics itself, limitations
and contradictions suggesting that political life is not the human life, at least
not simply or comprehensively. For Churchill this tmth led to an appreciation
of the powers of observation and memory called for by painting. He also
"noted a certain similarity between a philosopher and the uncivilized" man (p.
37), both of whom enjoy their leisure and want few things. He called the
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uncivilized man an "unconscious philosopher"(p. 37). Philosophers might well
be grateful to Churchill and in their own way return his admiration. In opposing
tyranny masquerading as final knowledge about the human things, Churchill
protected philosophy from lapsing into a state of unconsciousness, perhaps
even from a death that would have killed the soul instead of liberating it from
the body. And there may be more. Professor Harry V. Jaffa, who contributes
an illuminating Foreword to this volume, has spoken of the way the example of
Churchill's statesmanship could inspirit a philosopher's soul in dark times,
leading him to reconsider the classical philosophers who distinguish political
from philosophic life without segregating them. Professor
Emmert'
s thoughtful
scholarship, so profoundly at odds with current academic passions and preju
dices, brings Churchill's example to view, not vividly and partially as his own
writings did, but wholly or essentially, delivered from the partisan distortions
of his time and ours.

C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato's Apology of Soc
rates (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989), xv + 207 pp., $29.50, $12.95
paper.
Patrick Coby
Smith College
Reeve states in his Introduction that the Apology is a place where charac
teristic paradoxes about the person of Socrates can be profitably explored. He
considers six such paradoxes: (1) Socrates as an elenctic philosopher and the
problem of using refutation to convince someone to care for his soul; (2) Soc
rates'
claim to ignorance coupled with affirmations of things known; (3) the
dependence of virtue on knowledge and the puzzle of an ignorant and yet vir
tuous Socrates; (4) Socrates' denial that he is a teacher contrasted with the
judgment of history that he is the paradigmatic teacher; (5) Socrates' anti
democratic politics and his personal interest in conversing with members of the
demos; and (6) the compatibility of
Socrates' famed irony with his gadfly's
mission to improve the souls of others and the imperative of mounting a sensi
ble defense.
Also in the Introduction Reeve supplies quick solutions to each of the di
lemmas noted: (1) The Socratic elenchus results in psychic caring by disabusing
people of the conceit of knowledge; it is service to the god Apollo who wants
human beings to recognize their limitations. (2) Socrates has many superior
opinions informed by elenctic examination, but he lacks
"craft-knowledge"
of
virtue and of politics. (3) Socrates does not claim that he is virtuous, only that
he is never voluntarily vicious. (4) Socrates does not teach in the sense of
imparting knowledge to students; rather, midwife-fashion, he extracts ideas al
ready present. (5) The examination of one's opinions is the essence of a life
well led; since everyone should examine himself, everyone is equal, and Soc
rates, by promoting the examined life, is a democrat. (6) Socrates is not ironic
because his disclaimers are all tme and his defense is strategically sound.
Some of Reeve's solutions are scholarly commonplaces (e.g., the explana
tion of Socratic teaching); some are not (e.g., the discovery that Socrates is
democratic). The final product is a thesis partially supported by the scholarship
and partially peculiar to its author: namely, that Socrates says what he means
and means what he says, that he is sincerely interested in demonstrating his
innocence of the legal charges, and that he is a pious follower of Apollo (albeit
an elenctic philosopher) and acts in a manner consistent with his religious duty.
The key then to Reeve's interpretation is the belief that Socrates is a literalist
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and not an ironist and that his actions, both at the trial and before, are directed
by a god.
In my judgment Reeve is unable to establish any of these points. He begins
with the proem, reading it so as to show that Socrates is not ironic and that he
is not out to condemn himself. The fact that Socrates denies having knowledge
of forensic rhetoric, says Reeve citing Hackforth, means only that he has never
before used it, not that he has never before heard it (p. 6). Reeve notes that
Socrates admits to having heard the rhetoric many times before (35a4-7); he
even accepts the judgment that Socrates is using the rhetoric now (pp. 7-8).
Maybe so. But then Socrates is not the foreigner he claims to be when asking
the jury to make allowances for his ignorance (17d2-18a2). For Socrates to say
that he is a foreigner when he is not, and for him to say it to an audience
alerted to his cleverness, is irony in the first case and sabotage in the second.
Reeve argues, rightly I believe, that
Socrates' "foreign dialect" refers to the
elenchus (cross-examination) and not to the street talk of the vulgar populace.
Socrates knows that the elenchus is part of the cause of the prejudice against
him (20c-24a), and he mentions in the proem that the use of it will quite likely
provoke the jury (17c7-dl). Why then does he employ cross-examination
against Meletus, unless it be that he does not purpose an acquittal? Moreover,
Socrates boasts that he will prove his accusers wrong in calling him a clever
speaker (17bl-3). Now the measure of clever speech before a jury in a capital
trial is not that posterity judge it a masterpiece of rhetoric, as Reeve seems to
think (p. 5), but that it succeed in winning an acquittal. Thus the one sure way
that Socrates can make good his boast, prove himself unclever and his accusers
liars, is not to win an acquittal "by what [he] do[es]" (ergoi; 17b2).
Reeve charges Socrates with failure to reflect upon the possibility that "the
elenchus might be a technique capable of making the weaker argument the
stronger"(p. 165). It is "the unexamined part of his so thoroughly examined
life,"
complains Reeve. But Reeve is mistaken about this. Early in his defense
speech Socrates strays from the official indictment to charge himself with three
offenses: natural science, or "investigating the things under the earth and the
heavenly things"; sophistic rhetoric, or "making the weaker speech the
stronger"; and "teaching others these same things" (19b5-cl). Because Soc
rates responds to only two of the three charges (the first and the third), Reeve
supposes that there are only two charges, or that the first and the second
charges are regarded by Socrates as one as the combined subject matter of his
putative teaching which he denies even knowing. In point of fact (and as noted
by others), Socrates' disclaimer applies only to natural science. He offers no
defense against the second charge of sophistic rhetoric. By leaving unanswered
a charge which he alone brings up, Socrates, it seems fair to say, is being
ironic. He resorts to irony because he knows full well that in cross-examining
others he is sometimes guilty of making the weaker speech the stronger. In
deed, when he cross-examines Meletus, he gives the jury a threefold demon-
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stration of how it is done. To take just one example,
Socrates' "proof that he
believes in gods and is not an atheist is that he believes in daimons, the chil
dren of gods; since there cannot be children without parents, there cannot be
daimons without gods so the argument goes. But then Socrates likens a dai
mon to a mule, perhaps the only animal whose parents (a horse and an ass) are
not inferable from the offspring (although the Greek word for
"mule"
means
"half-ass"). Reeve, of course, disputes that there is anything amiss in
Socrates'
interrogation of Meletus. Having opted for the literalist interpretation, he is
obliged not only to impute obtuseness to Socrates (his belief that the elenchus is
morally unproblematic), but to find sense in nonsense.
On the question of Socrates' piety, Reeve must wrestle with the fact that
Socrates sets out to "refute" the oracle. Reeve's answer is at first convincing,
that Socrates, by questioning those reputed wise, intends only to determine the
oracle's meaning, not to refute it as such. But Reeve quotes Herodotus about
Croesus to the effect that when a person is presented with an enigmatic predic
tion, the proper course is to inquire a second time. Socrates makes no second
inquiry. After a long period of thought and with great reluctance (21b7-9) as
if his original belief in divine veracity is losing its hold he undertakes to
prove the oracle wrong. And when he imagines himself confronting the oracle
with the results of his investigation, he is described not as a suppliant seeking
clarification, as Reeve contends (p. 23), but as an antagonist accusing the god
of error (21cl-2).
A far more important point, however, is the claim that Socrates is a servant
of Apollo. Socrates of course says that he is, at least that he serves the god; but
for one simple reason he cannot be taken at his word again, irony must be
granted him. Socrates interprets the oracle to mean that that man is wisest who
like himself understands that he is "worth nothing with respect to
wisdom"
(23b3-4). Reeve offers some pertinent remarks about Apollo, who as the god
of limitation would quite appropriately deliver this deflationary, antihubristic
message. But Reeve fails to notice that Socrates attributes to the god the pre
ceding judgment that "human wisdom is worth little or
nothing"(23a7). It is
human wisdom which Socrates claims to possess (20d8-9). He has acquired it
by leading an examined life (he has thus made the oracle tme). He asserts that
an examined life is the only life worth living (38a5-6). He may agree with the
god that human beings are "worth nothing with respect to
wisdom"
and that
intellectual moderation becomes them. He does not agree, however, that the
pursuit of wisdom called human wisdom, the examined life, or philosophy
is also worth nothing. If Socrates was ever a disciple of Apollo, his life as a
philosopher has caused him to sever the tie.
It cannot be said that Reeve is unaware of alterations in
Socrates'
service to
the god, for he devotes a later chapter to the rational foundations of
Socrates'
chosen life: "On the one hand, Socrates has a religious reason to live the exam
ined life: the god has ordered him to do it (29b6-7). On the other hand, he has
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a pmdential reason to live the examined life: it is the best life for a human
being, and a person must do what he thinks best, even at the risk of death
(28d6-10)" (p. 71). Reeve concludes that both reasons "explain why Socrates
leads the examined life. But only his religious reason explains why he is an
Apollonianmissionary"(p. 72) meaning that Socrates exhorts his fellow citi
zens to care for their souls by examining their opinions about virtue. The as
sumption is that Apollo wants human beings to become philosophical. But the
opposite is closer to the tmth. Socrates conjectures that the god ordered him "to
live philosophizing and examining [him]self and
others"(28e5-6), just as Ath
enian generals stationed him at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium. Philosophi
cal conversation is a life-threatening duty, the purpose of which is to overcome
one's fear of death by recognizing that one does not know death to be a fearful
thing. Admittedly, there is here some endorsement of human wisdom on the
part of the god. But the emphasis is upon death-defying deeds as evidence of
self-knowledge. Full compliance would require that Socrates go public with his
"teaching,"
that he use political office as a means of courting his destmction.
But when such a possibility is raised (hypothetically), Socrates brings forth his
daimon and reports that it warns him to be cautious and private in order better
to preserve himself (31c-32a). The daimon contradicts and overrules the god
who is somewhat careless of Socrates and who seems to have little interest in
philosophy as a process or a progression toward wisdom. Philosophy, rather, is
skeptical humility with fearless obedience to one's superiors as its main result.
As the god of limitation (Reeve's point), Apollo defends the divine against
intmsions by the human. Apollo, it seems almost tme to say, is against philoso
phy and means to waste Socrates, whereas the daimon provides the pmdent
self-regard needed for philosophy and is
Socrates'
protector.
Unless one has been persuaded by Reeve that Socrates speaks only the literal
tmth, that he aims for an acquittal, and that he is a devotee of Apollo, it is
difficult to feel that Reeve's fascinating argumentation is ever entirely on the
mark. Some readers, no doubt, will be persuaded, for the book is intelligent,
scholarly, and well written. And those who are may also find helpful Reeve's
technique of extracting a proposition from each section of the Apology for com
parison with similar propositions in other dialogues. A case in point is Soc
rates'
contention that "it is virtue that makes wealth . . . good for a man"
(usually translated as "Not from money does virtue come, but from virtue
comes
money"
[30b2-4]) a statement which is the occasion for a twenty-page
excursus on knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Because Reeve gives so much
space to matters outside the Apology, much of the dialogue's detail and rich
ness go unremarked. This, too, is regrettable.
Catherine H. Zuckert, Natural Right and the American Imagination: Political
Philosophy in Novel Form (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc. 1990). xi + 271 pp.; $40.75.
Diana Schaub
University ofMichigan Dearborn
In that portion of Democracy in America concerned with the influence of
equality on the action and productions of the mind, Alexis de Tocqueville spec
ulates on the connection between politics and poetry:
Among a democratic people poetry will not be fed with legends or the
memorials of old traditions. The poet will not attempt to people the universe with
supernatural beings, in whom his readers and his own fancy have ceased to believe;
nor will he coldly personify virtues and vices, which are better received under their
own features. All these resources fail him; but Man remains, and the poet needs no
more. The destinies of mankind, man himself taken aloof from his country and his
age and standing in the presence of Nature and of God, with his passions, his
doubts, his rare prosperities and inconceivable wretchedness, will become the chief,
if not the sole, theme of poetry among these nations.
Writing at a time when, according to him, "the inhabitants of the United States
have, . . . properly speaking, no
literature," Alexis de Tocqueville nonetheless
ventured to predict the character ofAmerica's literary future. Catherine Zuckert
is also interested in the peculiar genius of American authors a genius no
longer merely prospective. Although she does not mention Tocqueville's as
sessment, her book, Natural Right and the American Imagination, might be
read as an elaboration, and at the same time a refinement and correction, of his
hypothesis.
Zuckert's exploration of the links between our political constitution and our
literature proceeds by a chain reading of six American novelists (Cooper,
Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, Hemingway, and Faulkner) whose works employ
a common format: the hero who withdraws from society to live in nature. From
the frontiersman Natty Bumppo to his latter-day descendants, Nick Adams and
Isaac McCaslin, from the seagoing Ishmael to the mnaway Mississippi rafter
Huck Finn, from the rebel and outcast Hester Prynne to the Blithedale Utopians,
they all, in one form or another, "light out for the
Territory." Zuckert argues
that this "characteristically American motif . . . parallels and recasts the move
ment of thought in the 'classic' statement of American political principles in the
Declaration of Independence." The dissolution of social and political bonds, the
appeal to the laws of nature and nature's God, followed (if possible) by the
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reconstitution of government on a more just basis are chief ingredients of both
the Declaration and these classic American novels. Tocqueville may have been
prescient when he identified the theme of man "standing in the presence of
Nature and of God," without a country; but in keeping with his general down
playing of the theoretical and practical significance of the Founding, he did not
connect this stance with the state-of-nature reasoning at the origin of the Ameri
can regime.
Whereas Tocqueville strongly suggests that it is politics which guides art,
according to Zuckert the American writer's engagement with the nation's
founding principles has not been determined or subordinate, but creative and
critical. The imaginative re-presentation of the founding argument has been
deliberately undertaken by novelists from Cooper onward, as a sort of exercise
in democratic myth-making. Far from being apologetic in intention, their myth-
making often exposes the ambiguities and deficiencies of the original Lockean
formulation of the doctrine of natural rights. As presented by Zuckert, the
Leatherstocking tales of James Fenimore Cooper, for instance, embody a
"Rousseauian"
correction of Locke, forwarding a moral rather than an eco
nomic understanding of the American regime, grounding human community in
compassion as well as calculation. Although Cooper's reputation has been in
eclipse for some time, Zuckert stresses his importance. By means of his drama
tization of natural goodness in the figure of Natty Bumppo, Cooper "initiated a
literary debate of sorts not only about the character of the human psyche and its
political implications, but also about the basis and wisdom of the whole notion
of returning to
nature."
Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, Hemingway, and Faulk
ner are all shown to ring changes on this theme.
Zuckert places Melville and Hemingway closest to Cooper, for despite great
differences among them, all three believed that "the most important function of
the literary artist is to provide a fictional illustration of the essential and rational
goodness of human life." Cooper, of course, does this most emphatically and
unproblematically. Moreover, while Natty Bumppo's natural justice and natural
theology cannot be transposed directly to social life, any more than Natty him
self can, they do have civic equivalents. Natty 's moral sentiments provide a
natural standard capable of informing political life. Solitary communion with
nature is likewise at the heart of Hemingway's fiction; there, however, it offers
no such possibility of social redemption. What Nick Adams experiences in
"Big Two-hearted River" is not religious wonder, but the pure sentiment of
existence, a momentary and fleeting passion, good in itself, albeit devoid of
specifically human content. Cooper and Hemingway's common desideratum
"To live according to
nature"is susceptible of radically different constructions.
Nonetheless, both authors show a certain unity of humanity and nature. Mel
ville, by contrast, grounds "the value, beauty, and dignity of humanity" in its
solidarity in the face of an indifferent nature. Even at the extreme, or perhaps
especially at the extreme, men recognize the goodness of life. Ishmael goes to
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sea to find a reason for both himself and his fellows to live. Despite their
different assessments of the friendliness of the cosmos to human endeavor,
Cooper, Melville, and Hemingway each finds the encounter to be beneficial,
whether it be productive of natural and political right, or individual happiness,
or human understanding and camaraderie.
Hawthorne, Twain, and Faulkner form something of a dissenting tradition,
believing that "such idealized depictions of human life in the state of nature
have dangerous political effects."In their novels, the
protagonists'
attempts to
return to nature are misguided, sometimes comically, sometimes tragically so.
There is no real freedom to be found in the flight from convention. Whatever
lessons the protagonists take (or fail to take) from their misadventures, the
reader is likely to come away chastened, reconciled afresh to family, law, and
tradition. That is not to say, however, that the stance of these authors toward
the American regime is simply defensive. The critical thrust of their work re
sides in their reinterpretations of the old staples of sexual morality, the mle of
law, and the bearing of history (respectively the specialties of Hawthorne,
Twain, and Faulkner). Hawthorne's anti-utopianism manifests itself in his cri
tiques of both Puritanism (The Scarlet Letter) and Fourierist communism (The
Blithedale Romance). In their antithetical ways, Puritans and Blithedalers abso
lutize community and undervalue (whether blithely or deliberately) the impor
tance of passion, particularly sexual passion. As the source of the human desire
to live together, as well as a source of division and quarrel, passion must be
accorded some scope, but also some regularity. Hawthorne, accordingly, en
dorses the liberal solution: the establishment of a private realm (constituted by
family and property) and a public realm that respects that privacy. However, he
assigns a new primacy and extension to the affectional aspect of the liberal
solution, such that the social contract itself is understood more on the order of a
marriage contract than a business contract. It becomes an enduring commitment
that reaches beyond mutual profit to encompass the participants'need for sym
pathy and support.
Twain and Faulkner, like Hawthorne, seek to dampen the ingrained Ameri
can fondness for starting over. Yielding to the call to "come-out from corrupt
institutions" (as the nineteenth-century abolitionists put it) is not seen by them
as the best route to the abolition or reform of those institutions. After all, in
Huckleberry Finn it is not flight that secures Jim's freedom (downriver being
the last place for a mnaway slave), but the allied action of religion and law
(Miss Watson's conscience as expressed in her will). Similarly, in Go Down,
Moses Faulkner expresses reservations about the wisdom of Isaac McCaslin's
renunciation of his tainted patrimony, an act which forfeits the possibility of
effective public action on the race question for the private satisfaction of moral
purity. Of the novelists discussed by Zuckert, Twain and Faulkner deal most
directly with the theme ofAmerican slavery. It may be part of why they discern
in the longing to return to nature a dangerous inability to leam the tmth about
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oneself and others. Historic injustice renders the innocence of natural equality
an unattainable illusion. Civic equality is the product of stmggle, the stmggle
of black and white alike to attain full humanity, to accept, understand, and
transform the bitter legacy of mastery and slavery.
Through their consideration of the respective meaning and choiceworthiness
of natural liberty and civil liberty, this select group of American novelists con
stitutes a microcosm of modernity. With the triumvirate of Cooper, Melville,
and Hemingway on one side and the countertradition of Hawthorne, Twain,
and Faulkner on the other, they reproduce, Zuckert argues, the two major
strands within Rousseau's own thought (as represented by the Second Dis
course and On the Social Contract). They also anticipate and, more impor
tantly, offer responses to certain developments in modem philosophy, including
the most potent: historicism and nihilism.
As the subtitle has it, this is Political Philosophy in Novel Form. Of course,
it was the philosophers themselves who first experimented with the novel as a
more popular and democratic conveyance for their political teachings. In the
Persian Letters, Montesquieu has one of his characters defend storytelling as
against "abstract reasoning"and "subtle philosophy"on the grounds that "there
are certain tmths with respect to which persuasion is not sufficient; they must
be felt as well."Rousseau, in La Nouvelle Heloise, was to follow Montes
quieu's literary lead. Zuckert, however, suggests that the natural-bom novelists
may be better than their irrepressibly intellectual predecessors at appealing to
the passions of readers. Cooper for instance, even though he is the most visibly
didactic, and therefore arguably the least novelistically accomplished, of the
American writers, is more accessible than Rousseau.
These fictional explorations of the central issue of political philosophy
nature versus convention qualify not only as a new and peculiarly democratic
genre of political thought, but as political deeds. Stated most boldly, as Zuckert
does not shy from doing, they are "attempts to re-found the American polity on
a tmer, more adequate view of nature including preeminently human
nature."
Although ultimately dubious about the extent of their influence on the self-
understanding of Americans, Zuckert demonstrates that these novels provide,
for those who are interested, reflections otherwise lacking on the idea-poor
American scene. American political discourse proper manifests a remarkable
degree of theoretical consensus about the origin, extent, and end of civil gov
ernment. Not surprisingly, our most sterling instances of political thought, the
Federalist Papers and the Lincoln-Douglas debates appearing in the lowly
guises of journalism and electioneering belong to periods in which consensus
on fundamental questions was still at issue, namely, during the fight for rat
ification of the Constitution and the fight over the future of slavery. Absent for
the most part from the nation's political life, the serious questioning and refor
mulation of our principles took place instead in the realm of make believe.
The most likely objection to Zuckert's enterprise that her reading is too
schematic, that she has simply laid a philosophic template over the course of
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American literature is, I believe, unwarranted. The vindication of her ap
proach lies in the richness of her individual readings. Each novel is interpreted
very much on its own terms. There is no mthless and distorting imposition of
philosophic language and concepts. One senses that the idea for such a thematic
study grew out of long and faithful acquaintance with the different novels; the
framework was not prefabricated, but built from the ground up. Despite the
array of heady references (Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Burke, Heidegger,
Bergson, and especially Rousseau), Zuckert does not treat these novels simply
as dramatic simulacmms of some philosophic treatise; she avoids the tendency
of those steeped in political philosophy to denigrate the uniqueness of the
poet's handling of his materials. Zuckert regards these works not as adapta
tions, but as originals.
In perhaps the most fascinating of her readings, Zuckert holds out the possi
bility that in Go Down, Moses and its sequel, Intruder in the Dust, Faulkner
achieves a philosophically adequate reconciliation of nature and history (via a
Bergsonian theory of time), and in doing so provides an American answer to
the crisis of natural right provoked by Continental, and especially German,
historicism, from Hegel to Heidegger. Buried in the footnotes is a quiet but
effective reproof to Allan Bloom, who "has made much of this 'German con
nection'in The Closing of the AmericanMind;
but,"
she remarks, "he does not
seem to have noticed the American literary response."Bloom's book shows
how an idea defeated on the battlefield can rise phoenixlike in the heart of the
conquerors. According to Bloom, it is a Nietzscheanized leftism "Nietzsche
without the
abyss"
that threatens the university, philosophy, and America.
Bloom perhaps undervalues the healthiness of the American ability to render
profoundly pernicious doctrines shallow. But, as Zuckert establishes, America
has far more admirable self-preservative resources than its philistinism. In the
productions of its literary artists, America can match philosophic depth with
depth. In Moby Dick, that "metaphysical
masterpiece,"
we are witness to both
the mindlessness of Pip as he plunges into the abyss and the inhuman single-
mindedness of Ahab as he confronts and seeks to conquer the abyss. But
Melville also portrays an alternative outcome: Ishmael, fortified by his "genial
desperadophilosophy"and perched on Queequeg's friendly coffin, has found
both a metaphysical and a real source of buoyancy amidst flux and indif
ference. While the source of the buoyancy that these American novelists offer
is variously located (in religion, family, friendship, law, nature itself), all seek
to render human life more livable, individually and (with the exception of
Hemingway) collectively.
Should the textual explications not convince one of the "fundamentally
philosophic character and the political function of classic American
literature,"
Zuckert's readings are buttressed by exterior evidence. Cooper and Faulkner,
for instance, explicitly acknowledged the novelist's role as public teacher
Cooper describing himself as "an American who wished to illustrate and en
force the peculiar principles of his own country by the agency of polite litera-
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hire." Zuckert looks at both The American Democrat, a political treatise written
by Cooper during a hiatus from fiction when he thought his message was being
misunderstood, and speeches given by Faulkner during his stint as a cultural
ambassador. She also documents briefly the six American
novelists'
familiarity
with philosophic writings. More important than this evidence of a European
tutelage, however, is the evidence of an intra-American dialogue. It is Zuck
ert's reconstruction of that dialogue which allows her to move so gracefully
from one author to the next. Disagreements existed not only over the character
of human and cosmic nature, but over the best way to embody and express that
character in a novel directed to a democratic audience. In tracing the rhetorical
development from Cooper to Faulkner, Zuckert adds another richly colored
strand of interpretation to the weave of her book. Hawthorne and his psycho
logical romances are introduced in contradistinction to Cooper's forthright mor
alizing. In "Fenimore Cooper's Literary
Offenses," Twain even more emphat
ically rejected Cooper's approach; in Huckleberry Finn, he crafted a comic
alternative. Zuckert claims that Twain's ironic presentation of Huck and Jim's
adventures downriver displaced the Leatherstocking saga as "the depiction of a
return to the state of
nature"
and "marked a new beginning in American litera
ture."
By their own testimony, both Hemingway and Faulkner are Twain's
descendants though of course they make very different use of their patri
mony.
All told, Zuckert makes a compelling case that the canon of American fic
tion has a specific philosophic bearing. English novels of the same period are
heavy with convention. Austen, Eliot, Dickens, Thackeray, and Trollope may
also inquire into the proper articulation of political order, but they do so with
out stripping the patina of convention. They are not foundational in the same
sense. We don't get our novels of manners until James and Wharton. As Zuck
ert demonstrates, the prevalence of the retum-to-nature motif is in no sense a
function of American backwardness. America did indeed possess a wild and
magnificent natural frontier; but more importantly America had open before it a
pristine political and philosophic frontier as well. As Alexander Hamilton put it
in the first Federalist:
[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on
accident and force.
Novel meditations on the philosophic basis of the American polity form a part
of that ongoing experiment in self-government. Through her investigation of
the peculiar genius of the American writer, Catherine Zuckert has given an
account, both sound and original, of the Founding's meaning for literature and,
in turn, literature's meaning for the Founding.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics. Fourth Edition (En
larged). Translated by Richard Taft. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990). 224 pp.; $35.00.
Frank Schalow
Loyola University, New Orleans
More than fifty years after its publication, Kant and the Problem ofMeta
physics continues to be one of Heidegger's most important and extraordinary
works. Richard Taft's welcome new translation, which is adopted from the
expanded fourth German edition, brings forth even further the unmistakable
vitality of Heidegger's classic albeit controversial exchange with Kant's tran
scendental philosophy.
There is little doubt that Heidegger's innovative dialogue with transcenden
tal philosophy, as first translated by James C. Churchill in 1962, has dramati
cally changed the English-speaking audience's view of Kant. Indeed, the im
pact for American scholarship may be even greater than Heidegger's
contribution in rediscovering Nietzsche. Yet in the almost thirty years that have
elapsed until the appearance of the second translation of the "Kant book," we
stand on the threshold of a corresponding shift in how to interpret the entirety
of Heidegger's thought. Traditionally, he has been viewed as one of the most
esoteric thinkers because of his preoccupation with the perennial question of
Being, the stalwart of a "meditative thinking" which seems rather distant from
some of the more politically involved concerns of human existence.
Recently, the opportunity has arisen to address Heidegger's meditative
thought in terms of its possible interfacement with explicitly ethical concerns
and pathways of political engagement. In spirit, this revolutionary move bears a
distinct affinity with Heidegger's attempt in the Kant book to expand the
breadth of Kant's celebrated Copernican revolution (pp. 8-12). The continual
effort to think the unthought and to bring what is
"unsaid" into speech defines
the trademark of Heidegger's appropriation of the entire Western tradition, a
task which the Kant book exemplifies (p. 138). Correlatively, the challenge to
us today lies in redirecting Heidegger's own hermeneutical strategy back upon
itself to see what marginal aspects of his own inquiry into Being can be brought
to the fore. The development of this way of reinterpreting Heidegger receives
much of its impetus from, but is certainly not reducible to, the continued reve
lation of the autobiographical fact of his adherence to National Socialism. But
even more significantly, the dawn of a new reading ofHeidegger's fundamental
ontology arises from a positive appreciation of his affinity with Greek political
thought, particularly with Aristotle's notion of phronesis. Of equal importance
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is the deliberate effort to discover the germ for an ethic in the vast reservoir of
his ontological meditations, despite his remarks to the contrary in the now
famous "Letter on Humanism" (1944). In what way does Heidegger's radical
reinterpretation or
"retrieval"
(Wiederholung) of Kant, to which this new trans
lation unequivocally directs our attention, bespeak the revolutionary move to
ward appreciating anew the inclusion of ethics and politics within meditative
thinking?
Before addressing this question, it is important to place Heidegger's task in
the Kant book in its proper context. In terms of pages, Heidegger devotes
almost the whole of that study to a radical re-examination of Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason. From the start, Heidegger emphasizes that his basic intent is to
recast the first Critique as a preliminary inquiry into the understanding ofBeing
constitutive of human nature, as a "laying of the ground for metaphysics"(pp.
9-12), in contrast to a "theory of
knowledge,"
which has been the primary
focus for neo-Kantians (p. 172). Thus, Heidegger shifts his own study of tran
scendental philosophy from the direction of the task undertaken in Being and
Time and develops the issue of finitude or temporal transcendence as the central
consideration to be recovered through Kant's effort to delimit human reason.
Kant's Copernican revolution thereby becomes less an attempt to establish the
possibility of an object according to antecedent conditions of knowledge and
more a recognition that any comportment toward things hinges upon a prelimi
nary understanding of Being. Heidegger's interweaving of his own task with
Kant's forms the heart of the controversy whereby he displaces the priority of
reason in both its theoretical and practical guises in favor of the synthetic power
of the imagination (Einbildungskraft). "This [root] is indicated by the fact that
pure sensibility and pure understanding lead back to the power of imagina
tion not only thus, but to theoretical and practical reason in their separateness
and their
unity"(p. 171). When transposed within the context of Being and
Time, the power of imagination becomes the corollary to the
"openness"
of
concern (Sorge) through which the manifestness of beings (including human
existence), and hence the possibility of understanding Being, first arise. In this
way, Heidegger brings forth his own version of human existence as "Dasein"
in its radical finitude as oriented toward futurity and death as the preliminary
theme of investigation on which the broader project of ontology rests.
As Heidegger observes in the preface to the second edition (1950) of the
Kant book, critics have often questioned the "violence" of his interpretation in
emphasizing the priority of imagination over reason. Yet the real focus of con
troversy hinges on the implications that this approach has for reinterpreting the
Critique ofPractical Reason, to which he devotes only three pages in his entire
study.' In the second Critique Kant seemingly roots moral reason in the domain
of freedom divorced from sensibility, experience, and temporality, in a manner
completely contrary to Heidegger's inquiry into Dasein's finitude. It was Ernst
Cassirer who called attention to this paradox, first in a famous discussion with
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Heidegger at Davos Academy (1929), which provided the spark for the Kant
book, and subsequently in his review of that work in 1930. The new translation
of the Kant book, which includes the Davos Disputation as an appendix, ac
cents Heidegger's exchange with Cassirer as the point of clarification for his
novel reading of transcendental philosophy. But what is only now coming to
the surface with Heidegger's preparation of the fourth edition in 1973 (three
years before his death) is how pivotal the unraveling of the above paradox
becomes to providing a fuller appreciation of the scope of his own reinterpreta
tion of Kant.2
Thus, the issuance of the new translation of the Kant book becomes a call to
take up a forgotten thread in Heidegger's critical exchange with transcendental
philosophy; we discover the opportunity to show how the finitude of moral
praxis leads to a deeper concern for the underpinnings of all ethical and politi
cal involvement. As Heidegger stated in his dialogue with Cassirer at Davos:
I believe that we proceed mistakenly in the interpretation of Kantian ethics if we
first orient ourselves to that to which ethical action conforms and if we see too
little of the inner function of the law itself for Dasein. We cannot discuss the
problem of the finitude of the ethical creature if we do not pose the question: what
does law mean here, and how is the lawfulness itself constitutive for Dasein and
for the personality? (P. 175)
Taking his cue from a retrieval of Kantian ethics, Heidegger maintains that all
moral comportment begins from a fulcmm of finite transcendence whereby an
individual's concern shifts away from the narrowness of immediate interest to
include his or her commonality with the other. According to Heidegger, the
perennially Kantian doctrine of respect for persons and of treating human be
ings as ends in themselves rather than as mere means becomes possible through
the very finitude which enables me to discover the limited scope of my own
possibilities. Through the disclosure of my own being as care, I experience the
corresponding affinity between the welfare of other human beings and myself.
When seen in this light, praxis is never simply an isolated event; instead it
arises with the self's response to the challenge of addressing its own nature and
relocating its place (along with an expanded sense of the good) within the
broader social community.3 The prospective projection of Heidegger's funda
mental ontology upon the hidden premises of Kantian ethics points to a way of
rescuing the Enlightenment political view of the human being as a "citizen of
the
world"(weltburgerlicher). This creative retrieval of Kantian ethics may
very well hold the key which points beyond the impasse of the regrettable
linkage of Heidegger's thought with his affirmation of National Socialism in
the 1930's.4
For Heidegger, the laying of the ground for metaphysics expands into the
concrete arena of praxis. This is an insight which one of his foremost students,
Hannah Arendt, pioneered in The Human Condition in suggesting that the finite
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capacity for
"world-making"
allows human beings to take up concerns that are
not merely reactive or instrumentally motivated, e.g., the administration of the
good in an encompassing rather than in a fixated, self-serving way. Within this
more contemporary context, the power of imagination becomes a vehicle of
ethical and political judgment (Urteilskraft) which discriminates various alter
natives for action in pursuit of the good. Arising on the furthest frontier of
moral and political philosophy, this development may very well provide the
authentic measure for the validity of Heidegger's retrieval of Kant.
The new translation ofKant and the Problem ofMetaphysics fluent, while
painstakingly faithful to the original German will ultimately prove indispens
able for anyone interested in Heidegger's thought as well as in current trends in
hermeneutics, ethics, and political philosophy. The publication of this impor
tant volume of Heidegger's collected works includes insightful and valuable
annotation and scholarship which will benefit even the more erudite of readers.
Yet even beyond this scholarship the patient reader will rediscover the animat
ing spirit ofmuch ofHeidegger's thought, which rarely occurs so powerfully as
in his venturesome attempt to probe the depths ofKant's transcendental philos
ophy.
NOTES
1. Heidegger takes up the issues of freedom and practical reason in a much more detailed
fashion a year later in his 1930 Freiburg lectures, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesam
tausgabe 31 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982). Also see Heidegger's earlier lec
tures from 1927-28, Phdnomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ges
amtausgabe 25 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977).
2. Cf. my article "Toward a Concrete Ontology of Practical Reason in Light of Heidegger's
Lectures on Human Freedom," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 17, No. 2 (May
1986), 155-65.
3. Cf. Charles M. Sherover, Time, Freedom, and the Common Good: An Essay in Public
Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989). Also see my exploration of his
thesis, "Imagining the Good: Politics in Transition," Research in Phenomenology, 20 (1990), 188
94.
4. Cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Poli
tics, Art (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
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